Russia explores new ties with Egypt

S P SETH

The recent visit to Egypt of a Russian delegation, including its foreign and defence ministers, Sergei Lavrov and Sergei Shoigu, is potentially of great significance not only for their bilateral relationship but also for the Middle Eastern region. The inclusion of the Soviet defence minister in the delegation raised all sorts of speculations, from Russia seeking a naval base in Egypt to a possible deal on the sale of Russian weapons. Which naturally has led some to speculate that Egypt might come to lean on Russia over time as a substitute for the US in a wide ranging relationship to include economic, trade, military and other aspects. Such a development, if forthcoming, will not happen overnight and that too in a region subject to sudden and volatile changes, as we have been seeing in Egypt. After all the flurry and welcome of the high level Russian delegation, there was subsequently an effort to underplay its significance as a possible counterweight/substitute for Egypt’s special relationship with the United States.

A close relationship between Egypt and the US was forged under President Anwar El Sadat in the seventies after he broke up with the Soviet Union. It was reinforced with the signing of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty in 1979 under US sponsorship. After Sadat was gunned down in 1981 at a military parade by an army officer, believed to be from the Al Jihad movement, his successor, Hosni Mubarak, further cemented these ties and became the US’ trusted regional ally underwriting, with the US, the security of Israel. Mubarak’s antipathy to the Palestinian leadership, trying to rock the boat in the region, was quite extraordinary which endeared him to the US and brought dollops of aid. But Egypt continued to go backward economically and politically. At times, the US gently prodded him towards democracy but when told that the choice was between him (his regime) and the Muslim Brotherhood (in the event of free and fair elections), the US always chose the devil they knew, as the phrase goes.

And it went on until the advent of the Arab Spring springing from Tunisia and soon enveloping Egypt. Faced with the seething anger and mobilization of the Egyptian people against their hated dictator of more than 30 years, the US had no option but to ditch him and hope that Egypt and the rest of the Arab world would be restructured along a stable democratic order for a new compact with the United States.  But the resultant chaos and instability engendered by people’s revolutions was sending shivers through some regional countries like Israel, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf kingdoms— Bahrain just surviving when Saudi Arabia sent its troops and tanks to crush the rebellion by its majority Shia population.

Not surprisingly then that Israel, which regarded Egypt as the bedrock of a relatively stable Middle East for its security, interceded strongly with the United States to save the Mubarak regime but without much success. Saudi Arabia did the same to save Mubarak to stem the tide of people’s power reaching the kingdom. There was another important consideration for Saudi Arabia. Riyadh feared that the revolutionary chaos in the Arab countries might provide Iran an opportunity to stir up trouble among the majority Shia population in its oil bearing eastern province. Whether or not Iran was involved, the whiff of the Arab Spring also reached there but the unrest was crushed.

At another level, Saudi Arabia is gravely worried about the nexus between Iran, Syria under Bashar al-Assad regime and Hezbollah in Lebanon, and is disappointed, indeed angry, with the US for giving the regime political oxygen by getting involved in the disposal of Syria’s chemical weapons rather than finishing off the Assad regime with a sharp and swift missile attack as was planned. Within the kingdom, its rulers took precaution to buy off their Sunni population with more financial benefits/rewards to insulate them from the prevailing ‘spring’ winds. Still, Saudi Arabia is having trouble managing its foreign workers and, at a deeper level, to ease up its socially conservative policies and still keep the country’s religious (Islamic) establishment on side.

Saudi fears about Egypt’s chaotic politics were validated, in their view, with the Muslim Brotherhood coming to power in the country’s first ever-free elections and thus setting ‘unhealthy’ standards for the region. President Morsi’s government appeared in terrible hurry to entrench itself in power by suppressing dissent and going after its political enemies. Which brought about a popular movement seeking their overthrow, seized on by the military as an excuse to remove and imprison Morsi and other leading Brotherhood leaders thus plunging the country into further chaos. The commander of the armed forces, General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, set up an interim civilian administration, and called the military coup against the Morsi’s regime as an act of restoring democracy. The US went along with this description but never felt quite comfortable about the overthrow of Egypt’s first elected government in what, for all intents and purposes, was a military coup. And when the Obama administration started to pressure the army-led regime to work out some sort of a political modus vivendi with the Brotherhood leadership to restore a semblance of an ongoing democratic process, Commander Sisi’s regime reacted angrily expecting unqualified support from the United States. But instead the US significantly curtailed its military aid, further fuelling the Egyptian regime’s disenchantment with the US.

It is against this backdrop that the high-level Russian delegation landed in Cairo among great fanfare, bringing back the memories of the Cold War era when Egypt under President Nasser was a virtual Soviet ally. Things are different now. Russia is a much-diminished power and the Cold War is over. The United States, though still a superpower, is on a downward trajectory and its annual aid of $1.5 billion, much of it for the military, is not all that impressive. The Saudi Arabia and its Gulf partners have more than made up the loss, with $12 billion in aid to the military regime. And more should be available to buy military hardware from Russia in case the US were to continue its suspension, though it will not be easy to replace the US as an arms supplier with Egypt’s arsenal predominantly equipped with US weaponry.

In any case, the presumed Russian alternative, at this stage, looks more like a diplomatic leverage to bring the US around to moderate, if not change, its ambivalence between the military and the Muslim Brotherhood. And it already seems to be working. During his recent Cairo visit, John Kerry reportedly said that Egypt was on track towards democracy. But the visit of the Russian delegation was still significant as providing a framework for exploring multifaceted cooperation between the two countries. More importantly, it gives Russia a toehold in probably the most important country in the Middle East. And by virtue of changing regional dynamics, with the US losing some of its shine and influence in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the region, there are new possibilities for Russia to explore and expand. Among them, the sale of Russian weapons is a lucrative proposition both strategically and economically. 

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

Contact: sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au