Egypt: revolution stymied

S P SETH

With the former Egyptian dictator Hosni Mubarak dying (reported clinically dead at one point), his systemic legacy looks like continuing. Nothing much has changed so far except that the generals, appointed by Mubarak, now rule the country. The generals’ grab for power for, what might be, an indefinite period is likely to plunge Egypt into further uncertainty. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has dissolved the recently elected parliament and arrogated to itself the task of the final approval of the constitution as and when it is drafted at their behest. They were happy to be rid of Mubarak when he became the symbol of all that was wrong with the country. In the process they (the military) became the darlings of the people with the slogan that the army and the people were one. In giving Mubarak a nudge into oblivion, they managed to save the system with their berths intact as the country’s rulers.

But it was not as simple as that as the military council was soon to find out. When the military council’s first attempts to formalize their role as the country’s arbiters brought out protesters once again into Tahrir Square, they made a tactical retreat by allowing the holding of parliamentary elections; resulting in the overwhelming victory of the Islamist parties with Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis garnering about 70 per cent of the seats.

The presidential contest that followed apparently gave Mohamed Morsi, the Brotherhood’s candidate of the Freedom and Justice Party, a narrow victory.  Ahmed Shafiq, a former air force chief and Mubarak’s last premier, did quite well at 48 per cent to about 52 per cent of Morsi, reflecting sharp polarization with a large section of the people going for the old order. Fearing that the military council might play politics with the election results by declaring Shafiq as President-elect, the Freedom and Justice Party made a pre-emptive announcement of having won the election. Whether or not Morsi is declared the official winner and the first popularly elected President of the country, the army has in any case pre-empted him of any real powers by dissolving the parliament and taking over the executive, legislative and constitutional powers for an indefinite period. Morsi, as President, will be a titular head with the military council fielding real power.

What it means is that Egypt’s revolution has been stymied. And the country is likely to be plunged into a power struggle between the Muslim Brotherhood and the army; in some ways reminiscent of the confrontation between the two since the days of the then Colonel Nasser who, with the help of some of his fellow military officers, had overthrown the monarchy in the fifties. The Muslim Brotherhood, with its roots going back to 1928 when it was founded by Hassan al-Banna, has a track record of taking on the powers that be, first in an anti-colonial role and subsequently against the military rule of Colonel Nasser and his successors, Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak. They were mercilessly persecuted, tortured and thrown into prison until Mubarak was satisfied that they were tame enough to be tolerated under strict internal security watch.

 When the Tunisian contagion--with its dictator Ben Ali fleeing to Saudi Arabia-- spread to Egypt and became the Arab Spring, the Brotherhood initially had difficulty believing that the anti-Mubarak upsurge was for real. They dithered before joining the Tahrir Square crowds. And at times, after Mubarak was overthrown, the Muslim Brotherhood seemed like becoming cozy with the military council to advance their political ambitions. Peter Hessler, in an article in the New Yorker, reveals this based on his conversations with Nader Omran, a spokesman for the Freedom and Justice Party, political wing of the Brotherhood. Omran told Hassler that the only problem was assuring the military council that it could make a “safe exit”. In other words, “They need to have some guarantees, but they have to first step down.” The Brotherhood felt close to gaining power on the basis of a deal with the generals.

And that is where the Brotherhood’s calculations have come unstuck, as the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces is not for retiring, with or without guarantees. The country seems set for the power struggle between the military and the Muslim Brotherhood, the latter projecting itself as the legitimately elected power centre further reinforced with the popular revolution that brought down Mubarak. But with the Ahmed Shafiq side claiming victory too, the picture is becoming murky giving the army enough scope to manipulate events to its advantage. The Muslim Brotherhood is mobilizing their supporters in Tahrir Square to continue the revolution that has been thwarted by the old system.

However, the Brotherhood made some important errors during the course of the revolution that has damaged its image of moderation and inclusiveness it sought to cultivate. For example, having promised not to field a candidate for presidential election, they went back on it, as power seemed within their reach. This has tended to polarize the Egyptian people as testified by the close presidential election results, admittedly unofficial but based on returns from polling booths. They even started to hobnob with the military council to achieve their political ambitions. Indeed, at times, they seemed keen to go out of their way to publicize their Islamic credentials. For instance, Morsi reportedly said at one point that, “ I swear before God …, regardless of what is written in the constitution, Sharia will be applied.”

There is nothing wrong with them proclaiming their Islamic credentials but it doesn’t gel with the spirit of the revolution that sought to build a broad church (to use an expression) where proponents of civil society, including women and minorities, played a lead role. The Brotherhood was a latecomer. The result is that the initial enthusiasm and fervour of the much-heralded Arab Spring might have waned; though the new crowds at Tahrir Square seem to reflect a sort of unity in diversity. But the Brotherhood, by their overweening political ambitions, managed to compromise the revolution. To take an example, the Coptics (the Egyptian Christians) who participated in the anti-Mubarak upsurge, are not too keen on the Brotherhood taking over the reins of power.  

Peter Hessler, in his New Yorker article, captures the essence of disillusionment with the Brothers. He writes, “Last fall, people often described them as honest and hardworking, but by the end of April, when the Presidential campaign officially began, it was hard to find anybody who openly supported Morsi. Comments were scathing; the Brothers were liars; they had made a mess of parliament; they cared only about their own interests…”

The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces will have quite a fight on their hands if Ahmed Shafiq is made President. But even with  Morsi as the winner, the country is likely to remain in a state of recurring strife as the elected President will have virtually no powers.

The question is: will the Brotherhood be able to forge a broad revolutionary church to carry on the revolution? That will remain to be seen because they haven’t been inclusive so far.

 Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times