The Syrian question?

S P SETH

Will he or will he not bomb Syria? He said he would. But later, he said he wouldn’t for the time being until the US Congress also had a say on this. However, if the Congress voted against it, it wouldn’t be binding on President Obama and the bombing might still go ahead, so we are told. If you, the readers, are confused, so are many analysts. It would appear, though, that the bombing would go ahead at some point soon as, without it, the US’ ‘credibility’ might suffer. A US naval flotilla is already poised to rain missiles on Syrian sites to destroy command and control centers as well as warehouses with weapons’ stockpiles.

The US wants to punish the Assad regime for crossing Obama’s ‘red line’ with its alleged use of chemical weapons against its civilian population. Logically speaking, the Assad regime would be daft to do this when they were already making inroads against the rebels. And that too at a time when the regime had allowed UN experts to visit the sites said to have been subjected to earlier chemical attacks.

So far, Russia and China have used their status as permanent members of the UN Security Council to veto any military action against the Assad regime, thus denying international legitimacy. The findings of the UN experts on chemical attack on the outskirts of Damascus have yet to be finalized. Indeed, the UN experts had to withdraw hurriedly from Syria with an imminent US attack on the horizon, postponed subsequently with a last minute change of mind by President Obama.

Whatever the inspectors’ findings, the US and its allies have already come to the firm conclusion that the Assad regime was responsible for the chemical attack. John Kerry, the US secretary of state, reportedly said that while the evidence being gathered by the UN experts was important but it was not necessary to prove what was already “grounded in facts, informed by conscience and guided by common sense.” In other words, the corroboration from the UN experts would be a plus but, if it weren’t forthcoming, the enormity of the crime would be pinned on the Assad regime.

In any case, the Syrian regime had engaged in a “cynical attempt to cover up” their actions, not only by delaying the arrival of the UN team but also by their subsequent shelling with conventional weapons of the affected area to leave no trace of a nerve gas attack. In other words, a UN report against Assad regime’s culpability, if forthcoming, will not be credible.

Here is where the entire thrust of the US case against Syria starts looking like the rationale for the Iraq war disaster. President George Bush had come to the conclusion, without objective supportive evidence, that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, and that he was in league with al Qaeda—both untrue. Which provided the basis for the US and its allies to attack Iraq, for which that country is still paying a heavy price.

One can only hope that the US and its allies would have learnt their lesson from the Iraq war. It was, for instance, supposed to be a war of liberation for the Iraqi people when they would be thronging the streets of Baghdad to welcome the victorious US army. And we know what happened to Iraq and what is still happening there in the aftermath of the war, started in 2003. The US forces finally left in 2011, leaving the mess for the shell-shocked people of Iraq.

As with Iraq in the early stages when the job seemed so easily accomplished, there is the same sense of optimism that a surgical missiles’ strike from the US fleet in the Mediterranean will significantly degrade the Syrian command and control centres and weapons stockpiles, perhaps even destroy chemical weapons, without any need for US troops on the ground. In other words, it will be a sharp and limited intervention with very little cost in human and financial terms. But this is not borne out by the examples of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and earlier, in Vietnam which dragged on.

Chris Harmer, a senior naval analyst at the US Institute for the Study of War, said to be a key exponent of the surgical missile strike plan, apparently is having second thoughts. Quoted in the Foreign Policy journal, he said that, “I never intended my analysis of a cruise missile strike option to be advocacy, even though some people [policy makers] took it as that.”  He elaborated that, “Punitive action [against Assad regime] is the dumbest of all actions” because it won’t produce the desired effects.  As for destroying chemical and other weapons’ stockpiles, “The logical response is if any weapons are left in the warehouses, he’s [Assad] going to start dispersing them among his forces if he hasn’t already.” Besides, bombing the weapons warehouses might cause mass casualties.

Against this backdrop, what exactly will the US hope to achieve with punitive military action when even its most loyal ally, the United Kingdom, is baulking at the prospect with the country’s parliament voting against any military action? With the rebel movement now in the grip of the militants and fighters with al Qaeda connections, the US certainly doesn’t want Syria to become a regional centre of jihad, like another Afghanistan.

