Iraq’s never-ending woes

S P SETH

Much is expected from the battle for Mosul in Iraq. It is hoped that if Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, is liberated from IS, that will significantly curb a new kind of terrorist menace that it represents. Ever since IS dramatically captured some important Iraqi towns and declared a caliphate, it became the centre for foreign jihadis who flocked to fight under its flag. They did so for all sorts of reasons, such as social alienation, discrimination, and isolation and to restore lost Islamic pride and glory from perceived western humiliation of the Islamic world, most recently in Afghanistan and Iraq.

IS-proclaimed caliphate thus became the rallying point for many Muslim youth looking for adventure, for righting historical wrongs and to have a sense of power by creating fear through grotesque killings, particularly in western countries like France and Belgium. IS encouraged alienated and angry Muslim youth in western countries to serve the cause in whatever way, including by individual acts of violence in countries of their residence and/or targeting events where people congregated for sports, entertainment avenues and so on. If the battle for Mosul is won, it is likely that the pace and number of random and ‘lone wolf’ attacks will increase in the targeted western countries and elsewhere to keep up IS brand.

But here, it is important to point out that all through the Middle East cauldron where the US-led coalition have sought to enforce their writ, the military victory was the easy part, though it might not be as easy against IS in Mosul where they are dug in to fight to the finish, because many of them might not have anywhere else to go. And their defenses are multilayered from hidden explosives of all kinds like explosive-laden trucks, suicide bombers, blowing up oil installations to create mushroom clouds to interfere with US aerial bombing and whatever else might be feasible.

IS has known about the Iraqi counter-offensive for quite some time and they had enough time to work out their strategy to impede and frustrate the attack. But they are arrayed against forces with tremendous firepower backed by the US aerial bombardment. It would appear that IS might not be able to hold on for too long and would need to disperse into smaller and more mobile guerilla units, requiring the Iraqi coalition of regular Iraqi forces, Iranian-backed Shiite militia and Kurdish peshmerga fighters to be in a state of constant readiness. There will be enough mayhem caused by suicide bombing in towns like Baghdad, already hit hard by such explosions.

However, in some ways, the bigger challenge will come after IS has been pushed out of Mosul. And that challenge will be to hold together the fractious Iraqi coalition, as their interests do not converge apart from putting together a common front, as far as possible, against IS. For instance, Iraq’s Kurds already have an autonomous state, virtually independent of the federal government. And they would like it to become a reality. But Iraq’s Shia government as well as its Shia population are not inclined to see the country split.

The Iraqi government wants to limit the Kurdish peshmerga forces’ role in the liberation of Mosul to the outskirts of the city. Indeed, the Kurdistan Regional Government’s prime minister, Nechirvan Barzani, had said that the peshmerga would play a “central role” in the liberation of Mosul, which has a minority Kurdish population. Iraq’s Shiite government, on the other hand, would like peshmerga to withdraw from Mosul as soon as the battle would be over. The role of Shiite militias is also highly controversial, because of Iran’s involvement and backing. It is controversial regionally from Sunni governments, as well as within Iraq among its minority Sunni population.

Mosul is a majority Sunni city, and the record of Iraq’s Shiite government under its former prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, was atrocious for its treatment of the Sunnis generally. The compact the US had forged with Sunni tribal chiefs during 2006-7 against the al Qaeda insurgency in Iraq had helped to virtually eliminate the movement at the time. As part of a general understanding with the Iraqi Shia regime, these Sunni units were to become integral part of the regular Iraqi forces, which didn’t eventuate because the Baghdad regime was against it. Instead, they went out hunting for Sunnis and in the process tortured and killed a good number, thus destroying the nebulous compact that was designed to create a cohesive Iraq.

And it was out of this that IS emerged and managed in 2014 to capture some major Iraqi towns, like Mosul, creating the outline of an expanded caliphate. They seemed to have the passive support/submission of much of the Sunni population against the backdrop of the atrocities of its Shia government. As the Iraqi coalition forces have advanced towards Mosul, it is increasingly emerging that IS had outlived its welcome and the residents of the liberated villages are relieved that they might not have to live under IS rule.

