Turkey’s political calculus

S P SETH

Turkey’s President Recep Tayip Endogan with his Ottoman complex, which requires him to play a determining role in the old domains of the Ottoman Empire, has not quite found the role that suits his temperament. He is still testing the waters as his recent attacking role simultaneously against IS and the Kurds testifies. His earlier attempts to shape Middle Eastern politics following the Arab Spring didn’t make much headway. In Syria, for instance, he wanted Bashar al-Assad’s regime to make way for the rebels, which the Syrian leader simply ignored. He then wanted the US to get rid of the dictator when he ignored Obama’s ‘red line’ by using chemical weapons.

True, the US too wanted to get rid of the Syrian dictator but didn’t find any reliable and effective alternative among the rebels to replace the Assad regime. The situation got murky with multiplicity of rebel groups of varied hues of jihadi credentials, often at war with each other.  The US found it difficult to distinguish between the secular nationalists and downright extremists. Not surprisingly, Washington started wavering, not sure if betting on these heterogeneous groups was a good idea. Therefore, its enthusiasm regarding immediate removal of the Assad regime slackened, though he was and still is the odious dictator. Such wavering on the US’s part enraged Turkey, and Ankara reckons it led to the rise of IS to become the menace it is today.

The rise of IS and its territorial expansion across the border between Iraq and Syria has created some difficult problems for Turkey. As a US and NATO ally, it was expected to be an integral and active part of the coalition against IS. But Turkey had reservations about playing an active military role, including providing bases for US aerial attacks on IS positions in Syria, which didn’t endear it to its western allies. From Turkey’s viewpoint, the collaboration between the Kurds and the US against IS had created a virtual alliance between the two.  And this was seen to be strengthening Kurdish nationalism straddling Iraq, Turkey and Syria.

Earlier, in 2013, Turkey and Kurdistan Workers Party---commonly known by its acronym, PKK---the militant Kurdish movement for an autonomous/independent Kurdish region within Turkey--- had entered into a ceasefire, which had largely held. But when IS operatives attacked a cultural centre in a Turkish border town killing 32 people, most of them young Kurd activists keen on helping their compatriots in their reconstruction work across the Syrian border, that seemed to have settled the argument for Turkey to go after both IS and the Kurds. The reported killing of a couple of Turkish soldiers around the time was blamed on the Kurds. And Turkey unleashed a barrage of aerial strikes against PKK mountain hideouts in northern Iraq, where they had fled and established military camps across the Turkish border. At the same time, Turkey also expanded its operations against Kurds in southeastern Turkey. In other words, it was a virtual declaration of war against the Kurds, inside and outside Turkey. At the same time Turkey was also attacking IS positions, even as it allowed the US to use its bases for aerial attacks and more intensive surveillance.  

This has put the US and NATO in a tight spot. The use of Turkish bases has certainly made operations against IS more effective, and Ankara’s offensive against IS a valuable addition to the US-led coalition. The downside, though, is that by declaring a war on the Kurds, it tends to undercut an important US ally on the ground in the war against IS. In other words, while the US gains Turkey as an active ally, the Kurds will be fighting war on two fronts against Turkey as well as IS. And they happen to be the one really effective force standing up to IS on the ground. And by going after Kurds, Turkey appears to be helping IS. If so, Turkey is using this situation to finish off and/or weaken the Kurdish autonomy/independence movement by abandoning any pretense of political reconciliation with its Kurdish community for which there had been some forward movement in the last few years.

Concerned with perceived Kurdish empowerment from a virtual alliance with the US against IS, Erdogan’s Turkey was also shaken by the recent parliamentary elections in which the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) lost its parliamentary majority. The sizeable vote of over 13 per cent for the predominantly Kurdish party gave them a number of seats in the parliament, making it difficult for the AKP to form a government. Losing parliamentary majority has upset Erdogan’s plans to use parliament to change the constitution to become Turkey’s executive president. And by raising the spectre of a security threat to the country both at home and abroad from Kurds and IS, he is seeking to create a national emergency to subvert the political process in the country. For instance, there is talk of stripping Kurdish members of the Turkish parliament of their parliamentary immunity, ostensibly for security reasons. Or else, hold new parliamentary elections against the backdrop of a national security threat to rally people around the ruling party. We will soon know which way Erdogan will sway— stripping the Kurdish parliamentary members of their immunity or hold new elections. Probably, he will do both successively. 

At the same time, the US and NATO would find it difficult to criticize the Erdogan government for going after the Kurds on charges of terrorism. PKK is branded a terrorist organization in many countries. Already the US is saying that Turkey has a right to defend itself, more or less absolving it of extreme measures. It is extraordinary that up to now IS was considered the biggest threat. Turkey has now changed the calculus to its advantage by putting the focus also on the Kurds, at least when it comes to its security. Turkish’s induction as an active US partner against IS might even prove a liability by completely muddying an already murky picture.

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

Contact: sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au