Wednesday, April 25, 2012


            Syrian conundrum           
S P SETH
The situation in Syria has reached a dangerous stalemate, with or without Kofi Annan. The Arab Spring seems to have hit a hard rock in that country where the regime, though unpopular with majority of the Syrian people, has some advantages. First: the country’s minorities and its business class are afraid of the alternative to the Bashar al-Assad regime. The alternative of a chaotic Sunni political order, with the likely domination of the Muslim Brotherhood or a variation of it after a deadly civil war, sends shivers down the collective spine of the Alawites (the ruling Shia sect), Christians, Kurds and other small communities. In other words, the Bashar regime has the core support of about 30 per cent of the population and they are standing by it; even though the al-Assad dynasty has a lot of blood on their hands. His father, Hafez al-Assad and the country’s dictator for 30 years, brutally crushed a rebellion in Hama in 1982 with an estimated 10,000 people killed. Which kept the deadly peace in Syria for 30 years. Bashar succeeded his father in 2000 after his death. And the son is repeating his father’s known prescription of quelling a rebellion through brutal force but it doesn’t seem to be working so far.
 Second: Bashar is not as isolated as media reports seem to suggest. He has Iran behind it, and Iraq is a friendly neighbor. The Hezbollah in Lebanon, with their veto on the Lebanese political system, are likely to keep that country out of any anti-Bashar regional coalition. And Russia and China are refusing to line up behind the US and Europe in the UN Security Council for any kind of military intervention to bring down the Bashar regime.  They are cautious this time because the Security Council resolution on Libya, which China and Russia supported, was overinterpreted by the US and Europe to bring down the Gaddafi regime. However, in the face of mounting civilian killings, reported to be over 9,000, they have been pressuring Damascus to do something tangible to resolve the situation. The Bashar regime has announced some initiatives to liberalize the country’s polity but it is all come too little too late. The Kofi Annan’s initiative has their support, including a Security Council resolution to send unarmed civilian monitors to ensure that both sides maintain the ceasefire enjoined on them. But whether it will last remains problematic. In other words, it is a messy situation with no prospect of any real breakthrough.
The Bashar regime also has the advantage of an almost complete control of the government and the armed forces. True, there are some defections from the army but the core of the military remains loyal. And in the government, there is virtually no defection of its diplomats, intelligence community and politicians. This is in stark contrast with Libya where the institutions became quite porous as the rebellion took hold.  The Syrian rebels, on the other hand, are quite divided. Besides, they have no liberated area to operate from. They don’t have anything like Benghazi, as was the case with the Libyan rebels. They are, therefore, counting on outside material help to advance their cause, which, in the present situation, is hard to come--- in any case not on the scale that Libya received.
Syria, though, remains under considerable international pressure and it might not be able to get away with its killing spree. At the same time, without effective international material support and intervention on the rebels’ behalf, they are in no position to topple the Bashar regime. It is not a totally isolated regime, as we have seen. The Israeli silence on the Syrian situation is telling. And by their silence they seem to be favoring the Assad regime. And it is understandable, from their viewpoint, because they would rather have the Bashar regime rule and control Syria rather than a radicalized and Islamic Syria at odds with them. They have had enough of the Arab Spring for their liking.
In this stalemated situation, it is not surprising that the international community is banking so much on Kofi Annan’s mission. And there has been progress of sorts with a unanimous UN Security Council Resolution (including Russia and China) authorizing the dispatch of unarmed civilian monitors. It puts even more pressure on the regime. The Bashar regime might continue to dig its heels but if it is unable to decisively prevail politically and militarily, its position is likely to become untenable.
 Internally: it might create cracks in the military. Though there is no visible sign of any unrest in the higher military command, the possibility of a military coup cannot be entirely ruled out with the successor regime inclined to make a political deal. Second: with the regime unable to ensure stability and security, it might start to lose the support of the minorities and business community keen to explore alternatives with the rebels. Third: the continuing violence, unrest and international sanctions are bound to seriously damage the country’s economy and hollow out the country. It might, therefore, become difficult for the Bashar regime to sustain military operations against the rebels for much longer. It has already been over a year since the unrest began, and the army is overstretched being shifted from one place to another. One cannot, therefore, rule out a sudden collapse at some point of time. Predictions about any outcome are only guesswork. But one thing is for sure that Syria is headed for a bloodbath with or without the Bashar regime from sectarian conflict.
At this point it is pertinent to point out the irony of the Gulf kingdoms, led by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, playing an important rallying role against Syria, considering their own human rights records in their respective kingdoms—hardly an example worth emulating. Saudi Arabia, for instance, is constantly engaged in crushing the Shia population in its oil-bearing eastern province. And, with its fellow potentates of other Gulf countries, is helping Bahrain to do the same with its Shia population.
There are two reasons for this. First: Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council are in the vanguard role to prevent Iran from playing an important/dominating role in the region. And Syria happens to be Iran’s close regional friend. Saudi Arabia and its fellow kings fear that an Iranian foothold in any Arab country will encourage Shiite disaffection and rebellion in their midst. Second: Syria is ruled by an Alawite (a Shia sect) minority killing Sunni rebels. It, therefore, has a sectarian ring to it, with Riyadh as protector of the Sunni population. 
What is being perpetrated in Syria by the Bashar regime is disgusting and repugnant. But with countries like Saudi Arabia and other Gulf rulers and their partners in the Arab League taking on them the mantle of promoting human rights and democracy, is distasteful, to put it mildly. 

Note: This article was first published in The Daily Times. 

