IS and the world

S P SETH

Lately, things haven’t been going too well for the Islamic State (IS) on the battlefield. In Iraq, for instance, Iraqi forces have largely pushed IS out of Ramadi, the capital of Anbar province in the largely Sunni heartland, with considerable help from the US by way of bombing IS positions. They had earlier  pushed them out of Tikrit and taken control of the northern city of Baiji and its oil refinery. An important point to make is that these areas are predominantly Sunni, and that the successful military operations enjoyed some level of cooperation with Sunni tribesmen under US patronage.

Any further consolidation of the Iraqi hold on Ramadi and elsewhere will depend on two important factors. These are, first, insertion and presence of a local force drawn largely from Sunni fighters to hold the city and, secondly, to establish a largely Sunni administrative structure to establish trust with the local Sunni population in an otherwise predominantly Shia-dominated Iraq. Here, it is important to mention that the US forces had earlier succeeded in destroying Abu Musab al-Zarqawi-led al-Qaeda militancy by enlisting Sunni tribal groups, enraged by the scant respect that the militant movement showed for local tribal traditions and authority. With US military training, weapons and money these tribal chiefs were promised amalgamation of their units into the regular Iraqi army. But the Shia government did not honor that commitment, as they didn’t trust the Sunnis as part of their new army. Besides, there was an element of settling old scores by inflicting on them the persecution and pain the Shias had suffered under the Saddam regime. It was time for tit for tat. And there was no time for creating an inclusive society and political order for a post-Saddam Iraq.

And it was in the midst of such fear, hopelessness and terror that the dormant al Qaeda in Iraq--once led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and virtually destroyed by the US forces allied with the newly raised and inspired Sunni tribal units-- expanded outgrowing its al Qaeda origin and metamorphosing to become IS and the so-called caliphate. In the new climate of fear, hate and terror among the predominantly Sunni regions of Iraq, IS found acceptance after the hell visited on them by the new Shia order. And when the Iraqi army crumbled last year in Mosul and elsewhere, the IS installed its control without any popular resistance.

The present Iraqi military advances into Ramadi with the revival of some Sunni tribal militias under US patronage, significantly aided by US aerial attacks on IS positions, is supposed to create an inclusive Shia-Sunni challenge to IS.  How it will be translated into a cohesive and inclusive political order is still to be worked out. Perhaps, it is all ad hoc and not thought through. And this is where the weakness lies and has been all through.

At the same time, in Syria, the situation seems even worse. A hopeful sign, if it can ever be translated into workable action, is the broad international consensus against IS. There is the Security Council resolution of bringing together the Damascus regime and different elements of the Syrian opposition (minus IS and other terrorist outfits like al Nusra front) for talks to create a transitional political order. The role of the Damascus regime under Bashar al-Assad in such transition is controversial, though there doesn’t seem any way around it with Moscow standing by it. There is also the prospect of some local ceasefires for humanitarian reasons. The whole process in its unfolding and implementation, if carried through, is extremely fragile.

At another level, there is an attempt to involve regional regimes into forging a united front against IS. This has been an ongoing process under US pressure. The US experience in Afghanistan and Iraq clearly showed that its military involvement in these countries only created a quagmire where it tended to return again and again without any conclusive result. The prolonged US military intervention has simply complicated and delayed the process of any kind of internal/regional resolution. At the same time, continuing and recurring US military intervention tends to give oxygen to outrageous Islamic militants, like the IS, by increasingly painting external intervention as a western attack on Islam.

The US feels that that this can be blunted both ideologically and on the battlefield by greater commitment and involvement of Muslim countries in a political and military alliance against the IS. Saudi Arabia, therefore, hurriedly chose to announce such a military alliance, including such heavyweights like Indonesia and Pakistan. But it started to unravel before taking any concrete shape. Jakarta was taken aback at the announcement by Saudi Arabia’s Deputy Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, of an “Islamic military coalition.” Indonesia’s foreign ministry spokesman pointed out that his country had been approached to join a “center to co-ordinate against extremism and terrorism.” But, according to Indonesia’s minister concerned with the country’s security, Luhut Pandjaitan, “We don’t want to join a military alliance.” 

Pakistan’s reaction was equally one of surprise. Its foreign secretary, Aizaz Chaudhry, said that Islamabad was seeking details from Riyadh. Even the Saudis, it appears, were not clear about their announced “Islamic military coalition.” While seeking to clarify the concept, Saudi foreign minister, Adel al-Jubeir, painted the “coalition” as a grouping that might offer/render assistance to each other to fight terrorist groups. It is a nebulous concept devised in hurry to emphasize regional commitment to fighting terrorism. Which has already existed in some form or the other. But the absence of Iran from any regional grouping to defeat IS is unlikely to work, because Riyadh’s overriding focus and priority remains to keep Tehran out of any kind of regional parleys. In any case, the escalation of Saudi-Iranian political rivalry from the execution of a prominent Shia cleric in Saudi Arabia has further complicated the situation.

In other words, all kinds of international initiatives might struggle to create enough momentum to start and sustain talks between the Bashar regime and different strands of opposition and rebel groups. In the meantime, the IS chief, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, has come out with a defiant message, declaring that, “… our state is doing well. The more intense the war against it, the purer it becomes and the tougher it gets.” He added, “Crusaders and Jews don’t dare to come on the ground because they were defeated in Iraq and Afghanistan.” He called on Saudi citizens to “rise up” against their government. And he claimed that IS would soon be in Palestine to establish an Islamic state there. These do not sound like the words of terrorism chief in retreat.