There are, however, two problems here. First, will the advancing Shiite forces regard the civilian Sunni population with suspicion? Second, as they start the screening process, will it turn into a general witch-hunt, leading to torture and killings? Therefore, any military victory, unless it is followed up by a comprehensive policy of social and political inclusion, is likely to make things worse because of the fractious nature of the Iraqi coalition on the ground with their competing and contradictory agenda, apart from a shared enemy in IS.

As if the Sunni-Shia sectarianism, compounded by the Kurdish component, weren’t enough, Turkey is threatening to jump into the fray demanding a role in the military operations and final disposition of Iraq’s fate. It is demanding a determining role for three reasons. First, it seeks to become the protector of the Sunnis as well as the small Turkmen population of Mosul’s 1.5 million people. Turkey is also keen to be in the fray to neutralize and, possibly, contain Shia Iran’s perceived dominant influence over Baghdad.

However, Iraq is dead set against Ankara’s self-appointed role in the region. Its prime minister has even threatened war with Turkey if its troops and armour were heading in Mosul’s direction. The US has tried to justify a role for Ankara to pacify the situation but there is no resolution. In other words, we have a situation potentially where the emerging Iraq-Turkish confrontation is likely to make an already difficult situation a lot more volatile.

The second reason for Turkey is that it wants to be in the region to keep a lid on Kurdish ambitions overlapping with the separatist/insurgent PKK Kurdish movement in its southeastern region. In the wake of the failed military coup in Turkey, Erdogan government is going after Turkey’s legitimate predominantly Kurdish political party, HDP, which has 59 seats in the Turkish parliament. But these members have been deprived of their parliamentary immunity and are being rounded up for alleged links with PKK.

The third reason is that Turkey under Erdogan, especially after the failed military coup, appears keen to establish historical claim to the region from the Ottoman times when its far flung Middle Eastern territories were carved out under an Anglo-French agreement following WW1.

If one looks at the complex interplay of forces in Mosul, any hope about the future seems bleak, to put it mildly. 

Note: The article was first published in the daily Times.

Contact: sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au 

 

  

Will Saudi Arabia implode?

S P SETH

Saudi Arabia is a political volcano waiting to implode though, as with most volcanoes, it is difficult to put any time scale on it. Indeed, the Saudi monarchy is aware, at some level, of political combustion and has been, for a long time, preemptively trying to hose down the simmering fire. One such occasion was in 1979 when, seemingly inspired by the overthrow of the Iranian monarchy and the establishment of an Islamic republic in that country, Islamic militants occupied Mecca’s Grand Mosque and declared a new order under a leader who proclaimed himself the Mahdi. But the Saudi forces, reportedly aided by Pakistani Special Services Group, counter-attacked and retook control of the Mosque. The Saudis now pushed ahead with their Wahhabi version of Islam, a pact of sorts with the country’s clerical establishment in return for their support of the monarchy.

Ever since, the Saudi kingdom and the Wahhabi version of Islam have become indistinguishable and used to strictly supervise and control people’s ‘moral’ and social behavior. Even with this internal compact with the clerical establishment, and partly on their behest, the Saudis still felt insecure and have gone on to promote Wahhabi version of Islam in the wider Islamic world. This supposedly would make Saudi Arabia the authentic voice of Islam among Muslims around the world, conferring on the kingdom the aura of legitimacy and respectability. But this search for internal and external security is a never-ending affair for a regime that continues to regard itself as under siege of some sorts. And there is an endless preoccupation to enforce ‘moral order’, even though there are signs of decay and decrepitude around.

Which, in different ways, figures in four books on Saudi Arabia in a recent issue of the New York Review of Books. The reviewer, Nicolas Pelham, the Economist’s Middle East Correspondent, has paraphrased some of their findings. For instance, Pascal Menoret, one of the authors, has described young men in the kingdom whose only escape from Riyadh’s social strictures is the homoerotically charged practice of joyriding the city’s grim highways. It is a case of so much energy bottled up but with no acceptable social and moral outlets. Paul Aaarts and Carolien Roelants describe the suppression of Saudi women, who still need a man to study, work, travel, or open bank accounts. Simon Ross Valentine is appalled at the power of the Wahhabi clerics. The Shias in eastern Saudi Arabia, the oil rich part of the kingdom, live on edge, with restrictions on practicing their version of Islam. And somewhere along the line, if one is prepared to take risks and these can be horrendous, it is possible to live a ‘corrupt’ life. According to Simon Ross Valentine, author of one of the books: “Wherever I lived in [Saudi Arabia], I was not only offered drugs and alcohol, but also ‘woman, for good time.’’’