Saturday, March 31, 2012

Afghan imbroglio

By S P SETH

Some of the recent events in Afghanistan might as well be the script for a horror movie. We have the spectacle of US soldiers urinating on corpses of their Taliban enemy, burning copies of Koran and, the most recent dastardly act of, an American soldier systematically breaking into some Afghan homes and killing family members, including women and children, without any rhyme or reason. The killings are said to be the random acts of a lone US soldier. But try telling this to the Afghan people who detect a pattern in US cruelty with no respect for Afghan lives.

Whatever the explanation, the damage is done with the US headed for exit from Afghanistan, sooner rather than later. The US, in any case, was already looking for a dignified exit by 2014 but that might not be happening now. The Taliban has suspended its tenuous contacts with the US in Qatar, with no new interlocutors in sight in such a charged atmosphere. And Karzai has asked the US to confine its troops to major bases, with a corresponding lull in counter-insurgency operations and nation building tasks for the period ahead. Of course, Karzai doesn’t want to be left behind the Taliban in voicing displeasure and frustration with the US. It is increasingly becoming an untenable situation for the US and NATO military presence in Afghanistan, and how it is sorted out would remain to be seen.

If history is any guide, the British had an awful time in the 19th century with their recurrent military expeditions into Afghanistan. In 1841, its entire force of 16,500 perished but for one soldier. The Soviet Union’s experience in 1980s was equally ignominious, eventually leading to a humiliating withdrawal after many casualties and lost morale. With some luck the US might stage a more orderly withdrawal and without total humiliation.

Ever since the US surge of 2009 with some initial successes, the military operations in Afghanistan have largely been a holding operation to contain the Taliban. The other two elements of the US strategy---to secure the interior and foster nation building ---have not made much headway. The Taliban were always around, making tactical retreat here and there, with people collaborating with them either out of fear or loyalty. As for raising the new Afghan national army and police forces with funding and training from the US and allies, they are proving highly porous riddled with Taliban influence and volunteers.

Since the US hasn’t really succeeded in creating a popular national Afghan counter-force to the Taliban, the prognosis for the country is for more chaos and bloodshed after the US withdrawal. Because of the Karzai government’s virtually total dependence on US armed presence and funding, it might not take long for the entire edifice to collapse with the new Afghan army splintering into groups fighting for competing power contenders or operating free-lance.

The Karzai government has very little popular support in the country for two good reasons. First: it is seen as American creation and imposition. And second: it is corrupt to the bone. And no matter what Karzai does, now and then, to attack US acts and behavior in Afghanistan, he lacks credibility. And the time is coming when his contradictory, but ineffectual politics of playing all sides of the game, might land him in an awful lot of trouble with no escape hatch.

On surface it might seem that the Taliban will be able to reclaim their lost kingdom in Afghanistan. Earlier they had come on top in the civil war that ensued after the Soviet withdrawal. They had three advantages at that time. First: they had, by and large, a clean image as being free of corruption. Second: after the mayhem of the civil war and lawlessness, their commitment to enforce strict Islamic rule found favor with many Afghans. And third: they had Pakistan’s support for its own strategic reasons, particularly to have a dependent and reliable Afghan regime for, what came to be known, as “defense in depth” against India.

Let us see how far these factors still favor the Taliban. They still are relatively clean compared to the Karzai regime that has become synonymous with corruption. They are likely to have a problem, though, with enforcing strict Islamic rule after the relatively liberal social mores that have developed in some cities, even if they are benefitting only a small class. The limited start to the education of girls is one example. There is also some relaxation of restrictions on entertainment, as with music, films and television. All this is counter to the Taliban precepts and practice, though they are capable of brutal repression.

They still have Pakistan’s support, with their leadership reportedly sheltering in Pakistan. Whether they will do Pakistan’s bidding, when in power, is another thing. It would seem that their rise to power in Afghanistan, after the Soviet withdrawal, did more harm to Pakistan than any good. For one, Pakistani Taliban have been an outgrowth of the Taliban in Afghanistan, with disastrous consequences for the country. Second, their sheltering and support of the al Qaeda leadership, blamed for the 9/11 bombing of the US targets, made Pakistan the witting or unwitting theatre of the US war against Afghanistan. The consequences for Pakistan of all this are still playing out.

In any case, any possible Taliban ascendancy in the post-US Afghanistan is unlikely to bring lasting peace and unity to Afghanistan and, by implication, to Pakistan. At best the Taliban might become dominant in the Pushtun region of the country, setting in motion another civil war against other ethnic and sectarian communities. The Pashtuns, the largest community at 42 per cent, are not the majority. And the Taliban have virtually no support among other sizeable groups of Afghans. The Tajiks are reportedly the second biggest at 27 per cent, followed by Hazaras and Uzbeks at 9 per cent each, with small communities of Aimak (4 per cent), Turkmens (3 per cent) and Baloch (2 percent).

When Afghanistan had some stability under King Zahir Shah, it functioned as a loose coalition of diverse tribes, clans, sects and ethnic groups operating basically as autonomous groups. The overthrow of the King in 1973 by his cousin, Prince Daud, started a chain of events that has meant a continuing state of instability and warfare to this day. Which doesn’t mean that the solution lies in bringing back monarchy. What it means is that any system that tends to centralize authority in Kabul, be it under the Taliban or whatever, will simply prolong Afghan agony. There is need for a flexible and accommodative political dispensation with tolerance in diversity. The Taliban are hardly the kind for a process of national reconciliation and unity, with their ideological and religious rigidity. Not only will they prove divisive in Afghanistan but are likely to plunge even Pakistan further into confusion and chaos.

