Islamic State

Islamic State

S P SETH

In a world plagued with multiple crises, the self-proclaimed Islamic State (of Iraq and Levant) has emerged as another lightening rod for a region that is already facing quite a few fires. Its rapid advance through Mosul and threatening Erbil at one point, the capital of Iraq’s Kurdish region, has sent shock waves bringing the US back into Iraq to contain this new threat. Indeed, the new Islamic army didn’t have to do much by way of fighting to occupy Mosul, because the Iraqi forces simply fled abandoning much of their American weaponry and equipment as a helpful contribution for the ISIL forces. The advancing forces also helped themselves to the vast treasury left behind. And the orgy of killings by the ISIS continued with gruesome pictures of those executed put on social media sites. While the enemy was advancing, the Iraqi political establishment was undecided, at that point of time, about who will govern the country. The elections held on April 30 had returned Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s party as the single largest group but nowhere near a majority to form a government. He will soon be replaced as Prime Minister by Haider al-Abadi.

Why has the Iraqi situation reached this critical point? The starting point, of course, was the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, which simply opened up a Pandora’s box that refuses to be put together. The situation got even more complicated when the Maliki Government played divisive sectarian and ethnic politics, targeting Sunnis and being distrustful of the Kurds. Even though Maliki had suffered greatly under Saddam Hussein and spent many years in exile in Iran and Syria, as Prime Minister he was largely practicing his former tormentor’s politics of fear and terror against his presumed enemies, the Sunnis. The tribal Sunni coalition forged with American support and involvement against al Qaeda in Iraq, that eventually killed its leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and destroyed much of its structure, was allowed to dissipate under Maliki as he didn’t want to share power with the Sunnis. In other words, Maliki was a paranoid leader keen to centralize power under his control and his faction of the Shiite community. However, considering all the fault lines of Iraqi politics of sectarian and regional divisions, it was probably expecting too much of any Iraqi leader to create and lead an inclusive Iraq. Iraq was and remains a fractured state. Maliki simply made an already difficult situation worse.

Will Haider al-Abadi be able to do a better job of uniting Iraq’s fractured politics and society? A hopeful feature in this respect is that his selection was welcomed by both the United States and Iran separately. In the short term, therefore, there is likely to be much talk of a united government with better representation for the Sunnis and Kurds. An ‘inclusive’ government will mean more US military and humanitarian assistance, and greater Iranian support (of all sorts) for the new political order. But, considering the deep-rooted sectarian, regional and ethnic fault-lines, such unity is unlikely to hold for long. The sectarian violence seems to have its own momentum.

A hopeful by-product of ‘inclusive’ politics, if it works, is that it might help to detach Sunni tribes and other Sunni groups from the brutal Islamic State, as happened when they helped the US military to suppress the al Qaeda in Iraq in 2006 and 2007. Whether or not it will happen is a matter of conjecture and hope. But increased American involvement, being canvassed increasingly by powerful figures in the US after the beheading of an American journalist, is likely to contain the threat from the Islamic state. It seems to be already happening in northern Iraq with intense US aerial bombardment. A combination of Kurdish pesh merga (military) forces on the ground, supported by stepped up US aerial strikes, is producing results for the time being at least. They have, for instance, retaken the Mosul dam from the IS forces.

In any case, the potential for the self-proclaimed caliphate is rather limited. There is much talk of great economic resources at its disposal and looted weaponry helping its onward march. But, over an extended period, any state entity would need to create a governing structure with recurring revenues and ability to engage in trade with other countries like, for instance, to sell oil from its captured oil fields and refineries. And that would be quite daunting for the Islamic State under constant attack and international isolation. Which doesn’t mean it will cease to be dangerous. It will certainly continue to be a magnet for jihadists of all sorts within Iraq and Syria as well as radical Muslims from abroad.

An important question is how best to create regional consensus on the issue? For Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies, including Turkey, the over-arching regional issue has been and is the sectarian divide between the Sunnis and Shias, the latter identified with Iran’s ambitions to carve out a powerful role. And this has been the driving force behind them helping jihadist groups of all sorts. But with the Islamic State and the caliphate becoming a potent threat, these Gulf kingdoms might have to rethink their entire strategy. A militant expansionist Islamist movement, committed to spreading its own version of Sunni Islam under the overarching umbrella of caliphate, is as much a danger to Shia Iran as it is to Sunni monarchies in the Gulf. The US would very much want the broadest regional consensus and a united front to stem the rising tide of the IS. But will it be possible to bring together Shia Iran and the Sunni Arab states of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf kingdoms to fight this menace? It doesn’t seem likely, considering their history. And it is these contradictions that might give enough political space to the new Islamic State to maneuver.

In the US-led international response to the ISIS militancy, the Kurdish region of Iraq is understandably getting much more attention by way of humanitarian and military assistance. The humanitarian situation of the Yazidi people of the Sinjar region, under siege by the IS forces, seems improved. But other minorities are now being targeted. And the threat to Erbil, the capital of the Kurdish region, appears to have been contained after the US aerial bombing. But such US commitment to Kurdish security is likely to create resentment among the Shias. In the larger regional context, any strengthening of Kurdish autonomy in Iraq will have spill on effects, over time, creating pressure for a regional Kurdish homeland. In other words, there are multilayered fault lines in Iraq and the region.  And this could work to the Islamic State’s advantage.

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

Contact: sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au