At the same time, Assad is hardly a preferred alternative for the US and its allies, as it will deepen the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah nexus with disturbing regional implications, including for Israel. The US’ regional allies, like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates, will be hugely upset if Assad regime were to prevail. But, at the same time, a limited operation without a follow up strategic plan doesn’t seem to advance US interests in any meaningful way.

Edward Luttwak, a senior associate at Washington’s Centre for Strategic Studies, an old hand and insider, sees a clear logic in it. Writing in the New York Times, he opined, “There is only one outcome that the US can possibly favor: an indefinite draw.” He added, “By tying down Mr Assad’s army and its Iranian and Hezbollah allies in a war against al-Qaeda-aligned extremist fighters, four of Washington’s enemies [and of Israel] will be engaged in war among themselves and prevented from attacking Americans or America’s allies…”

This might appear a smug and satisfying outcome for the US but to prolong the agony of the Syrian people is patently inhuman. Besides, military intervention(s) seldom remains limited, as we know from the recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Note: This article first appeared in the Daily Times.

Contact: sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au

Iran, Israel and US

S P SETH

Having occupied, divided, created apartheid-era Bantustans, and generally ruined Palestine, Israel is now turning its attention to Iran to rally the world, especially the United States, against that country. This has been going on for a number of years because Iran’s nuclear energy program, according to Tel Aviv, is an “existential danger” for Israel as well a threat to global peace. Therefore, it is not just an Israeli issue, but also a global issue requiring a global response.

Israel doesn’t accept Iranian proposition that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes. It believes that Tehran is actually working on a nuclear weapons program and indeed is quite within reach of making a bomb, though there is no hard evidence to back it up. It would therefore like the US, its most powerful ally, to stop Iran from heading in that direction by destroying its nuclear facilities. If the US were squeamish about it, Israel would do this on its own with the US standing behind it if things were to go wrong. Short of actually attacking Iranian facilities at this point of time, President Obama has said that the US wouldn’t allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. In other words, the US will keep all its options open including, if necessary, the military option. Which is quite a tight undertaking but not entirely satisfactory to Israel.

Against this backdrop, Israel’s additional worry now is that Iran’s new moderate President Dr Hassan Rowhani might somehow be able to sway the United States and its allies into constructive talks on the nuclear question. Rowhani has called for “serious and substantive talks” to break the deadlock over Iran’s nuclear program. To quote Rowhani, “As the president of the Islamic republic, I am announcing that there is the political will to solve this issue and also take into consideration the concerns of the other sides.” In other words, there is scope for compromise. But he also made it clear that Iran will not give up its nuclear program for peaceful uses as provided under international regulations. According to Rowhani, “Iran’s peaceful nuclear program is a national issue…we will not give up the rights of the Iranian people.” He added, “We will preserve our rights based on the international regulations. In Iran, nobody has said we will give up uranium enrichment, no one and at no time.”

 But Israel, the US and its allies are aiming for Iran to give up its nuclear program. And for that to happen, the US is banking on the harshest sanctions it can impose and force other countries in the world to do likewise to cripple Iran economically. In other words, it is engaged in economic warfare against Iran; there is no other word for it. The logic is that people’s economic hardship will turn them against the clerical regime and replace it with a more responsive (to US pressure) political order. And if that too doesn’t work, there is the ultimate threat of military intervention (bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities).

But Israel wants urgent action to destroy Tehran’s nuclear program. And it considers Rowhani an even bigger danger being a “wolf in sheep’s clothing”, as Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has described him. Netanyahu warned a group of visiting US congressmen against putting hopes in Rowhani as: “ He knows how to exploit this, and yesterday he called for more talks. Of course, he wants more talks. He wants to talk and talk and talk.” He added, “ And while everybody is busy talking to him, he will be busy enriching uranium. The centrifuges will keep on spinning.”

