Syria’s abysmal descent

By S P SETH

The Arab Spring has turned into a bloody autumn in Syria. What started as anti-regime graffiti by a bunch of kids in a remote town is now a full-scale assault by the Syrian regime on its own people. These kids were arrested and reportedly tortured, making it a trigger for the popular uprising that followed. President Bashar al-Assad’s regime has, however, portrayed the people’s revolt as the work of thugs and armed rebels supported by foreign powers. This doesn’t gel with the facts. First, if it were an armed rebellion with foreign involvement and backing, it wouldn’t have started with a bunch of kids writing graffiti seeking the change of regime. By most accounts, the people’s revolt has been largely peaceful. But the government’s response has been brutally violent with the deployment and use of tanks, heavy weaponry and the cordoning of towns and streets suspected of harboring rebels, with the denial of public utilities like water, electricity and supply of food. From the images on social websites as the main source of information (with the press denied access), the Syrian landscape in several places was like a ghost town after killings by the army. The death toll from the army’s operation is rising steadily to about 3000 people, with many more seriously injured.

Second: without the widespread use of massive force and fear of worse to come, people don’t run for safety and shelter across the country’s borders. Fearing the regime’s terror, many Syrians have fled across the borders into Turkey and Lebanon. They are now sheltering in camps set up by the Turkish government. Prime Minister Erdogan’s government had earlier enjoyed good relations with the Assad regime. But when it sought to impress the need for political reforms on the Assad regime the relationship turned sour. Damascus now suspects Turkey’s hand behind its troubles.

Third: even though the Assad regime might complain of a foreign plot, there is no credible evidence to support this assertion. Fourth: until recently, even the United States sought to refrain from any intervention on behalf of the protesters. The recent public appearance of the US and French ambassadors in the town of Hama was designed to lend moral support to the protesters, as well as a political tactic to cultivate a growing popular constituency in Syria. Of course, there have been sanctions against some key figures of the regime. But Bashar al-Assad was initially not targeted for sanctions because the US and its Western allies apparently hoped that, as a likely moderate, he might opt for a peaceful democratic transition. But this didn’t happen, and the sanctions were also extended to include President Assad. Therefore, the regime’s contention that it is facing an armed rebellion from thugs with foreign involvement is absolute nonsense. It is this kind of mindset that has brought trouble on the regime--- a failure to understand that the Arab world is in flux and that the authoritarian Assad dynasty, ruling in its own interest, do not have a special dispensation.

It would appear that President Bashar al-Assad is following in the footsteps of his father, Hafez al-Assad, who had the town of Hama bombarded in 1982 to quell an uprising by the Muslim Brotherhood. The estimates of civilian carnage from this brutal crackdown vary between 17,000 and 40,000. It shell-shocked the Syrian people, enabling Hafez al-Assad to rule unchallenged for nearly 30 years. That is until March of this year when, encouraged by popular revolt in Tunisia and Egypt, the Syrians too rose up to peacefully challenge the now President Assad who inherited his presidency from his late-father. His response was to do what his father did in an earlier era. Which is: to use overwhelming force to crush the people’s movement and spread fear to preempt another challenge to his power.

Will it work? It doesn’t seem to have worked so far. But the regime hasn’t given up. Nor have the people seeking a democratic change, provoking the regime into more killings and so it goes on. Even if the regime were able to restore some sort of order based on pervasive fear, it would have completely lost its legitimacy. It will not be business as usual and the government will simply be looking over its shoulder smelling danger everywhere. With thousands of its citizens forced into seeking safety and shelter across the borders into Lebanon and Turkey, the nucleus of a movement to challenge the regime from outside is already emerging. The refugee camps in Turkey are becoming the nerve centre of an anti-regime movement with support networks inside Syria. The popular peaceful movement for democratic reform, if handled with tact, finesse and accommodation of reasonable demands, might have been amenable to a democratic deal with the Assad regime. Now that so much blood has been spilled, they simply want the Assad regime to go. Indeed this could all have been avoided if the government had shown some understanding of its people.