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

Sunday, March 4, 2012

Iranian Nuclear Threat?

By S P SETH

Every country has its demons and they are particularly handy when rallying people against an enemy. Iran is such a demon with Israel, the US and the west. It even sprung up at a recent forum on Australian TV, when Iran’s perceived nuclear threat was the subject of a discussion among the participants. Some high profiled Israeli participants argued that it was not only a threat to Israel but also the world at large. The general argument, spoken or unspoken, is that the “mad mullahs” ruling Iran have no respect for human rights and hence not subject to any rational concern for humanity. They will, therefore do anything to advance their agenda. Of course, the threat to Israel from Iran’s nuclear program, the argument goes, is the greatest as it has threatened to wipe out Israel from existence. Though Tony Judt, a “self-hating Jew” as his fellow Jews would call him, questioned this Israeli formulation. He reportedly said that “the fear that Israel could be wiped off the face of the earth…” is not a genuine fear. In his view, it is politically calculated rhetorical strategy.

The question, though, is: how is Iran’s so far non-existent nuclear weapons a threat, when Israel has enough nuclear bombs to not only wipe out Iran but also all its Arab neighbors, if it chose to do so? But that is never the question. It is stated as a fact that Iran will soon have nuclear weapons and it will hardly wait to wipe out Israel from the face of the earth. Therefore, before it might even happen Israel has to preemptively destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Letting Iran become a nuclear power is even more dangerous than the old cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union where nuclear threat was contained through mutual deterrence. Because, as Jonathan Freedland argues in a recent column in the Guradian: “But an Iran-Israel nuclear stand-off would not be like the US-Soviet containment of the cold war, with its lines of communication and negotiated military doctrines underpinning a stable detente. There is no such communication or mutual understanding between Iran and Israel.” Therefore, if Iran were to become a nuclear power: “ The Middle East and the world would be on a hair-trigger to nuclear war.”

These are self-serving arguments that portray Iran as a demon of sorts not bound by any notion of rationality and morality. Writing in the Guardian, Professor John Mueller, author of the book Atomic Obsession, observes, “Iran’s leadership, though unpleasant in many ways, is not a gaggle of suicidal lunatics.” And he warns that, “ If Iran wants to develop a nuclear weapon, the only way it can be effectively stopped is invasion and occupation, an undertaking that would make America’s costly war in Iraq look like child’s play…”

However, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has reportedly said, “We are not seeking nuclear weapons because the Islamic Republic of Iran considers possession of nuclear weapons a sin…and believes that holding such weapons is useless, harmful and dangerous.”

The point to make, though, is that any country acquiring nuclear capability can graduate to making a bomb if it puts its mind and resources to it. But, even then, it is not an easy task spread over a number years involving miniaturization of weapons and the appropriate missile technology and capability. By any reckoning Iran is nowhere near it. The 20 per cent enrichment claim, recently made by Iran, even if true, falls way short of the required enrichment capacity of about 90 per cent.

The available intelligence, despite all the scaremongering, doesn’t support that Iran is moving to acquire nuclear bombs. Even the Obama administration, having first exaggerated the Iranian nuclear threat, is now seeking to dissuade Israel from its preemptive strike on Iranian nuclear installations. Indeed, as David Patrikarakos writes in the London Review of Books, “ While railing against the iniquity of international institutions [including the International Atomic Energy Agency], Iran… at no point has suggested that the system itself is wrong, merely that it is unfairly weighted against the developing world.” He adds: “The Islamic Republic does not seek to overthrow the international order but to be accorded what it believes is its proper place within it.” In other words, Iran refuses to be demonized or treated as a pariah state-- its fate since the 1979 revolution.

It is already under one of the most comprehensive sanctions regimes designed to cripple its economy. And Israel is openly threatening that it will attack Iran’s nuclear facilities in the next couple of months if the present sanctions regime doesn’t work. Such Israeli bellicosity is even starting to worry the United States, even though it is in agreement with Israel about the dangers of a nuclear Iran and, as President Obama keeps saying that all US options are open to prevent Iran from doing this. In this US presidential election year, the Republican contenders are outdoing each other in espousing Israeli hard line against Iran.

But the Obama administration and the US military brass are now urging and pleading with Israel not to light the fuse lest it all goes haywire. General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff recently warned that an Israeli “strike [on Iran] at this time would be destabilizing”, a euphemism to denote that things could get out of control. Indeed, the view in the US intelligence and military community, is that bombing Iran, as Lieutenant General David Deptula (retired) has said “ain’t going to be that easy.” The New York Times also quotes Michael Hayden, a former CIA director, as saying that air strikes capable of seriously setting back Iran’s nuclear program are “beyond the capacity” of Israel.

The Israeli Government will be fully aware of these limitations, as it has even been warned against this course by some of its former top intelligence operatives. But the entire stratagem seems meant to create a situation where the US would have no option but to be sucked into another war in the Middle East started by Israel. If that were to happen, the US might find itself facing a situation worse than its ill-fated military attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq. In its present weakened economic situation, with hefty cuts in defense expenditure over the next ten years, another military adventure will be disastrous for the United States, not to speak of the misery it will inflict on Iranian people. As for Israel, with a progressively weakened US strategic shield, its Iranian adventure might be a case of one adventure too many.

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

Wednesday, January 18, 2012

2012: Defining Year for the US

By S P SETH

The year 2012 will be, in so many ways, a defining time for the United States. It is the year of the presidential election that will show if the election as President of a black American in 2008 was simply an aberration. It is true that Barack Obama hasn’t performed well as President and could lose the election because of his lackluster record. But to lose against any of the present list of Republican contenders, none of them a stand out as a future president will, not insignificantly, be due to his racial identity. Which would mean that much of the self-congratulation many American liberals heaped on their country as having entered the post-racial phase of its history after Obama’s election might simply turn out to be false.