It is not just Netanyahu who is warning against Rowhani. It would appear that much of the Israeli state machinery has gone on the offensive. For instance, Yuval Steinitz, Israel’s minister for international affairs, reportedly said, “Rowhani is charming, he is cunning, and he will smile all the way to the bomb” And his advice to the US and the world reportedly is that Iran should be told unmistakably that it had only two choices: close its uranium enrichment program or “see it destroyed with brute force” that, in his view, would take only “a few hours of airstrikes, no more.” And he was very dismissive about a possible Iranian counter-attack, which might involve firing “several hundred missiles” with “very little damage because we can intercept many of them.” Therefore, as far as Israel is concerned it is time to go after Iran with all guns blazing to destroy its nuclear facilities. Indeed, according to some press reports, the US response to an Israeli attack on Iran might be softening.

Iran’s new President Rowhani is aware of the dangers. He has said, “Unfortunately, the war-mongering lobby in the US is opposed to constructive [talks] and only protects the interests of the foreign regime [Israel], and often receives orders from that regime…” If such were the state of affairs, the only solution for Iran would be to surrender and junk its nuclear program. Which, most probably, is unlikely to happen.

But surely, there would be some policy makers in the US worrying about stoking another conflict in the Middle East, when the US is trying hard to extricate itself from Afghanistan and its Iraq war project went so terribly wrong, with the country hit by bombs all too often. If a recent article in the New York Review of Books by William Luers, Thomas R. Pickering and Jim Walsh entitled, “For a New Approach to Iran”, is any indication, there apparently is concern at some levels about the dangerous drift in US-Iran relations that have struggled since the 1979 Iranian revolution.

The article broadly favours a diplomatic path to deal with the nuclear issue, complementing it with a broader dialogue on a whole range of issues, involving the region. It rightly evokes Obama’s March 2009 message that said, “My administration is now committed to diplomacy… and to pursuing constructive ties among the United States, Iran, and the international community. …We seek instead engagement that is honest and grounded in mutual respect.” In the same way, Iran’s new President has announced, “… there is political will to solve this [nuclear] issue”, taking into consideration the “concerns of the other sides.”  

The authors of the article have called upon their government to recall what President Kennedy said fifty years ago, in another context, urging his countrymen “not to see only a distorted and desperate view of the other side, not to see conflict as inevitable, accommodation as impossible and communication as nothing more than an exchange of threats.” This message is as apposite today in the context of US-Iran relations as it was in the era of Cold War. But to pursue this course, the US will have to rid itself of Israel’s pernicious and self-serving influence on its foreign policy.

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

Contact: sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au

Egypt facing a civil war

S P SETH

When is a coup a coup? Apparently, when the US says so. And so far (at the time of writing) the US has refused to call the removal from power of President Morsi by the military on July 3 a coup. The chain of events unleashed since then has led to an orgy of killings of Muslim Brotherhood supporters wanting their leader back as the country’s president. Though the US has condemned the recent use of military force, it was not prepared to call the military coup a coup.  Indeed, during his recent Pakistan visit, the US Secretary of State, John Kerry, justified the military coup in Egypt when he said that the Egyptian generals had acted to restore democracy.

Kerry was not entirely wrong to point out that the Morsi administration had indeed incurred the wrath of many Egyptians’, probably a majority, in trying to hijack a broad based revolution to rid the country of the Hosni Mubarak regime. For instance, the youth movement, Tamarrud (the rebellion) had collected 22 million signatures urging Morsi to resign, and had indeed organized the largest demonstrations to support their campaign.

The Muslim Brotherhood and its political wing, Freedom and Justice Party, simply couldn’t wait to use their political power to push their own agenda by riding roughshod over their opponents. Worse still, they even alienated some of their own political partners, like the radical Islamic outfit, the al-Nour Party, which supported Morsi’ removal. With power in their hands, the Brotherhood conveniently forgot what had won them the election; and that was to remain part of an inclusive national movement without seeking domination. They had, for instance, undertaken not to nominate for the country’s presidency. They had also undertaken not to run candidates in all parliamentary constituencies. In both cases, they backtracked.

