The nightmare that is Islamic State

S P SETH

The fall of Ramadi to the Islamic State (IS) has shown it to be more durable than is comfortable to believe. It led the US defence secretary to blame the Iraqi army for lacking the will to fight, even when they far outnumber their enemy. The Iraqis, on the other hand, blame the US for not providing enough weaponry and being selective about their aerial targets. Both might be right to a point. Unlike the loss of Mosul to the IS last June when the army simply fled, this time the Iraqi army did put up some resistance but only just. They seem to be more comfortable with disorderly retreat than putting up a good fight. And the reason for this is that, unlike their enemy, they lack the ideological and religious fervour that imbues and inspires the IS, however abominable that ideology might be.

At the same time, despite all the training and weaponry Iraqi forces have received from the Americans, their US mentors were hardly inspirational. They were basically foreign invaders even when they got rid of the Saddam regime, hated by Iraq’s Shia majority. However, the Nouri al-Maliki government, a Shia version of Saddam’s killing machine---though this time the victims were the Sunni minority- was hardly inspiring with widespread corruption where some of the listed army battalions existed more on paper with top commanders pocketing their salaries. And these so-called commanders were Maliki’s cronies heading different fiefdoms. It is important to remember that Maliki was the US choice, a continuation of the mishandling of Iraq by Washington. In other words, there was nothing inspiring in the Iraqi situation--- whether it was the US role or the Maliki experiment--- for the Iraqi army and society to cherish and uphold. His successor, Haider al-Abadi, might be an improvement on Maliki but in the absence of any worthwhile ideal and vision for the future, the Iraqi army simply is a ragtag force led by self-seekers out to enrich themselves.

Another important drawback is that Iraq lacks the unifying features of a nation state. It is a hodgepodge of ethnic and sectarian elements culled out of a dying Ottoman empire after WW1, like other Middle Eastern entities, and foisted on the world by the British and the French colonialists and manipulated by them for their economic, political and strategic gains. No wonder, the country never developed into a real nation state when its components lacked cohesive features. On the other hand, its disparate and fractious components, like the Sunnis, Shias and the Kurds, were ruled with an iron hand under Saddam Hussein’s brutal dictatorship, with the Shias and the Kurds as his special targets. And when the US attacked Iraq in 2003 and removed and hanged the dictator that was the easy part. The easy success of military operations, symbolized with President George Bush appearing on the deck of a US warship to declare victory, encouraged Washington to uproot the existing system by virtually abolishing the Saddam-era army, bureaucracy and everything else associated with it.

In the absence of any alternative structure to govern the country, Iraq soon descended into anarchy. Which led to the rise of the al Qaeda in Iraq, making things even worse. During 2006 and 2007, the US occupation succeeded in enlisting the support of the Sunni tribal leaders against the al Qaeda that had become unpopular with the local tribes because of its foreign leadership, high handedness and disregard for the tribal leaders. The US made a deal to fund tribal fighters against the al Qaeda in Iraq and to eventually have them incorporated into the regular Iraqi force. However, Iraq’s Maliki government wasn’t willing to incorporate Sunnis into the regular army, as they weren’t trusted. On the other hand, the US-approved Maliki government turned on the Sunni minority and any hope of a cohesive Iraq faded pretty soon.

Under Haider al-Abidi as Iraq’s Prime Minister, the US has been encouraging a coalition of Sunni tribal leaders and fighters into a united front of the Sunnis, the Shia militia and army and Kurdish fighters to fight the IS. At the same time, the US is tactically supportive of Iran’s role in backing the Shia militias with arms and, where necessary, taking a commanding position. While the Abidi government is keen to have the Sunnis on their side, they are reluctant to provide them with the necessary weaponry. The US is continuing the pressure on the Abidi government to enlist Sunni tribal leaders and is keen to provide them with US weapons. But the Abidi government’s distrust of the Sunnis would remain an obstacle. Therefore, any coalition between the Shia regime and Iraq’s Sunni minority is unlikely to eventuate or be effective. And the Kurds, on their part, are concerned more about saving their own autonomous region from IS than diverting their resources and fighters to save Shia Iraq. In other words, all this talk of a US-inspired grand coalition of Iraq’s feuding sectarian and ethnic groups seems rather unlikely.

The US is now committing more elite forces as trainers and advisers, taking their numbers to 3500. Indeed, there is talk of setting up a string of bases to do an effective job of training the Iraqis. This would suggest that the US is being drawn once again into the Iraqi war theatre. Whether this would be more productive than the disastrous experience, starting with the 2003 military invasion, would remain to seen. But the long record of direct involvement in the Iraqi war by the US and its allies is not very encouraging. Already, the US aerial intervention, while useful in stopping the IS advance in some areas, is not proving as effective as was originally thought.

There is also constant talk in the US that Iraqis or, for that matter, people in other troubled Middle Eastern countries, should do more of their own fighting, with the US and its allies willing to help with arms, intelligence, money and aerial support where necessary. The problem, though, is that these people blame their troubles on the US intervention in the region, in the first place. And they do not have the resources, leadership and cohesion to effectively fight against their real or imagined enemies, even as they are simultaneously feuding internally over a host of issues, with sectarian divisions at the top. Iran could be an effective ally against the IS but that raises a host of other questions further aggravating regional fault lines. Hence, there are no easy answers. However, even if the IS were to gain further ground, it will always remain under siege and will have difficulty functioning as a normal state. 

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

Contact: sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au