As it is, nearly 50 per cent of the prisoners in US jails are black, even though they constitute only about 13 percent of the population. In a review of some books on US’s racial divisions, Anthony Lewis writes in a recent issue of the New York Review of Books: “One analyst reckons that 32 per cent of black boys born in 2001 would spend part of their lives in prison, state or federal.”

The New Year is important for the US in another way. Which is: will the US be able to arrest its economic decline? Apart from its mountain of debt at about $15 trillion, about 100 per cent of its GDP, the consequences of its precarious economy in human terms are frightening. For instance, 25 million people are reportedly either unemployed or do not have enough work to get by, not to speak of those who have simply stopped looking for work in frustration. About 47 million people are living on food stamps. We are talking here of the world’s richest country. In a country of 300 million people, such statistics are staggering. And if this steep slide is not arrested and reversed, the US might be faced with serious social unrest. Already, the Occupy Wall Street movement is morphing into different categories of people’s protest.

On top of it, the country’s politics is becoming increasingly fractious. The Republican majority in the House of Representatives has brought any meaningful governance to a virtual halt. So much so that they brought the country to near bankruptcy by refusing to raise, till the last moment, the country’s debt ceiling. Even as the country is facing the worst economic crisis since the 1930’s depression, the political elites are refusing to face the reality of the US’ changing situation. Such denial is indeed an important reason why the country continues to be in such a state of disarray politically and economically. This mismatch between reality and rhetoric is a serious problem.

And it is also reflected in the US’ global policies. True, the US is still the strongest military power in the world. But as Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, all the military power in the world cannot win insurgencies without popular support of the local people on the ground. The shift to drone attacks against terrorist targets in Pakistan and elsewhere in the world might eliminate some top leaders, but the collateral damage in terms of civilian casualties is much greater. If the goal is to rally local people against terrorists and insurgents, the civilian casualties from drone attacks is certainly the wrong way to go about it.

The point is that the US is in a pretty difficult spot, despite its military prowess. Even after spending a trillion dollars on military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (the total cost, to include all related expenses, is estimated at over $3 trillion), it is going nowhere. In Iraq, for instance, where the US has pulled out its troops, the country looks like descending into a sectarian civil war. And in Afghanistan, where it is proposing to pull out by 2014, Washington is now seeking a peaceful way out by making contacts with the Taliban. They, in turn, insist on a prior US military withdrawal for meaningful talks.

Still, Washington claims that both Iraq and Afghanistan have been worthwhile military enterprises—the first for bringing democracy in the country, and the second for destroying the al Qaeda bases, and introducing elements of stability and democracy. However, Iraq is now left to its own devises to deal with a turbulent internal situation. In Afghanistan, the process is still fluid and it is anybody’s guess if it will get better or worse as the US starts its withdrawal process to 2014.

Even as Iraq and Afghanistan are still suffering from the ravages of US military invasions, another hot spot is emerging with Iran now targeted for refusing to abandon its nuclear program. The US and its European allies are seeking to choke off Iran’s economic lifeline by targeting its oil exports. Countries seeking to import Iranian oil will face penalties. In effect, it will amount to an economic boycott of Iran to force it into abandoning its nuclear program. Tehran has responded by threatening to close off the Strait of Hormuz, thus blocking a vital waterway for a quarter of the world’s oil supplies. This will impact disastrously on global economy, already in a precarious situation.

The US, in turn, has made clear that its Navy will continue its task of ensuring freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. If both Iran and the US are serious about their intentions, then it doesn’t require a genius to work out that this could mean military confrontation between the two countries in the year of presidential elections in the United States. The year 2012 will thus be pivotal in regard to how the US and West will deal with Iran. Hopefully, they both are playing a game of bluff and brinkmanship. But these things have a way of getting out of control sometimes. The US has said a number of times that all the options to deal with Iran’s nuclear ambitions are on table.

Another issue that is seriously complicating the US relations with the Islamic world relates to the Palestinian question. The US has quashed the Palestinian quest for recognition of its statehood through the Security Council. Instead, it is forcing another round of talks this year between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Since Israel is refusing to stop further encroachments into the West Bank and Jerusalem through its settlement activities, there doesn’t seem any hope that these talks will go anywhere. It is just a diversion intended, probably, to scuttle any further movement of political unity between the Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank Palestinian authorities. In this year of presidential elections, the US political establishment of both the Democratic and Republican sides will be, even more than usual, seeking to please the country’s powerful Jewish lobby. Therefore, on this score, the US relations with the Muslim world are unlikely to make any headway.

The unfurling of a new US defense strategy to focus more on China’s rise in Asia-Pacific is likely to further complicate Sino-US relations this year. Even for a secure and assured superpower this is a long list of challenges in the New Year. But the US is no longer in that position, racked as it is with economic and political problems at home and abroad.

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

Thursday, December 15, 2011

US’s Iranian Obsession

By S.P.SETH

The storming of the British embassy in Iran, and the retaliatory measures by Britain and other Western countries to curtail diplomatic ties with that country, has escalated their cold war (so far) to a dangerous level. At its root is the perceived Iranian ambition to acquire nuclear weapons.