These assurances were meant to assure the secular and youthful pioneers of the revolution that the Brotherhood would be real partners in the unfolding revolutionary enterprise. But when they won the presidency and a large number of parliamentary seats, they decided to push through a constitution that seemed very much like an Islamist document, ignoring the rights of women, minorities, secular and liberal elements of the country’s new revolutionary political spectrum.

Indeed, even Sheikh Mohamed Abdel Zaher, one of al-Azhar’s leading clerics, was not impressed with Morsi’s attempts to refashion Egyptian society along more rigid Islamic lines. He reportedly felt that, “ He [Morsi] was guilty of bad behaviour.”  He added, “He and his people tried to take all the important positions of Egypt for themselves and the people rejected this.  He became like something of the old regime.”

The problem with the Muslim Brotherhood in government was that they had never been in power before. Ever since its formation in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna with a view to refashion Muslim society, on a global scale hopefully, to follow the Islamic scriptures and precepts, it struggled to make  headway clashing with established political order and system. As a result, they found themselves hounded, persecuted and proscribed, while trying to survive under the most difficult circumstances, whether it was in Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Tunisia and elsewhere.

Indeed, in the early nineties when Islamists were about to win elections in Algeria, the country’s military annulled the vote leading to a bloody civil war costing nearly 200,000 lives. Within Egypt too, the country’s military regime from Nasser down to Mubarak persecuted and tortured them, banning them from any overt political role. But the movement still survived and lived to win an election in revolutionary Egypt when Morsi was elected the country’s President in 2012.

But without any political experience of governing and lacking the art of political consensus and compromise, they took their election win as a holy edict of sorts, quoting ad infinitum from their new political bible of democracy. And they felt terribly wronged when President Morsi was unceremoniously removed from power. In this situation, the only vindication for them of their principled position would be the restoration of Morsi to the country’s presidency. As against this was the army’s position that they were only following the people’s will to remove Morsi and his regime from power. In other words, both the Brotherhood and the army had reached an irreconcilable situation.

 At this point it is important to examine the role of external forces. The first overt sign of US displeasure with the Morsi regime came when President Obama said last year that the US considered Egypt neither an ally nor an enemy. Which, in simple language, meant that the Morsi regime was not reliable. But, at the same time, they didn’t want to cut them off completely. In other words, the US was sending confusing signals to both the military and the Morsi regime. General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, the army chief, bolstered up by popular and widespread demonstrations against the Muslim Brotherhood, preferred to read US signals, however confusing and ambivalent, as signs of US support. And when the 48-hour ultimatum for a political resolution of the crisis expired, el-Sisi felt confident, both domestically and internationally, about the popular and political correctness of his decision to depose Morsi as the country’s president, replacing him with an army-appointed interim president and a new government with himself as defense minister and deputy prime minister.

By refusing to call the coup a military coup, the US seemed to be showing some preference for the army’s interim solution. But, at the same time, it was working for some kind of political reconciliation between the warring parties. Which didn’t impress the Brotherhood. While in Pakistan, John Kerry clearly expressed US preference for the military’s removal of President Morsi by calling it an exercise in restoring democracy backed by popular demand.

Still the army was not terribly happy as General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi blasted the US government for its lack of support. And it is even more unhappy now when President Obama has condemned the army’s killing of civilians, and announced the cancellation of a joint military exercise next month; though the $ 1.5 billion annual US aid, much of it for the army, will continue as usual. The fact is that the US can’t afford to cut off the Egyptian army, which is the lynchpin of its strategy of maintaining Israel’s security, an important component of which is the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt.

All the efforts of the US, European and Arab envoys to mediate and prevent a bloodbath in Egypt having failed, the military let loose its fire power and went on a killing spree. The way things are in Egypt, the country looks like descending into a civil war, like the one in Algeria when that country’s elections in 1992 were annulled by the military to prevent Islamic Salvation Front gaining power. If that happens, it will have catastrophic effects for the entire region.

 Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

Contact: sushilpseth @yahoo.com.au

Iran: Rouhani’s unenviable challenge

S P SETH

While the 2009 Iranian elections posed a serious challenge to the country’s political system, and were interpreted by the ruling clerical hierarchy as a foreign-inspired, if not instigated, conspiracy, the recently held elections, on the other hand, passed off peacefully. The election result was conclusively in favour of the 64-year old cleric Dr Hassan Rouhani as the country’s new president, effective from August 3. His outright victory, though, was a surprise because there was a general view that he would have to fight it out in a second round, being unlikely to pass the 50 per cent mark.

There are two challenges awaiting Rouhani, at home and internationally. Internally, the ruling hierarchy is divided between moderates and conservatives/hardliners. It is not a division that challenges the existing system. It is, in some ways, like the Democrats and Republicans in the United States, with a common commitment to the political system. This is not to equate the two systems. The big difference is that in Iran the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has the ultimate power; appointed to the position by Ayatollah Khomeini, the father of Iran’s 1979 revolution. He can, if he chooses, make and break president’s power. The 2009 Green Movement, unlike the Rouhani-led moderates, sought to challenge the system and was crushed. Rouhani is part of the system, with relatively pragmatic and flexible approach to accommodate the changing times at home and abroad. For instance, Rouhani would like to be more flexible to the changing modes of women’s dress code and respond to the desires of the country’s youth and middle class for greater freedom.

Will this put him into confrontation with the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khameini, and his Guardian Council? Not necessarily. There was admittedly some tension when Mohammad Khatami was president and was not allowed to push forward moderate reforms. Which created a lot of disappointment and frustration among the middle class and the country’s youth. These frustrations further built up under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency, finally bursting out in the 2009 Green Movement challenging the country’s political system. It was crushed to give Ahmadinejad another term. His second term has been an even bigger disaster at home and abroad.

Against this backdrop, one hopes that the Supreme Leader and the clerical hierarchy around him would give Rouhani enough latitude to fine tune the system for changing times. And if that were to happen, Rouhani might give the system a new legitimacy for new times. The fact that the elections, that makes Rouhani the new president (effective August 3),  were free and fair without interference from the clerical hierarchy and its militia, would seem to suggest that this time Iran might see a managed switch to moderation in its internal and external politics.

Another reason for a moderate shift is that the tough talk by the conservatives so far has brought considerable pain to the Iranian people from massive international sanctions that are crippling Iran’s economy. The sanctions are the result of Iran’s nuclear program. The world, by and large, doesn’t believe Iranian protestations about the peaceful nature of their nuclear program, even though, by most accounts, Iran doesn’t have any active program of making a nuclear bomb. This distrust is as much due to Iran’s opaque nuclear program as the harsh and aggressive tone of Iranian diplomacy on the subject, particularly rhetorical utterances of President Ahmadinejad.

Dr Rouhani, as Iran’s new president with his nickname “the diplomat sheikh”, hopes to change that. Which doesn’t mean that Iran is likely to abandon its nuclear program. What it means is that under Rouhani it is likely to become more transparent, possibly with a low enrichment target, to defuse bomb-making accusations. In return, the incoming Rouhani administration might ask for progressive lifting of international sanctions. Will it work?

This is the big question; because it didn’t work when as Iran’s nuclear negotiator in 2004, Rouhani played a key role in voluntary suspension of uranium enrichment. The US was not satisfied as it wanted Iran to abandon its nuclear program altogether. One might hope that this time, with Rouhani as president, the US might be inclined to explore more seriously Iran’s claims about peaceful uses of its nuclear program. And if the US response were to be as negative as under the Bush administration, intoxicated at the time with its initial military successes in Iraq, it could once again push Iran into a radical Islamic mode and even national mobilization against a perceived US-Israeli attack on its nuclear installations.

Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel has already started his aggressive campaign threatening unilateral attack on Iranian nuclear installations to put pressure on the United States. It might be worth recalling that Iran, even when its revolution was in its infancy, fought off a US-inspired and aided Iraqi attack under Saddam Hussein to a standstill and to see him eventually overthrown by its former benefactor, the US. Of course, the new Iranian middle class might not be willing to undergo the same sacrifices to maintain their nuclear independence but that would remain to be seen.

