US-Iran rapprochement?

S P SETH

Will the US and Iran be able to restart where they broke off in 1979 when the Iranian revolution deposed the Shah? The break in their relations of over 30 years has only made things worse. And their problems over the years have come to be crystallized in the strong US opposition to Iran’s nuclear program. Overlaying this, and indeed reinforcing this, is Israel’s pathological distrust of the Iranian regime. Israel’s position is that Iran’s nuclear ‘weapons’ program is an existential threat for them because of its perceived commitment to destroy Israel. And for this they quote some of the rhetorical statements of the former Iranian president Ahmadjinejad. One of the first things President Hassan Rouhani did, as a goodwill gesture, was to send greetings to the Jews on Rosh Hashanah, Jewish new year. He also condemned the killings of the Jews as a “crime that the Nazis committed towards the Jews”.  This is a big change in tone and, even, content, from his predecessor.

                                                                                                                                                                                                       On the question of Iran’s nuclear program, President Rouhani’s administration  has started a dialogue with the United States and other permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany to address the concerns and apprehensions that Iran is engaged in a clandestine nuclear program to make an atomic bomb.  During his recent UN address, Rouhani addressed the nuclear question at two levels. First, he declared, “…Nuclear weapon and other weapons of mass destruction have no place in Iran’s security and defense doctrine, and contradict our fundamental religious and ethical convictions…” Second, while denying categorically that Iran had any nuclear (weapons) ambition, Rouhani however strongly asserted Iran’s “right to enrichment [of uranium] inside Iran and enjoyment of other related nuclear rights.” And to ignore this or demand its surrender, according to Rouhani, “… is, therefore, an illusion, and extremely unrealistic…”

In an article he recently penned for the Washington Post, he outlined why it was important for Iran to master nuclear technology. He said, “…To us, mastering the atomic fuel cycle and generating nuclear power is as much about diversifying energy resources as it is about who Iranians are as a nation, our demand for dignity and our consequent place in the world.” He has also said that Iran “is prepared to engage immediately in time-bound and result-oriented talks to build mutual confidence and removal of mutual uncertainties with full transparency.”

In his UN address, he avoided referring directly to Israel’s hostile role on the nuclear issue but alluded to this indirectly by cautioning the US leadership from “following the short-sighted interest of warmongering pressure groups…” Not surprisingly, though, Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel still holds the view that Rouhani is a “wolf in sheep’s clothing.” Israel is going to be even more upset as Rouhani has raised the issue that Israel, which has nuclear weapons but refuses to confirm or deny it, should join the non-proliferation treaty. This has so far been a non-issue in the nuclear proliferation debate because Israel somehow is believed to have a special dispensation, under US and western political protection, from transparency and accountability in this matter. 

Obama’s response to the new Iranian leadership’s diplomatic overtures has been cautiously optimistic. In his UN speech, for the first time an American president acknowledged, “… America’s role in overthrowing an Iranian government [in 1953] during the Cold War.” Such a symbolic gesture is helpful in creating the right atmospherics. While asserting that “… we are determined to prevent them [Iranians] from developing a nuclear weapon” President Obama also said that “…we respect the right of the Iranian people to access peaceful nuclear energy”, while meeting their “responsibilities under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the UN Security Council Resolutions.” At the same time, Obama noted that, “Meanwhile, [Iran’s] Supreme Leader has issued a fatwa against the development of nuclear weapons, and President Rouhani has just recently reiterated that the Islamic Republic will never develop a nuclear weapon.”

As part of the process of furthering their dialogue, the US secretary of State and the Iranian Foreign Minister have already met, and Iran and the UN Security Council permanent members (the US, Russia, China, UK and France) and Germany will soon be holding a dialogue on the nuclear question. Another encouraging development has been a telephonic conversation between Obama and Rouhani to break the ice, so to say, enveloping their relations since the 1979 Iranian revolution. For the first time, the dialogue on the nuclear question will be held against a backdrop of some positive exchanges. But that is no guarantee of real progress. According to Obama, “To succeed, conciliatory words will have to be matched [by Iran] by actions that are transparent and verifiable.”