Why are the US and its allies so obsessed with Iran? Surely, even if it were to become a nuclear power (which is not the case, as things stand), it cannot become such a horrible threat to the world. The superior nuclear arsenal of the United States, Israel and others will annihilate Iran if it were to use its (presently non-existent) nuclear weapons against any other country. This is not to suggest that Iran should become a nuclear power. Indeed, for a credible nuclear free world, all existing nuclear countries should shed their nuclear weapons. Until then, they have no moral authority to enforce their will on others. Because as long as nuclear status is a power symbol as well as the weapon of last resort, it will continue to tempt nations able to go that way.

To understand Iran’s pariah status, one has to go back to its Islamic revolution in 1979. The overthrow of the Shah of Iran in 1979, a loyal US ally, was a terrible blow to the United States for reasons of geopolitics, strategy, and the control of oil supplies from the Middle East, of which Iran was a major producer. Iran was the first chink in the US’ strategy of controlling the Middle East, and could set a precedent for other countries in the region. On top of it, the new Islamic Iran was not only contemptuous of US power; it even had the temerity to humiliate the United States by holding hostage its embassy staff. Since then, on both sides, there is a continuing war of nerves.

In 1980, the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein invaded Iran, with US encouragement and support, to assert Iraq’s sovereignty over the vital Shatt-al-Arab waterway. The resultant war between the two countries lasted eight years, with an estimated million dead and wounded--- perhaps even more. Iran suffered the most in human lives lost, with the war ending in a stalemate and a UN ceasefire. But it wobbled the Iranian regime and set back its political agenda of promoting the Islamic revolution through its example. And that was not an inconsiderable gain for the United States and its Middle Eastern allies comprising the region’s dictators and kings. These countries, like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and others, were feeling uncomfortable and insecure from Iran’s Islamic revolution.

The irony of it is that Saddam Hussein’s Iran adventure set the stage for his destruction at the hands of his benefactors, the United States and its allies. An important reason for Saddam’s invasion and occupation of Iraq (illegal as it was) was his country’s large financial debts incurred through borrowings from neighbors like Kuwait. At the time they were only happy to lend all that Saddam wanted because he was fighting for all of them against the dreaded new Islamic regime of Iran. And when he was virtually defeated (because Iran was ready to fight on), Kuwait asked for its money back, which Saddam had no way of paying. In that desperate situation, he decided to annex Kuwait and solve all his financial problems and more by taking over the country’s oil wealth. He had reportedly mentioned his plans of annexing Kuwait to the US ambassador in his country who, the story goes, didn’t raise any objection. Which Saddam took as clearance from the United States, with their close relationship forged during the Iran-Iraq war.

As we know, Saddam’s Kuwait invasion led to the first Gulf war in which the United States defeated Iraqi forces and Kuwait was restored to its ruling dynasty with Iraq required to pay reparations. It was also subjected to a harsh regime of UN sanctions, impacting its population, especially women and children. The United States just stopped short of overthrowing the Saddam regime, which task was subsequently completed by President George Bush senior’s son after he became President in 2001. The second Gulf war was unleashed on Iraq because of Saddam regime’s alleged links with the terrorists as well as its weapons of mass destruction (WMD). And that was a lie. But he had to go any way, as he had outlived his usefulness against Iran and was too difficult--- among other things. However, initially, the speed with which the US forces advanced made Iraq’s neighbors, like Iran and Syria, nervous lest it might be their turn next. They became keen to cooperate with the US to hunt down terrorists in their own backyards and to generally improve relations with the United States. But, at the time, the US was in a celebratory mode, with President Bush declaring the “mission accomplished” on the decks of a US warship.

The US was on a mission to bring about democracy and freedom in the region under its control and supervision and to have uninterrupted access to oil supplies. At the same time, the demonstrative effect of strong and successful US action was supposed to have salutary effect on groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Palestinians in occupied territories. In other words, it will not only reassert firmly the US control and dominance but also solve Israel’s security situation in a volatile region. This was the time when there was so much talk of reintroducing benign imperialism and to make the United States’ dominant role in the world clear cut both in words and deeds. The point of recalling all this is to note that Iran’s clerical regime is still around, though it has multiple problems and challenges at home, as we shall analyze later.

An important, if not determining factor, in the US obsession with Iran is the role Israel and the powerful Jewish lobby plays in the formulation of its foreign and strategic policies in the region, with Iran perceived as a serious threat. Iran has been dismissive of Israel and a strong proponent of the Palestinian cause. President Ahmadinejad has made provocative statements denying that the Holocaust ever happened. Similarly, he doesn’t accept the legitimacy of the Israeli state, promising to eliminate it. Against this backdrop, Israel sees an existential threat from Iran’s nuclear program. And wants to bomb its nuclear plants to preempt it. Obviously, it would prefer the US to do it, as Iran is seen as a global threat. If not, it would like to have comprehensive US backing.

Lately, the United States and its allies have ratcheted up the pressure on Iran, following an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report pointing to “credible” evidence suggesting Iran is working towards developing nuclear weapons. But there is nothing really new in this because Iran has been accused of doing this for a number of years now, even though the US intelligence suggested it otherwise not so long ago. Indeed, there is no hard evidence that Iran is working to acquire a nuclear arsenal. But the IAEA report is convenient to launch another concerted campaign and to impose another layer of sanctions on Iran.