The Arab Spring came a little later in Syria, which led the government to believe that it was a case apart from other unpopular regimes. It believed that the Syrian people were happy with their rulers and the system. But it didn’t take long to shatter that illusion. But the government is refusing to see what is apparent to most people. Which is that the Assad regime has lost its legitimacy to the point where people are prepared to risk their lives to challenge its rule. The government, though, still seems to have the backing of the armed forces, commanded by trusted officers with family and communal ties. This close-knit political, military and economic cabal has a lot to lose if forced into giving up control and power.

In other words, the government still has the firepower on its side to inflict maximum fatalities on its people. Despite this, the people are standing their ground everyday in the face of overwhelming use of force. There are, however, some sketchy signs of unrest among army ranks, particularly in areas where they were ordered to fire on peaceful civilians in their own towns and regions. While the military command seems loyal to the regime, their ranks might baulk at following such orders all the time. It has already happened in some units when ordered to fire in their townships. Some of these soldiers have now fled across the border into Turkey to escape reprisals for refusing orders. And if this were to spread to more units, the government might lose its most potent advantage over the rebels.

The Syrian government has handled the situation abysmally, considering that they had some advantages other Arab regimes didn’t. First, they had the support of about 20 per cent of the population, as well as the passivity of many others. For instance, the Assad regime enjoyed the support of its own Alawite (Shia) minority of about 13 per cent, controlling the levers of power all around. Besides, it also had the backing of other minorities to include Christians and minor sects and communities. These minorities weren’t too keen on the resurrection of a Sunni-led political order to include Muslim Brotherhood. At the same time, the major cities like Damascus and Aleppo were largely free of anti-regime fervor. Syria’s trading class didn’t want chaos and instability that might result from revolutionary fervor and change. But the Assad regime made such a hash of things with overkill (literally) that the popular revolt now covers now all the country. In other words, instead of establishing an orderly democratic transition, the government is now dealing with bushfires of revolt everywhere. Some minorities and other elements of the population, who backed the government, are not sure where it is all leading the country.

Second: much of the international community was initially not keen on instigating or encouraging the popular revolt in Syria. They hoped the regime might be able to preside over an orderly democratic transition. There was fear that the unraveling of Syria might trigger unpredictable regional consequences affecting its neighbors. Above all, the United States and its allies have neither the money nor the political will to undertake more military commitments. All these considerations seemed to insulate Syria from a concerted international action against the regime.

The Assad regime, however, opted for brutal force to deal with an internal problem, better tackled through a peaceful solution. In whatever way the problem is finally resolved, the danger is that the country might descend into the sectarian chaos of greater bloodshed between the Sunnis and the ruling community of Alawite (Shia), further adding to an already complex situation in the Arab world.

Will Gaddafi Survive?

