Netanyahu and Israel

S P SETH

By electing the right-wing political cabal, led by Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli voters once again rejected any prospect whatsoever of a peaceful settlement of the Palestinian question. Netanyahu, who had in 2009 seemingly accepted the idea of a two-state solution, formally rejected it when electioneering, proclaiming emphatically that there would be no Palestinian state under his watch. Not only that, he even tried to rouse his Jewish electorate warning that the country’s Arab voters, constituting about 20 per cent of the population, were voting in “droves” to unseat his government. To quote Netanyahu, “The right-wing government [of Netanyahu] is in danger. Arab voters are coming out in droves to the ballot booths.” He knew that the racist card, along with the rejection of a Palestinian state, would produce the desired result and it did. He will now be free to pursue an even more oppressive agenda for the country’s Arab citizens and the occupied Palestinian territory.

But under international pressure, particularly from the Obama administration, Netanyahu has sought to backtrack on his rejection of the two-state solution. But, however, it is worded, Israel’s underlying policy is aimed at preventing the emergence of a sovereign Palestinian state alongside Israel on the pre-1967 borders, before Israel annexed/occupied Palestine after the June 1967 war. For instance, most Israeli citizens, leaving aside its Arab population, favour the continuation of its settlement policy of encircling Palestinian territory crisscrossed with checkpoints to control the movements of Palestinian people. How do you create a sovereign or even semi-sovereign Palestinian state when its territory is parceled out among Jews supported by state forces to keep the Palestinians out, as well as humiliating them all the time through all sorts of identity checks? It is difficult to believe that an Israeli state practicing such apartheid, whether led by Netanyahu or any other Israeli political formation, will accept a sovereign Palestinian state unless it is subjected to the kind of international sanctions that apartheid-ruled South Africa faced in its dying days. And there is no sign of that as yet.

So why is the Obama administration, and some of its European allies, were suddenly taken aback by Netanyahu’s comments about the rejection of the two-state solution and his Arab baiting? After all, it has been apparent all along that Israel would do everything possible to thwart the emergence of a sovereign Palestinian state. And the discrimination of Israel’s Arab citizens is an open secret. The main reason is that the pretense and symbolism of a two-state formula was useful as a goal, however distant and improbable. It avoided forcing the issue as the Palestinian Authority sought to seek membership of the United Nations and its sister organizations. The US was able to justify its vetoing of the UN Security Council resolutions pertaining to Palestine because, they contended, that there was a peaceful path through negotiations as Israel was ‘committed’ to a two state solution. And it served Israel well, without having to actually deliver the two-state outcome. At the same time, the Palestinian Authority (PA) continued to police its own people on behalf of the Israeli state. And for that, Israel collected revenue for the PA, which paid for its police and general administration; though the revenue was withheld recently. It seemed a neat arrangement suiting Israel. But they still weren’t happy because the PA at times wanted the real thing, like a real state.

Now that Netanyahu has rejected the two-state solution—never mind his retraction after the election and an apology of sorts to Israel’s Arab citizens-- it is difficult to maintain the pretense of a peacefully negotiated two-state solution. First, because all the diplomatic efforts put in by the Obama administration to further the peace process were frustrated because Israel wasn’t interested in a positive outcome. The diplomatic initiative of the US secretary of state, John Kerry, so incensed the Israeli defence minister, Moshe Ya’alon, that he described him ‘messianic and obsessive… [and wished] he [Kerry] should win his Nobel prize [for peace efforts] and leave us in peace’. Which is clearly indicative of the Israeli attitude towards a peaceful solution.

Indeed, Israel’s President Reuven (Ruvi) Rivlin is most forthright against the idea of a Palestinian state. In his profile of President Rivlin, David Remnick of the New Yorker wrote that the President “is ardently opposed to the establishment of a Palestinian state.” According to Remnick, “He is instead a proponent of Greater Israel, one Jewish state from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea. He professes to be mystified that anyone should object to the continued construction of Jewish settlements in the West Bank.” Remnick quotes Rivlin to say that, “It can’t be ‘occupied territory’ if the land is your own.” It is as simple as that. Therefore, when Netanyahu ruled out a Palestinian state under his watch, he was saying the obvious as spelled out even more clearly by the country’s president. It is not that Israel has been lacking in making its intentions known but that the US and its western allies haven’t been keen to face the reality because that required doing something tangible to translate into action their support for a sovereign Palestinian state.

Will it happen now? Though the Obama administration is miffed with Netanyahu and there have been strong statements both by the President and some of his senior advisors about reassessing US options after the Israeli leader’s rejection of a two-state solution and his racist comments about Israel’s Arab citizens, it would be very surprising if the US would translate it into a definite policy to push statehood for Palestine. Still the strongest statement has come from the White House chief of staff, Denis McDonough, before a liberal Jewish American group. He reportedly said that a separate Palestinian state was the best guarantee of Israel’s long-term security because: “An occupation that has lasted for almost 50 years must end, and the Palestinian people must have the right to live in, and govern themselves in their own sovereign state.” He added, “In the end, we know what a peace agreement should look like. The borders of Israel and an independent Palestine should be based on the [June 4] 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps.”

However, even as the Obama administration have made some bold statements critical of Netanyahu and his government, it has reiterated its commitment to Israel’s security. That makes US statements largely irrelevant. For instance, Israel might simply wait out Obama’s presidency, as he enters the lame duck stage of his administration. With the Congress unlikely to support any change, Israel can do what it wants. But internationally, and to some extent within the US, Israel’s continued intransigence and arrogance is slowly creating exasperation that might create a helpful environment for the eventual creation of a sovereign Palestinian state. But it is still early days for the long-suffering Palestinian people to count their chickens before they are hatched.  