IS and the world

S P SETH

Lately, things haven’t been going too well for the Islamic State (IS) on the battlefield. In Iraq, for instance, Iraqi forces have largely pushed IS out of Ramadi, the capital of Anbar province in the largely Sunni heartland, with considerable help from the US by way of bombing IS positions. They had earlier  pushed them out of Tikrit and taken control of the northern city of Baiji and its oil refinery. An important point to make is that these areas are predominantly Sunni, and that the successful military operations enjoyed some level of cooperation with Sunni tribesmen under US patronage.

Any further consolidation of the Iraqi hold on Ramadi and elsewhere will depend on two important factors. These are, first, insertion and presence of a local force drawn largely from Sunni fighters to hold the city and, secondly, to establish a largely Sunni administrative structure to establish trust with the local Sunni population in an otherwise predominantly Shia-dominated Iraq. Here, it is important to mention that the US forces had earlier succeeded in destroying Abu Musab al-Zarqawi-led al-Qaeda militancy by enlisting Sunni tribal groups, enraged by the scant respect that the militant movement showed for local tribal traditions and authority. With US military training, weapons and money these tribal chiefs were promised amalgamation of their units into the regular Iraqi army. But the Shia government did not honor that commitment, as they didn’t trust the Sunnis as part of their new army. Besides, there was an element of settling old scores by inflicting on them the persecution and pain the Shias had suffered under the Saddam regime. It was time for tit for tat. And there was no time for creating an inclusive society and political order for a post-Saddam Iraq.

And it was in the midst of such fear, hopelessness and terror that the dormant al Qaeda in Iraq--once led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and virtually destroyed by the US forces allied with the newly raised and inspired Sunni tribal units-- expanded outgrowing its al Qaeda origin and metamorphosing to become IS and the so-called caliphate. In the new climate of fear, hate and terror among the predominantly Sunni regions of Iraq, IS found acceptance after the hell visited on them by the new Shia order. And when the Iraqi army crumbled last year in Mosul and elsewhere, the IS installed its control without any popular resistance.

The present Iraqi military advances into Ramadi with the revival of some Sunni tribal militias under US patronage, significantly aided by US aerial attacks on IS positions, is supposed to create an inclusive Shia-Sunni challenge to IS.  How it will be translated into a cohesive and inclusive political order is still to be worked out. Perhaps, it is all ad hoc and not thought through. And this is where the weakness lies and has been all through.

At the same time, in Syria, the situation seems even worse. A hopeful sign, if it can ever be translated into workable action, is the broad international consensus against IS. There is the Security Council resolution of bringing together the Damascus regime and different elements of the Syrian opposition (minus IS and other terrorist outfits like al Nusra front) for talks to create a transitional political order. The role of the Damascus regime under Bashar al-Assad in such transition is controversial, though there doesn’t seem any way around it with Moscow standing by it. There is also the prospect of some local ceasefires for humanitarian reasons. The whole process in its unfolding and implementation, if carried through, is extremely fragile.

At another level, there is an attempt to involve regional regimes into forging a united front against IS. This has been an ongoing process under US pressure. The US experience in Afghanistan and Iraq clearly showed that its military involvement in these countries only created a quagmire where it tended to return again and again without any conclusive result. The prolonged US military intervention has simply complicated and delayed the process of any kind of internal/regional resolution. At the same time, continuing and recurring US military intervention tends to give oxygen to outrageous Islamic militants, like the IS, by increasingly painting external intervention as a western attack on Islam.

The US feels that that this can be blunted both ideologically and on the battlefield by greater commitment and involvement of Muslim countries in a political and military alliance against the IS. Saudi Arabia, therefore, hurriedly chose to announce such a military alliance, including such heavyweights like Indonesia and Pakistan. But it started to unravel before taking any concrete shape. Jakarta was taken aback at the announcement by Saudi Arabia’s Deputy Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, of an “Islamic military coalition.” Indonesia’s foreign ministry spokesman pointed out that his country had been approached to join a “center to co-ordinate against extremism and terrorism.” But, according to Indonesia’s minister concerned with the country’s security, Luhut Pandjaitan, “We don’t want to join a military alliance.” 

Pakistan’s reaction was equally one of surprise. Its foreign secretary, Aizaz Chaudhry, said that Islamabad was seeking details from Riyadh. Even the Saudis, it appears, were not clear about their announced “Islamic military coalition.” While seeking to clarify the concept, Saudi foreign minister, Adel al-Jubeir, painted the “coalition” as a grouping that might offer/render assistance to each other to fight terrorist groups. It is a nebulous concept devised in hurry to emphasize regional commitment to fighting terrorism. Which has already existed in some form or the other. But the absence of Iran from any regional grouping to defeat IS is unlikely to work, because Riyadh’s overriding focus and priority remains to keep Tehran out of any kind of regional parleys. In any case, the escalation of Saudi-Iranian political rivalry from the execution of a prominent Shia cleric in Saudi Arabia has further complicated the situation.

In other words, all kinds of international initiatives might struggle to create enough momentum to start and sustain talks between the Bashar regime and different strands of opposition and rebel groups. In the meantime, the IS chief, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, has come out with a defiant message, declaring that, “… our state is doing well. The more intense the war against it, the purer it becomes and the tougher it gets.” He added, “Crusaders and Jews don’t dare to come on the ground because they were defeated in Iraq and Afghanistan.” He called on Saudi citizens to “rise up” against their government. And he claimed that IS would soon be in Palestine to establish an Islamic state there. These do not sound like the words of terrorism chief in retreat.

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.