The upshot of the new sanctions is to put a total economic embargo on Iran by the US and its allies. At the same time, Iran is being told that the US is keeping all its options open to force it to forgo its nuclear program. Which obviously means that the US is not ruling out military means including, presumably, bombing Iranian nuclear facilities. At the same time, Israel is letting it be known that it is studying plans to bomb Iranian nuclear plants. To emphasize the urgency of the situation, Israel’s defense minister, Ehud Barak, has reportedly said that his country has less than a year to act.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s credibility recently took a serious hit when a conversation between President Sarkozy of France and President Obama was picked up while talking about Netanyahu at the G-20 summit. During their tête-à-tête, when a mike was still on, Sarkozy said: “I cannot stand him. He’s is a liar.” To which Obama replied, “You are fed up with him? I have to deal with him everyday.” Now Israeli publicists are trying to make out an argument that Netanyahu’s image should not distract from the view that he is the authentic voice of his country on the question of Iranian nuclear threat to Israel and the need for a preemptive strike.

In a recent newspaper article David Landau, a former editor-in-chief of the Israeli newspaper, Haaretz, wrote: “Israel was created from the ashes of Auschwitz. Its primary mission is ‘never again.’” He added, “The world needs to recognize that Netanyahu authentically articulates that perspective and that reality.” But if Israel were to unilaterally bomb Iranian nuclear plants, it would not only face a massive Iranian counter-attack but is also likely to create a major crisis in the Middle East with Israel at the receiving end of it which might, for once, transcend the Shia-Sunni divide to face a common Israeli threat to the region.

Landau doesn’t under-rate the dangers of bombing Iran on its own. He reflects the calculation of many in Israel, including its government, when he writes: “Against all that [the dangers and consequences for Israel] is the calculation, carefully unspoken but present nevertheless, that a unilateral Israeli strike would trigger massive American intervention against Iran’s nuclear program…because Washington would have an overwhelming interest in ‘finishing the job’ that Israel began.” Is Landau the medium to openly convey the message of his government? It certainly seems like when he finishes his article with a warning of sorts: “The bluffer [Netanyahu] isn’t bluffing. Let’s hope Obama, Sarkozy and the rest are hearing him loud and clear.”

Even as this kind of drum beating is going on, Iran’s detractors hope that, “The regime in Tehran is deeply unpopular and may yet implode.” That may be so but there is no better way to rally Iranians around the regime when the country is in grave danger of facing a foreign attack.

It is true that the clerical regime in Iran is beset with serious internal problems. The presidential elections in 2009, and the brutal crackdown on the opposition, dented the regime’s legitimacy. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s return to presidency was very controversial, with some regarding it as a cruel farce. Having made it to the presidency second time with the support of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Ahmadinejad is not comfortable with the over-riding political authority of his mentor. He seems keen to set up his own power base to challenge Khamenei. In this connection, an interesting article published in a recent issue of the New York Review of Books, written by an “anonymous” Iran expert, is quite significant. It says the rupture between Khamenei and Ahmadinejad was provoked by “Esfandiyar Rahim Mashaei, President Ahmadinejad’s chief of staff and close advisor [two of them are also related, with Mashaei’s daughter married to the President’s son]…” Mashaei is “reputed to be in contact with the Twelfth Imam--- a messianic figure…” believed to be in hiding since the tenth century.”

Ahmadinejad has resisted attempts by the Supreme leader to have Mashaei removed, but his efforts to have him groomed as his successor (when he leaves the presidency) seems doomed. Seeking to set up a higher political and religious authority than Khameini in the person of Mashaei, as a medium with the Twelfth Imam, is like making the Supreme leader irrelevant. It doesn’t look like this will work because, for one, Mashaei, with some of President’s other cronies, is involved in an embezzlement/banking scandal. And, second, Ahmadinejad’s regime has been quite incompetent in managing the country’s economy. The unemployment is high, inflation is raging and Iran’s middles class is unhappy with the country’s state of affairs. And with a tighter Western regime of sanctions, things are going to get worse for the mass of people. However, any foreign attack on Iranian nuclear installations, and the consequent series of events, will become the glue that holds the country together under the existing regime.

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times

Wednesday, October 26, 2011

Iran: US’s Perpetual Bad Boy

By S P SETH

As if the world were not in enough trouble already, another crisis is brewing with considerable destructive potential. This relates to the US allegation of Iran’s involvement in a plot to kill the Saudi ambassador in the United States. This was allegedly hatched with two Iranian front men, one of them a US citizen, who hired a Mexican drug mafia to do the killing in a restaurant frequented by the Saudi ambassador for a fee of $1.5 million. The plot was discovered and foiled in an FBI sting operation.

The US aired these allegations at a high level, with the country’s attorney general and FBI chief, fronting the press. More importantly still, President Obama also raised the issue at a press conference. The seriousness of the charge against Iran is apparent with Obama demanding answers, emphasizing that all options were now open, including possibly military measures. In the meantime, the US will work to further tighten international sanctions against Iran on top of a layer of them already in place.

Not surprisingly, Iran has denied the charge calling it a political fabrication.. Its supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, defiantly warned that Iran would deliver an “unforgettable response” to any “improper actions” from the United States over the alleged assassination plot.

This is a serious charge. But even in the US, there is skepticism about Iran’s alleged involvement. Mansour Arbabsiar, a used car salesman who is charged with the plot, is not the kind of guy with the skills and organizational ability to be involved in such a complex and dangerous task. According to a former business partner, “He was pretty disorganized, always losing things like keys, titles, probably a thousand cell phones…” In other words, he was kind of scatterbrain. At the same time, he “never spoke ill of the United States”, liked his whisky and wasn’t religious at all.

“He couldn’t even pray, doesn’t know how to fast. He used to drink, smoke pot, go with prostitutes.” These are some of the descriptions about Arbabsiar from friends and business associates who have known him for decades. On this portrayal, he is hardly the person who will have the passion and conviction of a religious fanatic or arch nationalist.