Already, even symbolic diplomatic progress is creating some nervous reaction among countries committed to perpetual hostility to Iran. As New York Times colourfully reported (September 29), “ For Israel and Persian Gulf states like Saudi Arabia, President Obama’s telephone call with President Hassan Rouhani of Iran on Friday was the geopolitical equivalent of discovering your best friend flirting with your main rival.” And it is not just the nuclear issue. To again quote New York Times’ report, “ But beyond that [the nuclear issue], the prospect of even a nonnuclear Iran—strengthened economically by the lifting of sanctions, and emboldened politically by renewed relations with Washington—is seen as a dire threat that could upend the dynamics in this volatile region.” But that is going too far, when the real conversation between Iran and the US and its allies on the nuclear question is yet to begin in earnest.

There are two issues here. While the Iranian President has categorically ruled out Iran’s ambition to develop a nuclear bomb, he is also firm that his country is determined to master the nuclear energy cycle. Any country doing that would have the technical capability to make a bomb, if it were to reach the level of enriching uranium to a very high level of 90 per cent. Iran doesn’t have that capability and neither does it claim to be working to that level. But it probably has up to 20 per cent capacity that is commensurate with peaceful medical and other uses. This is where transparency and verification by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) comes in.

If Iran is categorical about not making a bomb, as it is, it shouldn’t be a terribly difficult exercise to let in the IAEA inspectors for verification. But if the US and its allies were to insist on Iran altogether abandoning its uranium enrichment program for even peaceful uses, that is unlikely to happen.

The future direction of US-Iran dialogue will depend on if Israel would continue to have a veto on US decision-making in this matter. During his UN address and meeting with President Obama, Netanyahu made it clear that Israel would settle for nothing short of dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program. Otherwise, Israel might feel impelled to make a pre-emptive strike at some time on Iranian nuclear installations.

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

Contact: sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au

No end in sight for Iraq fiasco

S P SETH

As the world’s attention is focused on the ongoing Syrian massacre, the killings in Iraq continue unabated. When it was attacked in 2003 under the presidency of George Bush, Iraq was to be rid of Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction. Soon after, then-president Bush appeared on the deck of a US warship wearing military uniform to declare victory, and a new ‘liberated’ Iraq was launched that was supposed to become a model democracy for the region. But that didn’t happen. The US got increasingly embroiled in all sorts of troubles, finally quitting in 2011 leaving the country with Noor al-Maliki as its prime minister. Even though Iraq had elections and Maliki cobbled together a government, it somehow didn’t gain legitimacy among the country’s disparate and divided population. Its Kurdish region is virtually independent, its minority Sunni population is at war with the country’s new majority Shia government, and there is an ongoing al Qaeda insurgency blowing up people here and there. Iraq’s so-called liberation is a cruel joke on its people.

How did it all happen? Indeed, for a time, in the eighties, Saddam was a US favorite in the region, a bulwark against the ‘crazy’ mullahs who had seized power in Iran in 1979 through a popular revolution against the shah. At another time, in 1951, a popular revolution had got rid of the shah electing the country’s nationalist leader Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq as prime minister. But a US engineered coup got rid of Mossadeq, and brought back the shah as their trusted man. But his megalomaniac rule was hugely unpopular. He was deposed once again 1979 in a popular revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini and backed by elements of the liberal-left political spectrum. As the predominantly new clerical political order took hold, it soon became a bloody affair both internally and externally.

Internally, Ayatollah Khomeini adroitly eliminated his one time liberal-left political partners in revolution through a bloody purge, throwing many of them into prison, just like the shah had done earlier with his political enemies. Those who escaped fled into exile operating as People’s Mujahedin of Iran and were given shelter in Iraq by Saddam Hussein. However, within Iran, the new clerical political order, with Ayatollah Khomeini as the supreme leader, continued to have popular support.