The nuclear issue aside, Iran is also a serious thorn in the US side with its commitment to stand by the Bashar al-Assad regime and its support of the Hezbollah in Lebanon. Syria is Iran’s only Arab ally, and both the Assad regime and Hezbollah are receiving considerable military and financial assistance from Iran, including possibly some Iranian Revolutionary Guards fighting in Syria against the rebels. Iran believes, as does the Hezbollah in Lebanon, that if the Syrian regime were toppled, the rebels and their regional Arab allies, like Saudi Arabia, Qatar and others, would go after them. Therefore, for Iran, Syria would appear like its forward base to ward off a bigger enemy.

As it happens, the need to topple the Assad regime has created strategic convergence between the US, most Arab states and Israel; because it would break the crucial political and strategic nexus with Iran and thwart its regional ambitions. And they are also are opposed to Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

Iran’s newly elected president Rouhani has the unenviable task of convincing the US and its allies that its nuclear ambitions are not weapons-related, and that it has a legitimate role in the region that is not disruptive. And at the same time to be pursing a reformist agenda within the country without provoking the ire of the Supreme Leader. It is going to be difficult but not impossible as long as the US and its allies are not bent on Iran’s virtual surrender.

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

Contact: sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au 

Crisis in Turkey

S P SETH

When Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan went on a foreign trip to visit three North African countries in the midst of serious anti-government protests, it conjured an image of Nero fiddling when Rome was burning. Erdogan, of course, is nowhere like Nero. He prides himself as being a democratically elected leader with strong grassroots support. And until the protests in Istanbul erupted, starting late May, over turning the city’s major public park, Gezi Park, into a replica of Ottoman-era military barracks and a mall, he probably himself was not aware that he was so disliked by many urban residents in Istanbul and many other cities for his authoritarian style. The popular protests in Taksim Park, resonant of Tahrir Square in Cairo, spread to over 60 Turkish cities. In other words, what started as a small protest in Istanbul over a local matter became the trigger for a much large movement with a smorgasbord of grievances against a government that tended to believe that it didn’t need to explain its decisions and actions to the people; with Erdogan behaving like a modern Sultan working to recreate architecturally (and sometimes regionally) the old glory of the Ottoman empire.

And that image seemed reinforced on his return when he rebuked his “children” for their wayward and irresponsible behaviour. Erdogan told them that he had no plan to change his plans for converting the park into a historical-cultural-commercial project. As one protester reportedly said, with tongue-in-cheek, “Papa’s coming home and when he sees what we have been up to he’s going to be really angry.” And that he was, blaming the countrywide protests on terrorists, vandals, looters and foreigners. There have been many arrests; with even high school students detained being naughty spreading malicious rumors on social media sites. There have been some fatalities and many injured from the indiscriminate use of tears gas and water cannons by the police.

Undoubtedly, Turkey has become an economic success story, with Erdogen as the country’s Prime Minister in the last decade. And he has done it by opening up the economy. Ironically, this success story has created a plethora of problems. For instance, the rapid expansion of Turkey’s middle class has created a class of citizens critical of Erdogan’s patriarchical style of doing things. They are educated and they have their opinions and preferences and they want to be consulted and heard. And when Erdogan decided that the Gezi Park will be replaced with a replica of the Ottoman era, it was news to them and an unpleasant one about a landmark of their Istanbul city which, in some ways, was a reference point for many of them growing up and living there. Gezi Park and Taksim Square are part of the city’s personality and hence part of the environment in more than one sense.

From a local issue relating to Istanbul, the protest has gone national and the regime is still refusing to come to terms with the fact that they have a serious problem confronting them. Which, in essence, is that many people are not happy with the way Prime Minister Erdogan and his government are steering the country.  And again and again, on issue after issue, there is a sense that Erdogan is arrogant with a big ego, with almost zero tolerance for opinions at variance with him. Even where he has no expertise, he behaves like he knows best without any reference to the people whose lives will be affected, whether it is the future of the park in Istanbul or even people’s intimate lives. For instance, he has called on Turkish families to have at least three children. His creeping program of Islamization in a society with a strong streak of secularism is not liked by many people. His government is increasingly putting curbs on drinking as it is against Islam. Indeed, there is a concerted effort to reengineer society to conform to Islamic precepts and traditions. Of course, there is nothing wrong with it as long as this is what people want. But Turkey is not a traditional Islamic society. It is culturally pluralistic with a strong secular streak on which modern Turkey’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, sought to model the country after the defeat of the Ottoman empire in WW1.