Even as the popular revolutionary upsurge has spread to almost all Arab countries, it is probably facing its toughest test in Libya. The Libyan rebels, inspired by the relative ease with which Tunisian and Egyptian dictators were overthrown, and chuffed by their early successes in Benghazi, were hoping to topple Gaddafi and reach Tripoli in an easy swoop. Gaddafi, though, mounted a strong counter-offensive in a bid to demolish the rebellion. But for the French aerial intervention in the nick of time, backed up soon by the British and US bombardment of Gaddafi forces, his troops would have entered Benghazi to crush the rebels and their supporters. The aerial attacks to stop Gaddafi are now a NATO responsibility, with the British and the French doing much of the heavy lifting with the United States in a supportive role. The NATO operations draw their legitimacy from the Security Council resolution 1973 to prevent a possible massacre of the Libyan people in eastern part of the country.
The situation in Libya is very fluid, with Gaddafi forces engaged in a siege of Misrata, with its nearly half-a-million people subjected to constant pounding of heavy artillery. The NATO aerial operations are hampered by a fear of civilian casualties, as well as a failure to distinguish between Gaddafi and rebels forces, with the former often wearing civilian clothing to confuse the enemy. Though the rebels have been high on confidence and passion, they are sorely lacking in organization, discipline, training and weaponry. They basically want the NATO to turn the corner for them and get rid of Gaddafi
But with political divisions in the NATO ranks, as the French and the Brits carry much of the load; there doesn’t appear any immediate prospect of the rebels having an upper hand. However, there are signs that the British and French might be getting involved on the ground in a supportive military role. Such incremental Western involvement is likely to erode Gaddafi’s military advantage. And will further crumble his power base in the country. At the same time, it will not be smooth sailing for the intervening Western powers with their already overstretched economies. There is, therefore, some urgency for them to bring down Gaddafi to limit their role. Besides, they are keen not to be seen as the old colonialists staging a comeback.
Gaddafi would like to play this card. But his problem is that he is neither popular with Arab rulers nor with the Arab masses. In a popular environment when dictators are disposable, Gaddafi might not be the right leader to lead a supposedly anti-colonial movement. Another problem for Gaddafi is that if he can’t prevail over the rebels soon enough, he might run out of revenues (from the sale of oil) to continue his military operations. And if Gaddafi can’t sell oil, he won’t be able to maintain and support his political base. Like a number of Arab countries, Libya is heavily dependent on oil revenues and the political patronage that goes with it.
Gaddafi has so far held on because, unlike Egypt and Tunisia, he commands multiple security forces comprised of mercenaries owing allegiance to him, militias under the command of his sons and regular armed forces. Having staged a military coup in 1969, Gaddafi knew how easy it was to overthrow the country’s monarchy. He, therefore, took steps to create balancing military structures that have enabled him so far to hold on to power.
However, his medium and long-term prospects might not be all that bright. The defection of some of his ministers, senior diplomats, and others point to a crisis in his inner circle that is likely to become more pronounced as NATO pushes on with its military intervention, mostly from the air. Although there are differences in the NATO ranks regarding the level of commitment against Gaddafi, the recent joint article in the press by Barack Obama, Nicolas Sarkozy and David Cameron is a strong assertion of their common commitment to get rid of Gaddafi. It is, however, problematic because the relevant UN resolution doesn’t authorize this.
Obama, Sarkozy and Cameron concede in their article that the “UN Security Council Resolution 1973 is to protect civilians… It is not to remove Gaddafi by force.” It adds, “But it is impossible to imagine a future for Libya with Gaddafi in power…It is unthinkable that someone who has tried to massacre his own people can play a part in their future government.” They contend, “so long as Gaddafi is in power, NATO and its coalition partners must maintain their operations so that civilians remain protected and the pressure on the regime builds…”
The NATO strategy, therefore, is to keep up the military pressure on Gaddafi (including the arming and training of rebels in some way or the other), encourage defections in his inner circle, enforce multiple sanctions like the freezing of his government’s financial assets and trade embargo, and help create an alternative political structure to take over from Gaddafi when the time comes. With international isolation, increasing erosion of his internal popular and political base, and fast depleting revenue, it is difficult to see how Gaddafi can survive for long. It might still be time for him to work out a safe exit passage for him and his family. But if he continues on his present course, he might eventually end up before the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity.
What might follow after Gaddafi is a big question mark because the rebels do not have a clearly articulated political blueprint (disorganized as they are), apart from an omnibus commitment to freedom and dignity. As one Benghazi businessman told a New Yorker reporter, “ We want democracy. We want good schools, we want a free media, an end to corruption…and a parliament to get rid of whoever, whenever, we want.”
The Libyan revolution, as revolutions elsewhere in the Arab world, has laudable goals but the future is murky and full of pitfalls. But it is still an inspiring time to see how people’s power can topple long ruling dictators in the Arab world.


NOTE: This article was first published in Daily Times

Israeli veto on US’ Palestine policy

Israeli veto on US’ Palestine policy

By S.P.SETH

Even as the despotic Middle Eastern regimes are falling, the US is continuing to dither. One area where the US now can act with vigor is the continued Israeli intransigence over the Palestinian issue. Obviously, at the present time when the Middle Eastern countries are seeking to overthrow their dictators and despots, the attention of its people is primarily focused on their struggle at hand. But when things settle down and they forge new relations with the United States, even Egypt and Jordan, the two countries with peace treaties with Israel, are unlikely to actively help Israel to continue choking off Gaza, as Hosni Mubarak’s regime did.

Israel has always argued that its occupation of Palestinian territories is not an issue of much, if any, relevance in the Middle Eastern polity. Therefore, all those who argue that a resolution of the Palestinian question will significantly improve the US and Israeli relations with the Arab world, indeed with the Muslim world, are barking up the wrong tree.

