Russia
explores new ties with Egypt
S P
SETH
The recent visit to Egypt of a Russian delegation, including its foreign
and defence ministers, Sergei Lavrov and Sergei Shoigu, is potentially of great
significance not only for their bilateral relationship but also for the Middle
Eastern region. The inclusion of the Soviet defence minister in the delegation
raised all sorts of speculations, from Russia seeking a naval base in Egypt to
a possible deal on the sale of Russian weapons. Which naturally has led some to
speculate that Egypt might come to lean on Russia over time as a substitute for
the US in a wide ranging relationship to include economic, trade, military and
other aspects. Such a development, if forthcoming, will not happen overnight
and that too in a region subject to sudden and volatile changes, as we have
been seeing in Egypt. After all the flurry and welcome of the high level
Russian delegation, there was subsequently an effort to underplay its
significance as a possible counterweight/substitute for Egypt’s special
relationship with the United States.
A close relationship between Egypt and the US was forged under
President Anwar El Sadat in the seventies after he broke up with the Soviet
Union. It was reinforced with the signing of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty in
1979 under US sponsorship. After Sadat was gunned down in 1981 at a military
parade by an army officer, believed to be from the Al Jihad movement, his
successor, Hosni Mubarak, further cemented these ties and became the US’
trusted regional ally underwriting, with the US, the security of Israel.
Mubarak’s antipathy to the Palestinian leadership, trying to rock the boat in
the region, was quite extraordinary which endeared him to the US and brought
dollops of aid. But Egypt continued to go backward economically and politically.
At times, the US gently prodded him towards democracy but when told that the
choice was between him (his regime) and the Muslim Brotherhood (in the event of
free and fair elections), the US always chose the devil they knew, as the
phrase goes.
And it went on until the advent of the Arab Spring springing from
Tunisia and soon enveloping Egypt. Faced with the seething anger and
mobilization of the Egyptian people against their hated dictator of more than
30 years, the US had no option but to ditch him and hope that Egypt and the
rest of the Arab world would be restructured along a stable democratic order
for a new compact with the United States.
But the resultant chaos and instability engendered by people’s
revolutions was sending shivers through some regional countries like Israel,
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf kingdoms— Bahrain just surviving when Saudi Arabia
sent its troops and tanks to crush the rebellion by its majority Shia
population.
Not surprisingly then that Israel, which regarded Egypt as the
bedrock of a relatively stable Middle East for its security, interceded
strongly with the United States to save the Mubarak regime but without much
success. Saudi Arabia did the same to save Mubarak to stem the tide of people’s
power reaching the kingdom. There was another important consideration for Saudi
Arabia. Riyadh feared that the revolutionary chaos in the Arab countries might
provide Iran an opportunity to stir up trouble among the majority Shia
population in its oil bearing eastern province. Whether or not Iran was
involved, the whiff of the Arab Spring also reached there but the unrest was
crushed.
At another level, Saudi Arabia is gravely worried about the nexus
between Iran, Syria under Bashar al-Assad regime and Hezbollah in Lebanon, and
is disappointed, indeed angry, with the US for giving the regime political
oxygen by getting involved in the disposal of Syria’s chemical weapons rather
than finishing off the Assad regime with a sharp and swift missile attack as
was planned. Within the kingdom, its rulers took precaution to buy off their
Sunni population with more financial benefits/rewards to insulate them from the
prevailing ‘spring’ winds. Still, Saudi Arabia is having trouble managing its
foreign workers and, at a deeper level, to ease up its socially conservative
policies and still keep the country’s religious (Islamic) establishment on side.
Saudi fears about Egypt’s chaotic politics were validated, in their
view, with the Muslim Brotherhood coming to power in the country’s first ever-free
elections and thus setting ‘unhealthy’ standards for the region. President
Morsi’s government appeared in terrible hurry to entrench itself in power by
suppressing dissent and going after its political enemies. Which brought about
a popular movement seeking their overthrow, seized on by the military as an
excuse to remove and imprison Morsi and other leading Brotherhood leaders thus
plunging the country into further chaos. The commander of the armed forces, General
Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, set up an interim civilian administration, and called the
military coup against the Morsi’s regime as an act of restoring democracy. The
US went along with this description but never felt quite comfortable about the
overthrow of Egypt’s first elected government in what, for all intents and
purposes, was a military coup. And when the Obama administration started to
pressure the army-led regime to work out some sort of a political modus vivendi
with the Brotherhood leadership to restore a semblance of an ongoing democratic
process, Commander Sisi’s regime reacted angrily expecting unqualified support
from the United States. But instead the US significantly curtailed its military
aid, further fuelling the Egyptian regime’s disenchantment with the US.
It is against this backdrop that the high-level Russian delegation
landed in Cairo among great fanfare, bringing back the memories of the Cold War
era when Egypt under President Nasser was a virtual Soviet ally. Things are
different now. Russia is a much-diminished power and the Cold War is over. The
United States, though still a superpower, is on a downward trajectory and its annual
aid of $1.5 billion, much of it for the military, is not all that impressive.
The Saudi Arabia and its Gulf partners have more than made up the loss, with
$12 billion in aid to the military regime. And more should be available to buy
military hardware from Russia in case the US were to continue its suspension,
though it will not be easy to replace the US as an arms supplier with Egypt’s
arsenal predominantly equipped with US weaponry.
In any case, the presumed Russian alternative, at this stage, looks
more like a diplomatic leverage to bring the US around to moderate, if not
change, its ambivalence between the military and the Muslim Brotherhood. And it
already seems to be working. During his recent Cairo visit, John Kerry
reportedly said that Egypt was on track towards democracy. But the visit of the
Russian delegation was still significant as providing a framework for exploring
multifaceted cooperation between the two countries. More importantly, it gives
Russia a toehold in probably the most important country in the Middle East. And
by virtue of changing regional dynamics, with the US losing some of its shine
and influence in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the region, there are new
possibilities for Russia to explore and expand. Among them, the sale of Russian
weapons is a lucrative proposition both strategically and economically.
Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.
Contact: sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au