The games they play with Syria

S P SETH

Syria remains a blighted country. But a recent international conference in Vienna (and its follow up) has created some momentum that might create a framework, over time, for a peaceful resolution. That, at least, is the hope nurtured by some observers. The situation in Syria is such that nobody can predict with any confidence what might happen next. The hope from Vienna conference derives from the fact that it was the most representative meeting of external powers with involvement in the Syrian theatre, some of them at odds with each other pursuing conflicting agendas. For instance, Iran was a participant, for the first time, in any international gathering on Syria. Which is an important recognition of its pivotal role in Syria where it is a major supporter, economically, politically and militarily, of the Bashar al-Assad regime.

The nuclear deal with Iran became a precursor to its possible role as a facilitator in Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East. It would have been inconceivable, only a short time ago, to see both Saudi Arabia and Iran in an international conference on Syria, as one of Riyadh’s major goal in Middle Eastern politics is to keep Iran out as a pariah. It worked hard, unsuccessfully though, to prevent the nuclear deal between the US and Iran. And it has also not been successful to keep Iran out of the Vienna conference. Which could both be a plus and a minus. It is a plus because it is difficult to envisage any progress in Syria without Iranian engagement. And it could be a minus if Riyadh were to simply play a wrecking role by demanding the removal of Bashar al-Assad regime as a pre-condition, as well as the removal of foreign fighters (from Iran) and the Hezbollah militants.

At another, almost parallel conference, in Bahrain’s capital, Manama, of mostly Western and Arab officials, Saudi Arabia launched a counter offensive of sorts, which might wreck the international dialogue through the Vienna route. At the Manama Dialogue security conference in Bahrain, Saudi foreign minister Adel al Jubeir set forth Riyadh’s position. And, not surprisingly, he reportedly said that the timing of Assad’s departure and withdrawal of foreign fighters (from Iran in Syria) remained the main sticking points to finding a lasting solution to the civil war in Syria. In his way of putting it, the IS and, al Nusra and other militant groups, that are the enemy of both the Assad regime and the US-led coalition against IS, might seem benign. And Saudi weapons and aid for its favoured jihadis/rebels is for a good cause.

It would even appear that the international conference in Vienna and its follow up would be used to put enormous pressure on Iran and Russia to ditch Assad, making it sound like it would be in Moscow’s own interest. Iran, though, is unlikely to waver in support of Assad. Russia might buckle at some point, which seems to be the strategy. And it is because, first, Russia cannot sustain its military intervention because of the heavy costs involved. And, second, it would have to consider at some point that its deeper involvement in a conflict, which has strong sectarian elements (Sunni versus Shia), will put it on the wrong side of the Sunni Muslim world.

Antony Blinken, the US deputy secretary of state, highlighted the problems that Russia might face if it continued its military involvement in Syria. He reportedly told the security conference in Bahrain, “Russia cannot afford to sustain its military onslaught against everyone opposed to Assad’s brutal rule. The costs will mount every day in economic, political and security terms, but at best only to prevent Assad from losing.” And he predicted a “quagmire” that gets Russia deeper alongside Iran, and Hezbollah and, in the process, alienating Sunni Muslims. In other words, it is in Russia’s own best interests to work with the US-led coalition, comprising Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies, to get rid of Assad.

The problem though is that Moscow doesn’t see it that way, because the simple removal of Assad will not solve the problem. Moscow, though, has made it clear that its support of Assad is not absolute and not a matter of principle. A spokeswoman for the Russian foreign ministry recently made it clear that they feared that another regime change in the Middle East “could simply turn the whole region into a large black hole.” In other words, Moscow’s support for the regime in Damascus is pragmatic in terms of the realities of the situation.

The US-supported anti-Assad elements do not have much sway in the country, and those wetted and trained by the US have not mattered much any way. The US has now abandoned that programme. It is now reportedly doling out more cash to the opposition, pledging another $100 million in aid that will take the amount to $500 million since 2012. These funds are supposed to help local and provincial councils, emergency services and so on. How these funds will be disbursed is not clear. At another level, for the first time, the US is making a commitment of a small contingent of about 50 special operations commandos to help the mainly Kurdish fighters in northern Syria against IS. This could be the thin edge of the mission creep, which has happened in other theatres.

The US might be right that Russia’s deepening engagement in Syria would land it into a “quagmire” as it did the United States in other areas. But unless Russia and the United States and its allies come to a common understanding of their mission, which is to push back and eventually defeat IS, they might all end up in a “quagmire”. The recent downing of a Russian civilian plane in Sinai and the terrorist attacks in Paris clearly underline the need for a united international front against IS.

 If the forum of the international conference in Vienna is used to put pressure on Russia to get rid of Assad, this most likely will fail, at least for quite sometime. Russia clearly sees that the Assad regime is the only functional entity in the country. And to dump it in the absence of a clearly discernible and functional alternative is to make things even worse. As for Iran and Hezbollah, they seem to have come to the conclusion for quite some time that Assad’s Syria is their frontline against IS and other militant groups.    

Note: This article first appeared in the Daily Times.