Even Barack Obama once believed that a resolution of the Palestinian issue will greatly help the US make a new start with the Muslim world. Unless one is a downright bigot, it makes sound sense. As David Remnick writes in a recent issue of the New Yorker:”….The Netanyahu government’s refusal to come to terms with the Palestinians , and its insistence on settlement building, have steadily undermined both the security and the essence of the [Israeli]state, which was founded as a refuge from dispossession… [and] its prospects will not be enhanced by an adherence to the status quo [of occupation].”

Remnick adds, “That was true before the uprising in Cairo, and will remain true after it. This was true before the uprising in Cairo, and will remain true after it.” Because: “Judgment—whether rendered by gods or by people---can be postponed but not forestalled.”

But is Washington listening? Not at all, judging by its veto of the Security Council resolution condemning the Israeli settlement activity in occupied Palestinian territories. The irony is that only a short while ago the Obama administration was urging Israel to extend its 10-month moratorium (which the Netanyahu government was forced to impose under pressure from the Obama administration on illegal construction) for a little longer to facilitate peace talks between Israel and the Palestine Authority. Which Tel Aviv refused?

If, this was the US position a while ago, why did it not join other Security Council members to condemn Israel for acting against international law? Susan Rice, the US ambassador to the UN, argued it was a matter better pursued in negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

At a time when the Arab world is going through a people’s revolution, on the Palestinian issue the US is still taking shelter behind arcane and, frankly, absurd arguments that even its European allies are finding it hard to digest. As Jonathan Freedland has written in the Guardian, “… that peace with Arab rulers alone could never last, and that one day Israel will have to make peace with the peoples [Arabs] it lives among.”

And he adds, “ That day may not be coming soon—but that truth just got a whole lot harder to avoid.” Not if the United States will continue to reinforce Israeli delusion by giving it political, economic and military support.

The point is that the US’ Middle Eastern strategy is in tatters. It had two pillars. First: an alliance with regional dictators to keep the Arab people down because, if allowed democratic rights, they might elect an Islamist regime hostile to the US strategic interests in the region. Indeed, there was a convergence of interests between the US and Arab dictators and monarchs because both feared the Arab people and Islamists.

The second pillar is the United States’ unquestioning commitment to Israeli state and its “security”. Both pillars are interconnected because Israeli “security” and US strategic interests require supine rulers in the Middle East, like Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, that would do their bidding.

Regarding the first, the People’s Power has shown that Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic groups were as much spooked by the popular and essentially secular nature of the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world as anybody else. The militant Islam as a political force was largely exaggerated. Indeed, the protesters everywhere were gathering around the banner of freedom and democracy that should calm US fears.

Even a prominent US conservative analyst like Robert Kagan of Brookings Institution, a prominent early advocate of Iraq war, has said, “ We were overly spooked by the victory of Hamas” in the 2006 Palestinian elections. And he says, “…There’s no way for us to go through the long evolution of history without allowing Islamists to participate in democratic society.”

Which raises a pertinent question: “What are we going to do ---support dictators for the rest of eternity because we don’t want Islamists taking their share of some political system in the Middle East?” In other words, the US would need to reorient its Middle Eastern policy to accommodate the dynamics of democracy in that region, including legitimate political representation of Islamic parties.

Writing in the New York Times, Nicholas Kristof is equally emphatic when he says, “For decades, the US embraced corrupt and repressive autocracies in the Middle East, turning a blind eye to torture and repression, in part because of fear that the ‘democratic rabble’ might be hostile to us.” He adds, “Far too often, we were both myopic and just plain on the wrong side.”

An important factor in this has been the Israeli pressure, reinforced by the powerful Jewish lobby in the United States, to keep supporting and nurturing the despotic rulers because they were easy to manipulate and were equally fearful of the “democratic rabble”. Over the decades, Israel and the US have become indivisible over the Middle East, particularly on the Palestinian question. And that still seems to be the case, despite all the fluttering of democracy in the Arab world, as evident in the US vetoing of the UN Security Council resolution to condemn Israeli settlement activity in occupied Palestine.

Unless the United States starts seeing its national interest independently of Israel, there will be this dichotomy in its Middle Eastern policy. The democratic Arab countries in a new Middle East are unlikely to confront Israel militarily over Palestine, but their popular constituencies at home will not let them turn a blind eye to the sufferings and bombing of fellow Arabs in the Palestine. And this will have an important bearing on their relations with the United States.

Note: This article was first published in Daily Times