If Arbabsiar is the fall guy in an international power game, so much the worst for him. The question then is: what is this game? As far as one can see, it has different facets. At this time the politics of the coming US presidential election is an important factor. President Obama doesn’t want to end up as a one-term President. He is rating poorly in almost all opinion polls. Therefore, there is great need for one or more issues to distract the people’s attention from the country’s economy that is weighing him down. In the absence of any overriding domestic issue(s) to trump economy, an external mischief/danger from a known enemy, like Iran, might work. Whether or not it will is another matter. Iran is already a nuclear villain, perceived as posing a threat to the United States and its allies, most notably Israel.

Israel has been pressing the United States for some time now (starting with the Bush administration) to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities or else let it do the job with its support and help. Indeed, the then vice-president Dick Cheney was understanding and supportive of Israel undertaking this task in the interest of its security. But with the United States already bogged down in Afghanistan and Iraq, Bush had stopped listening to Cheney.

There is no suggestion here that the US might let loose Israel on Iran, but this talk of keeping all options open is suspiciously reminiscent of the Bush-Cheney era. Any military action against Iran will have dangerous and unpredictable consequences for regional and global politics. With or without any military action against Iran, Obama’s tough talk against Teheran will go well with the Jewish lobby in the United States and garner electoral support for Obama in his race for re-election. Even though the Jewish population of the US is small, they are politically very powerful, being the United States’ richest and most successful minority. They are also part of a close political alliance with the country’s Christian right and support for them cuts across political divide between the Democrats and the Republicans.

Another explanation is the Saudi factor. Ever since the Arab Spring blossomed, the relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia have been strained, particularly, because after sitting on the fence, the US abandoned its old and reliable ally, Hosni Mubarak. Hosni Mubarak’s overthrow, with the US apparently doing very little to save him, even from subsequent public humiliation of a caged trial, hasn’t gone well with the Saudi royal family. It is not a good look for the Saudi royals.

Through its moral support for the Arab Spring (though belated), the US has lost important regional allies in Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia, without any concrete gains—apart from Libya where Gaddafi has been eliminated. In this situation of diminished strategic assets, the US is keen to maintain and nurture its strategic relationship with Saudi Arabia. Which not only is its major oil supplier but also the dominant voice in the Gulf Cooperation Council. It is, therefore, keen to mollify the bruised Saudi kingdom.

For Saudi Arabia, there are two major concerns. First, of course, is the Arab Spring, being a threat to the kingdom’s stability and even its monarchy. For the present, though, it seems to have bought off most of its citizens with a bit more share in the country’s oil wealth. Second: Riyadh is terribly worried about Iran’s regional designs. The Saudis believe that Iran is creating trouble in Bahrain, Yemen, where there is a Shiite separatist movement, and in Saudi Arabia’s oil rich eastern province with its Shiite majority.

Riyadh has canvassed the United States to further toughen its policy against Iran. As WikiLeaks revealed, the Saudis, like Israelis (but for their different strategic reasons), pressured the US to bomb Iranian nuclear installations. Since the nuclear issue hasn’t so far galvanized the world into anti-Iranian frenzy, and Iran is managing to live with multiple sanctions, a new issue has emerged by way of the alleged Iranian plot to kill the Saudi ambassador in the United States. Washington is demanding answers from Iran, is further tightening already tight sanctions and has put all options on the table to deal with Iran.

This should mollify Saudi Arabia, and might even, at some point, divert the focus from popular revolts in Arab countries with Iran emerging as a regional and global threat with its nuclear ambitions. Whether or not it works is another question, but it should satisfy Riyadh that the US, at the very least, is responding to Saudi concerns.

Similarly, Israel is keen to shift the focus from the Arab Spring and the Palestinian issue to the much more pressing issue, for them, of the Iranian threat. Rekindling the Iranian issue in a Saudi context tends to give it an Arab texture to revive the emotively charged issue of Sunni-Shia divide with Iran perceived as seeking to dominate the Arab world.

As things stand, it doesn’t look like that an Iranian threat will overshadow the popular movements in the Middle East. But to the extent that Iran has become a fresh issue in US politics allegedly plotting to kill the Saudi ambassador, this might encourage Israel to create further diversion by bombing Iranian nuclear installations with US understanding, the way Dick Cheney saw it in terms of Israeli security. If so, it might open a dangerous new front in an already charged region.

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times

Thursday, August 4, 2011

Syria’s abysmal descent

By S P SETH

The Arab Spring has turned into a bloody autumn in Syria. What started as anti-regime graffiti by a bunch of kids in a remote town is now a full-scale assault by the Syrian regime on its own people. These kids were arrested and reportedly tortured, making it a trigger for the popular uprising that followed. President Bashar al-Assad’s regime has, however, portrayed the people’s revolt as the work of thugs and armed rebels supported by foreign powers. This doesn’t gel with the facts. First, if it were an armed rebellion with foreign involvement and backing, it wouldn’t have started with a bunch of kids writing graffiti seeking the change of regime. By most accounts, the people’s revolt has been largely peaceful. But the government’s response has been brutally violent with the deployment and use of tanks, heavy weaponry and the cordoning of towns and streets suspected of harboring rebels, with the denial of public utilities like water, electricity and supply of food. From the images on social websites as the main source of information (with the press denied access), the Syrian landscape in several places was like a ghost town after killings by the army. The death toll from the army’s operation is rising steadily to about 3000 people, with many more seriously injured.