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

Contact: sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au   

Iraqi offensive against IS

S P SETH

There is a general view that Iran is at the forefront of the offensive against the so-called Islamic State (IS). The Iraqi forces had simply fled last June when the IS almost walked into Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city. This is not to suggest that Iranian forces are actually doing the fighting against the IS. What they have done really is to put together Shia militias, trained them and even equipped them in some cases, with some of its commanders in the field leading them. There are, of course, the Iraqi armed forces also in the field, but the sea change was the involvement of Iran and militias backed by it. And that was showing results as IS was reportedly pushed back in some parts of Tikrit, the birth place of the former dictator Saddam Hussein, thus improving the morale of Iraqi troops. But the situation now appears to be stalemated (despite recurrent unconfirmed reports of Iraqi victory in Tikrit), leading the Iraqi government to enlist US help with aerial bombardment of IS positions. That created its own complications as some of the leading militias in the field didn’t like US involvement as they had hoped to take back Tikrit from the IS on their own. But that was sorted out, and the US aerial assistance is now an integral part of the battle against IS. But that doesn’t mean that the Iraqi army and its allied militias are about to overrun Tikrit. Even if that were to happen, that wouldn’t be the end of the IS in Iraq. There are several components that complicate Iraq’s story.

The Iraqi state, as it emerged from the decade long US military intervention, was transformed from a Sunni-dominated machine under Saddam Hussein into a Shia-controlled instrumentality. And its brief under the then Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki seemed largely to hunt its Sunni citizens. Maliki’s Iraq was a state of revenge, and there was no pretense of creating a cohesive nation based on inclusion. How far have things changed since Maliki’s replacement? Before we examine this, there is a bit of recent history that is relevant.  The IS grew out of the al Qaeda in Iraq that was defeated by an alliance between the Sunni tribes and the US forces. The al Qaeda in Iraq had itself emerged out of the ruins of the Saddam’s machine. But as it started to turn on the Iraqi Sunni tribes, they made a common cause with the US military. At this point the interests of the US forces in Iraq tended to converge with the Sunni tribes. And they coopted them into a shared armed struggle against the al Qaeda. They were assured that in the new Iraq the US was creating these Sunni tribal fighters, paid and armed by the US, would become part of the new Iraqi armed forces.

But when the Shia-dominated state emerged, the US was unable to have this undertaking enforced by the Maliki government. The Maliki government and the country’s Shia-majority didn’t want any Sunni armed group (s) become part of the country’s armed forces, regarding it as a threat to its new power structure. On the other hand, as pointed out earlier, the new Shia state apparatus turned on the Sunni minority to remind them brutally that the country now had a new power structure more interested in excluding the Sunnis than creating an inclusive democratic state catering to all people and interests. Living in fear of their lives and many experiencing torture, they aligned themselves with the Sunni IS when its forces moved into Mosul and elsewhere. They obviously forgot that the IS was a later-day incarnation of the al Qaeda in Iraq against which they had collaborated with the American forces. But that was in the past and now the new Shia-dominated Iraq was the greater danger.

Iraq’s new Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi might succeed where Maliki failed but it is still too early to say; though there are reports that some Sunni tribal leaders are willing to make a common cause with the Iraqi armed forces. Whether even this will turn the tide against the IS would remain to be seen. One important reason why it might not work is that while the Iranian-trained militias are helping to push back the IS forces in some areas, Tehran’s leading role in Iraq is not going to be welcome, over medium and long term, signifying its domination, especially by the country’s Sunni population. In other words, the underlying sectarian and regional divide in Iraq is likely to remain a destabilizing factor providing ammunition for the IS at critical times.

And this divide has an important destabilizing dimension in the region as well. Saudi Arabia and its Gulf partners are deeply concerned about Iran’s perceived regional influence already exercised, as they see it, in Tehran’s support for the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria and its Hezbollah connection, with the latter fighting for the Damascus regime. (The developments in Yemen have added a more dangerous dimension that might be examined in a separate article.)  And it is making Riyadh and other Gulf states very nervous as the US appears supportive of Iran’s role against IS, even as the former remain mindful of the threat to their monarchies from IS as the vanguard of new Islamic revival and resurgence. The announcement of the so-called Islamic caliphate is a strong indication of it. And it is already drawing foreign jihadists, even from western countries, to its banner. In other words, there are no easy solutions to untangle the present mess and put together a new cohesive political architecture in Iraq and Syria and the region.

The fragmentation of Iraq, Syria and the neighbouring Lebanon has its roots in the arbitrary reconfiguration of these territories as separate states by Britain and France as colonial powers after the dismemberment of the Ottoman empire in the wake of WW1. Some have suggested that Iraq might be better off if divided along sectarian and regional lines. Will that solve the problem? It doesn’t look like because that will simply externalize the existing conflicts along the boundaries of new states thus created. This could even make things worse. Besides, the conflict in Iraq, Syria and, by extension, in Lebanon is also regional, with Iran, Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies fighting proxy wars. The only possible solution is a regional one with neighbouring countries facilitating and underwriting a new agreement rather than aggravating the conflict. In other words, the offensive against IS has to be both political and military. And that, if at all feasible, will be a long process. In the meantime, there is unlikely to be much respite for Iraq and Syria.

Note: This article first appeared in the Daily Times.

Contact: sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au