When the old King Salman, at 79, succeeded his even older half-brother who died aged 90, the future of the kingdom assumed even greater urgency. Though Saudi Arabia is still an important regional power, it has slowly been losing its capacity to virtually dictate the course of events in the Middle East. This happened for a variety of reasons. First, it was the sudden eruption of Arab Spring early in this decade, which not only created turmoil in some of the regional countries but also posed threat to internal stability in the kingdom. A trusted way for the kingdom to maintain status quo in the region was its strategic alliance with the United States that gave Riyadh an almost determining role in the way US exercised power in the region, which in turn was based on strategic convergence of their interests. And that prevailed largely until the eruption of the Arab Spring when the US, in the new circumstances of a popular revolt, was unable to save Hosni Mubarak in Egypt despite strong advocacy by Riyadh and, indeed, by Israel.

In any case, the seizure of power by the new Egyptian military strongman, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, eased Riyadh’s concerns to some degree. But the example set by the Arab Spring was an important, if not a determining factor, in the popular uprising in the predominantly Shia populated kingdom of Bahrain to challenge the autocratic and repressive regime of its Sunni monarchy. Saudi Arabia lost no time in coming to the rescue of its follow monarch by rushing troops to quell the rebellion, fearing the contagion might spread to its restive Shia-dominated eastern province. The US didn’t seem too concerned about the Saudi and Bahraini government’s excesses in Bahrain, and in its largely Shia eastern province, as this was projected as an exercise in containing Iran’s perceived dangerous and nefarious role to expand its regional power by destabilizing neighbouring Arab countries.

Which brings us to the conflict in Yemen, where Houthi rebels, now in control of the capital, Sana’a, are pitted against a Saudi-led regional coalition, which is bombing the hell out of Middle East’s poorest country because the Houthis, broadly categorized as Shias, are perceived to be fighting a proxy war on behalf of Iran. And Saudi Arabia considers Iran to be its inveterate enemy both at home and in the region and must be contained. The US has broadly shared this view and has helped Riyadh with weapons, intelligence and strong naval presence in the regional waters. But the recent Saudi bombing of a funeral gathering, which killed 140, mostly innocent people, even embarrassed the US, especially when it was leading the charge against Russia over its bombing raids in eastern Aleppo. Which led to reports that the US would be reviewing its relationship with Saudi Arabia. But the Saudis are continuing their bombing missions.

Even though US-Saudi strategic ties still remain close, Riyadh is unhappy with the state of affairs. Despite their strategic convergence to contain Iranian influence in the region, a serious breach occurred with the US-Iran agreement to freeze Tehran’s nuclear programme for the next 10-15 years. Which has resulted in lifting of some important sanctions against Iran. It seriously displeased Saudi Arabia, as it was keen, like Israel, to keep Iran in international purgatory.

The second important breach has been over Syria, as Riyadh wanted the US to get rid of the Bashar al-Assad regime. Which Obama was reluctant to do directly to avoid any more direct regional military involvement after the experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. In other words, the US is now more cautious and selective about regional military involvement and not simply does Riyadh’s bidding. And since its dependence on Saudi oil has lessened, it is seeking to exercise some flexibility in pursuing its regional policies while, at the same time, maintaining a close strategic relationship with Riyadh.

With its regional clout dented as its strategic control of oil is lessened from reduced demand internationally and excess supply and consequent fall in oil price, Saudi Arabia’s position both internally and externally is becoming increasingly precarious. And this is sought be dealt with by Mohammed bin Salman, the country’s now effective ruler as deputy crown prince under his aging father’s rule, following the new king’s coronation in January 2015. The prince has floated plans to diversify the kingdom’s economy to reduce dependence on oil income, which is easier said than done. Externally, Iran remains the primary preoccupation, while still promoting Wahhabi version as Saudi Arabia’s Islamic brand. With such limited vision, Saudi Arabia is caught in a time warp that might, sooner or later, envelop the monarchy on a course to self-destruction. 

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

Contact: sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au