Second: without the widespread use of massive force and fear of worse to come, people don’t run for safety and shelter across the country’s borders. Fearing the regime’s terror, many Syrians have fled across the borders into Turkey and Lebanon. They are now sheltering in camps set up by the Turkish government. Prime Minister Erdogan’s government had earlier enjoyed good relations with the Assad regime. But when it sought to impress the need for political reforms on the Assad regime the relationship turned sour. Damascus now suspects Turkey’s hand behind its troubles.

Third: even though the Assad regime might complain of a foreign plot, there is no credible evidence to support this assertion. Fourth: until recently, even the United States sought to refrain from any intervention on behalf of the protesters. The recent public appearance of the US and French ambassadors in the town of Hama was designed to lend moral support to the protesters, as well as a political tactic to cultivate a growing popular constituency in Syria. Of course, there have been sanctions against some key figures of the regime. But Bashar al-Assad was initially not targeted for sanctions because the US and its Western allies apparently hoped that, as a likely moderate, he might opt for a peaceful democratic transition. But this didn’t happen, and the sanctions were also extended to include President Assad. Therefore, the regime’s contention that it is facing an armed rebellion from thugs with foreign involvement is absolute nonsense. It is this kind of mindset that has brought trouble on the regime--- a failure to understand that the Arab world is in flux and that the authoritarian Assad dynasty, ruling in its own interest, do not have a special dispensation.

It would appear that President Bashar al-Assad is following in the footsteps of his father, Hafez al-Assad, who had the town of Hama bombarded in 1982 to quell an uprising by the Muslim Brotherhood. The estimates of civilian carnage from this brutal crackdown vary between 17,000 and 40,000. It shell-shocked the Syrian people, enabling Hafez al-Assad to rule unchallenged for nearly 30 years. That is until March of this year when, encouraged by popular revolt in Tunisia and Egypt, the Syrians too rose up to peacefully challenge the now President Assad who inherited his presidency from his late-father. His response was to do what his father did in an earlier era. Which is: to use overwhelming force to crush the people’s movement and spread fear to preempt another challenge to his power.

Will it work? It doesn’t seem to have worked so far. But the regime hasn’t given up. Nor have the people seeking a democratic change, provoking the regime into more killings and so it goes on. Even if the regime were able to restore some sort of order based on pervasive fear, it would have completely lost its legitimacy. It will not be business as usual and the government will simply be looking over its shoulder smelling danger everywhere. With thousands of its citizens forced into seeking safety and shelter across the borders into Lebanon and Turkey, the nucleus of a movement to challenge the regime from outside is already emerging. The refugee camps in Turkey are becoming the nerve centre of an anti-regime movement with support networks inside Syria. The popular peaceful movement for democratic reform, if handled with tact, finesse and accommodation of reasonable demands, might have been amenable to a democratic deal with the Assad regime. Now that so much blood has been spilled, they simply want the Assad regime to go. Indeed this could all have been avoided if the government had shown some understanding of its people.

The Arab Spring came a little later in Syria, which led the government to believe that it was a case apart from other unpopular regimes. It believed that the Syrian people were happy with their rulers and the system. But it didn’t take long to shatter that illusion. But the government is refusing to see what is apparent to most people. Which is that the Assad regime has lost its legitimacy to the point where people are prepared to risk their lives to challenge its rule. The government, though, still seems to have the backing of the armed forces, commanded by trusted officers with family and communal ties. This close-knit political, military and economic cabal has a lot to lose if forced into giving up control and power.

In other words, the government still has the firepower on its side to inflict maximum fatalities on its people. Despite this, the people are standing their ground everyday in the face of overwhelming use of force. There are, however, some sketchy signs of unrest among army ranks, particularly in areas where they were ordered to fire on peaceful civilians in their own towns and regions. While the military command seems loyal to the regime, their ranks might baulk at following such orders all the time. It has already happened in some units when ordered to fire in their townships. Some of these soldiers have now fled across the border into Turkey to escape reprisals for refusing orders. And if this were to spread to more units, the government might lose its most potent advantage over the rebels.

The Syrian government has handled the situation abysmally, considering that they had some advantages other Arab regimes didn’t. First, they had the support of about 20 per cent of the population, as well as the passivity of many others. For instance, the Assad regime enjoyed the support of its own Alawite (Shia) minority of about 13 per cent, controlling the levers of power all around. Besides, it also had the backing of other minorities to include Christians and minor sects and communities. These minorities weren’t too keen on the resurrection of a Sunni-led political order to include Muslim Brotherhood. At the same time, the major cities like Damascus and Aleppo were largely free of anti-regime fervor. Syria’s trading class didn’t want chaos and instability that might result from revolutionary fervor and change. But the Assad regime made such a hash of things with overkill (literally) that the popular revolt now covers now all the country. In other words, instead of establishing an orderly democratic transition, the government is now dealing with bushfires of revolt everywhere. Some minorities and other elements of the population, who backed the government, are not sure where it is all leading the country.

Second: much of the international community was initially not keen on instigating or encouraging the popular revolt in Syria. They hoped the regime might be able to preside over an orderly democratic transition. There was fear that the unraveling of Syria might trigger unpredictable regional consequences affecting its neighbors. Above all, the United States and its allies have neither the money nor the political will to undertake more military commitments. All these considerations seemed to insulate Syria from a concerted international action against the regime.

The Assad regime, however, opted for brutal force to deal with an internal problem, better tackled through a peaceful solution. In whatever way the problem is finally resolved, the danger is that the country might descend into the sectarian chaos of greater bloodshed between the Sunnis and the ruling community of Alawite (Shia), further adding to an already complex situation in the Arab world.