In the last over ten years, with three election wins behind him, Erdogan and his AKP party fundamentally changed Turkey in some positive ways. Its economic success is one such change.  Another is the civilian control of the Turkish army, with its generals given to staging coups in the past to maintain Ataturk’s secularism. Under the generals, secularism become a rigid belief system of sorts to proscribe any kind of external symbol of Islamic faith, like wearing veil by women. Under Erdogan, Islamic symbols and practices are encouraged and propagated.

But he seems to be making the same mistakes that the country’s generals did, with secularism, by propagating and promoting Islam virtually as state ideology. And many of his opponents of all hues and convictions include a fair proportion of those who do not like the country’s reversion to officially approved Islam. At the same time, his rule has also “nurtured a pious capitalist class” as Tim Arango wrote in the New York Times, reporting from Istanbul, “whose members have moved in large numbers from rural Anatolia to cities like Istanbul, deepening class divisions.” Therefore, the secular/religious divide has been further reinforced with class divisions as well as the widening urban-rural chasm.

There is no sign as yet that the political hold of Prime Minister Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) is in danger. And this is for two reasons. First, his rural constituency of conservative and faith-based voters, are still solidly behind him. Second, the country has made impressive economic strides in the last decade under AKP’s rule and many people would be loathe to let that be jeopardized with no real political alternative to Erdogan’s rule. The present movement against the government is a spontaneous protest ignited by a wide variety of grievances with virtually no organized political organization seeking to replace it. Many protesters are angry that the government is seeking to erase the historical memory of the Ataturk’s secular republic by creating Ottoman period replicas, as in Gezi Park, and to create an illusion of continuity between the Ottoman period and the present regime.

And to pursue its conservative agenda, the regime is prepared to crush dissent and throw journalists and other critics of the government into jail. Under the Erdogan regime, Turkey is said to have more journalists in prisons than any other country in the world. It is this intolerance and refusal to listen to people that has spawned the protests against the government. In other words, Prime Minister Erdogan is not ready to be a consensus leader for the whole country.  It is his way or the highway. And therein lies the danger.

US and Middle East

S P SETH

Since his re-election, the Obama administration has sought to reactivate its Middle East diplomacy to help create some measure of stability and progress in this highly volatile region. And the focus is on three aspects. The first is to create momentum for an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue that might eventually lead to a two-state solution. The second US initiative is intended to restore Turkish-Israeli amity, so badly sundered with the killing in 2010 of nine Turkish peace activists in an Israeli commando raid on a Turkish vessel, carrying relief supplies for the beleaguered Gaza strip under Israeli blockade. And the third, the most important and crucial at the present time, is the worsening Syrian crisis.

Regarding the first, President Obama’s recent Israeli visit, his first official trip to that country, was intended more to sooth relations with the Netanyahu government. The personal chemistry between Obama and Netanyahu didn’t work at all through the former’s first term, and Obama was keen to rekindle the traditional coziness between the two countries. During his visit, he re-emphasized US commitment to Israel’s security, and the two leaders were shown to be pretty much at ease with each other.  Since then, John Kerry, Obama’s new Secretary of State, has been engaged in shuttle diplomacy to push talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA).

It is important to note that this new push incorporates Israeli demand for talks without preconditions. Which means that Israel wouldn’t be required to halt settlement activities in the occupied territory, that has been and still is Palestinian Authority’s demand for resumption of peace talks with Israel. The US has also prevailed on Arab States to modify an earlier initiative requiring Israel to commit to the pre-1967 borders between Israel and Palestine in return for its recognition by all Arab League states. Under the reported new modified formula, the Arab League might agree to mutual land swaps between Israel and Palestine to facilitate an eventual two-state solution. It would mean that Israel might get to retain much of its settlements, with token transfer of some land to Palestine. It would be hard to imagine the PA falling for this, considering the likely popular backlash from its people.