The external dimension of the 1979 revolution was a bitter fall out between the new Iranian regime and the United States. Tehran accused the US embassy in Iran of being a hive of spies, and its staff were held hostage by the revolutionary guards for well over one year. To this day, the US and Iran have no diplomatic relations and their relationship remains in a state of crisis. Iran is facing the worst economic sanctions from the US and many other countries for its nuclear programme.

It was against this backdrop of intense US hostility to Iran that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq became Washington’s virtual ally. Saddam had a long-standing maritime dispute with Iran over the Shatt al-Arab river boundary between the two countries. Saddam obviously saw an opportunity in the uncertainty and confusion that prevailed in the period after the revolution in Iran and sought to settle the scores and undermine the new regime. The new Shia political order in Iran was seen as a dangerous development. It was feared that the new regime might be inclined to extend its revolutionary fervor and missionary zeal to whip up Iraq’s majority Shia population. Saddam was, therefore, keen to preempt any Iranian threat in the near future by starting a war in 1980 while the new regime was still finding its feet.

Iran’s ongoing troubles with the United States created a commonality of purpose between Saddam Hussein and the United States. Saddam got encouragement, weapons, chemicals, intelligence, money and much more from the US during his war with Iran. It was a bloody war, lasting 8 years (1980-88), and fought to a stalemate. Iraq extensively used chemicals weapons, such as mustard gas, against Iranian troops. The estimates of casualties, with Iran suffering the most, vary from half-a-million to a million or more.

Saddam Hussein, who was generally not well regarded by his fellow Arab rulers, if not out-rightly hated, received their support in his crusade against Iran under its clerical regime. Some of them, cash rich with their oil revenues, lent him money to prosecute his war against Iran. But when the whole project failed, they wanted their money back with interest. Saddam’s Iran war had bankrupted Iraq and he was looking for some way of replenishing his coffers, as well as to restore his lost prestige among his people and in the region. He decided to attack and occupy Kuwait with its vast oil wealth, which would make Iraq the preeminent oil producer in the world.

He was said to have broached the subject at the time with the US ambassador and received no specific objection. Banking on his friendship with the US, forged during his Iranian adventure, he let loose his armed forces against Kuwait and managed to occupy much of the country in a rather short period of time. Which raised hackles among the Arab world’s oil producing monarchs, many of them US allies as well as important oil suppliers.   The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which threatened to change the region’s geopolitical situation with Iraq commanding significant oil supplies, created alarm bells in Washington that led to the US invasion of Iraq, early 1991. Iraq was easily defeated but the then-president Bush senior desisted from regime change.

The Saddam regime lived on US sufferance, subjected to severe UN sanctions and barely surviving on the oil-for-food programme. That is to say, it was allowed to sell enough oil to buy its food and other necessities. This didn’t seem to seriously affect the regime, but the Iraqi people, particularly Iraqi children, suffered horribly under this because of shortages of medical supplies and other necessities. The regime change was subsequently effected under George Bush (junior) to complete his father’s half-finished job after he attacked Iraq in 2003. Saddam was hunted down and subsequently hanged by a new Iraqi Shia regime installed under the US occupation.

The prime reasons for the US invasion of Iraq that it had weapons of mass destruction and links with the al Qaeda were found to be untrue. As we now know that the laudable objective of liberating and making Iraq into a model regional democracy has turned out to be cruel joke played on the Iraqi people. Surely, Saddam Hussein was a tyrant and his overthrow by the Iraqi people would have been a welcome development. But its US invasion only compounded Iraq’s tragedy.

Worse still, the increasing involvement of extremists of the al-Qaeda linked Islamic State of Iraq and Levant in the Syrian conflict to support rebels has the potential of turning the two states into another terrorist hub, on the lines of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Iraq’s tragedy is not over yet. It is likely to get worse before it gets better-- if it gets better.   

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

Contact: sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au