In the case of Turkey, ever since Recep Tayyip Erdogan became Prime Minister, the government has become supportive of the Palestinian cause. This is particularly noted in its opposition of the inhumane Israeli policy of blockading Gaza and reducing the territory’s about 1.7 million people to a bare existence. Which has created some criticism of Israeli policy internationally, leading in 2009 to the dispatch of a peace flotilla headed towards Gaza carrying supplies for its beleaguered residents. This also included a Turkish vessel. Israel regarded this as a provocative act designed to break its blockade of Gaza, leading its commandos to raid the Turkish vessel killing 9 Turkish peace activists.

Turkey demanded an apology, which Israel refused. During his recent visit to Israel, President Obama persuaded Netanyahu to apologize, which he did in a phone call to the Turkish Prime Minister, Erdogan. Though this has broken the ice between the two countries, the sticky issue of compensation for the 9 Turks killed, as well as the question of Israeli blockade of Gaza, remains to be sorted out. The US is keen on resolving the strained Turkish-Israeli relations, both being its close allies. Turkey is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Israel reckons itself as US’ advanced guard in the Middle East. And both are currently involved directly or indirectly in the Syrian crisis, with Turkey helping the Syrian rebels to overthrow the Bashar regime.

That brings us to Syria, where the situation is getting ever more complicated and dangerous by the day. The Lebanese Shia group has openly joined the battle on behalf of the Assad regime.  According its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, “ It is our battle and we are up to it.”  With the Hezbollah fighting for Bashar’s cause, the Syrian regime has been able to evict the rebels from the strategically important town of Quasayr on the Syrian-Lebanese border. That brings the Syrian conflict right into Lebanon. Its northern city of Tripoli was already experiencing sectarian Sunni-Shia tit-for-tat, which now is further heightened.  A few rockets have also hit the Hezbollah-dominated areas in Lebanon.

In the meantime, the US-Russian initiative to convene an international conference in Geneva this month to find a diplomatic solution to the Syrian crisis is in trouble. The conference might be postponed for next month, if it were to eventuate at all in the near future. The European Union’s lifting of the arms embargo on weapons supplies to the rebels created another complication, drawing criticism from Russia. At the same time, Russia’s decision to fulfill, what it calls, contractual obligations to continue supplying arms to the Assad regime, has been condemned by the US and its allies, particularly the supply of sophisticated anti-aircraft missile systems. And has brought a strong response from Israel, threatening to target any such weapon systems. Which, in turn, has drawn a strong counter-response from Bashar al-Assad in an interview with Hezbollah TV, threatening to take the battle into Israel. In other words, the situation in Syria is taking a much more sinister form of a regional conflagration.

Lately, the regime has gained an upper hand on the battlefield, with the help of the Hezbollah, having evicted the rebels from Qusayr, where they had been entrenched for nearly one year. Which has raised its morale, raising hopes of regaining more territory, under rebel control, and re-establishing the Assad regime’s writ all over the country.

Things might change, though, if the US were to step in directly on the rebels’ behalf, as President Obama is under great pressure internally and externally. This will, of course, further widen the Syrian crisis with international ramifications. So far, President Obama has resisted, being reluctant to enter another Middle Eastern war when its interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have been so disastrous. He told a press conference last year, “The notion that the way to solve every one of these problems is to deploy our military--- that hasn’t been true in the past, and it won’t be true now.”

And he revealed his political and moral dilemma in an interview this year with The New Republic when he said, “How do I weigh tens of thousands who‘ve been killed in Syria versus the tens of thousands who are currently being killed in the Congo.” At a more practical level, though, there is such a thing as limits on US power that is already overstretched. In any case, we will soon find out if Obama is able to resolve his dilemma.

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

Contact: sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au