Turkey-Russia
turnabout
S P
SETH
Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s recent visit to Russia is
an important development. First of all, it breaks the logjam in their
relationship, which nosedived after a Russian plane was shot down last November
for breaching Turkish air space for bombing raids on Syrian rebels. Moscow
denied any violation of Turkish air space and demanded an apology. As the
apology was not forthcoming, the relations between the two countries were
virtually suspended thus adversely affecting Turkish economy. Russia stopped
imports of fruit and other agricultural products, and tourism from Russia was
halted. Similarly grandiose projects like a gas pipeline and a nuclear power
plant to be built in Turkey were suspended. Erdogan’s visit will now lead to a
resumption of their suspended relationship, with prospects of closer ties
between the two countries.
It would seem that Erdogan was already having second thoughts and was
keen to repair the damage from the shooting of the Russian warplane. He had already
expressed regret for the incident, as earlier demanded by Putin. In the wake of
the failed military coup in Turkey, President Putin’s rapid phone call
expressing solidarity with President Erdogan was regarded as a “psychological boost”
by the Turkish President, when it was needed most. Which in a way puts in
context Erdogan’s initiative to revive his country’s strained relationship with
Russia. While Russian President was immediately forthcoming and supportive of
Erdogan’s situation and apparently his crackdown on his internal enemies, the
US and Europe have lately become critical of the sweeping nature of Erdogan’s
suppression of all freedoms, using the coup as a blunt instrument to go after
all his real and imagined enemies. And he feels let down because, in his view,
his crackdown is indeed meant to protect democracy.
He believes that the US and Europe are hypocritical in not
appreciating and recognizing that his enemies are indeed “terrorists” and that
his campaign against them is on par with the west’s war on terrorism. And, in
the case of the US, Erdogan feels even more aggrieved and betrayed that they
are sheltering the cleric, Fathullah Gulen, who is said to be the mastermind behind
the failed coup. His Hizmet movement is said
to be working for the overthrow of Erdogan’s democratically elected government.
And by refusing to extradite Gulen for his “terrorist” crimes, the US is
complicit in the failed coup and all that Gulen and his supporters are hatching
against the Erdogan government and Turkey’s democracy.
Erdogan believes that he is not without leverage in seeking to
forestall western criticism of his policies for failure to follow due legal
processes. Both Putin and Erdogan find
western criticism and values self-serving and hypocritical. They find
themselves under western pressure to tailor their internal politics and system
to dovetail with western concept and practice of democracy as a universal
system. Even though Turkey is a NATO ally, Ankara feels let down when subjected
to criticism for its tough internal crackdown after its democratically elected
government came close to be overthrown. And indeed, as the Erdogan government
sees it, all this time the architect of all the conspiracies, Fathullah Gulen,
is safely ensconced in the United States and acting with impunity.
The Turkish government is seeking Gulen’s extradition, but the US is
refusing to hand him over even after President Erdogan made a direct request to
President Obama. Therefore, as Ankara sees it, this is not how friends and
allies are supposed to act. In the same way, but in a different context, Putin sees
Russia subjected to comprehensive sanctions for safeguarding its sovereign
interests from an advancing NATO alliance by seeking to coopt Ukraine into EU
and, likely, into NATO. On the face of it, there is no agreement between them
on specific issues that rile Turkey and Russia against the west. But there
appears to be a shared sense of outrage over western hypocrisy and double standards.
Russia is treated as a pariah and Turkey fears that it might be heading in that
direction for refusing to ‘behave’ according to western norms.
Turkey would very much like its western allies, particularly the
United States, to become part of its crusade against the Kurds which it regards
as a bigger enemy than IS. But they happen to be the US’ principal ally on the
ground against IS. It is only recently
that Turkey has hardened its policy against IS. Otherwise, it has been allowing
jihadis and weapons to pass through its borders into Syria. Erdogan has sought
all this time to bring down the Bashar al-Assad regime, and was unhappy when
the United States didn’t take the opportunity to bomb Assad regime out of
existence when it crossed Obama’s ‘red line’ with the use of chemical weapons
on its citizens. And when Russians intervened to save Assad with their bombing
sorties, it was then than Erdogan ordered the shooting of the Russian plane
putting Russian-Turkish relations in serious jeopardy.
Even though the process of
repair and revival has seemingly begun, there is no indication that Turkey and
Russia might sort out their serious differences on Syria policy. In other
words, the apparent improvement in Moscow-Ankara relations appears tentative
rather than substantive. While the imagery created by Erdogan’s Moscow visit is
useful internally in both countries as having alternative options, their real
value, as of now, lacks depth. The resumption of economic relations will
marginally help Turkey but it cannot afford to risk its overall relationship
with the US and Europe.
Erdogan seems to believe he has more cards to play, as he did with
slowing down the exodus of refugees from Syria and elsewhere into Europe.
However, Ankara is unhappy at the ‘ingratitude’ of the EU, even though they
have reportedly paid Turkey over $4billion for its services. The promised
visa-free travel for Turks doesn’t appear to have materialized. And considering
that Europe is critical of Erdogan’s no-holds-barred repression of his
‘enemies’ in the country, it doesn’t look Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership
is likely to make any advance. On the face of it, Turkey is not making much
headway in enlisting the US and European support on a whole range of issues
that it considers important.
Which has led President Erdogan to believe
that he might be able use his Russian card to create the necessary space to
deal with the US and Europe. But there is one problem. While Putin has been
able to create a larger than life image for Russia by intervening in Ukraine
and in Syria, Russia is no Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War. Although
it is the second largest nuclear power in the world, its economy is in rather
bad shape from falling oil prices compounded by comprehensive western
sanctions. In that sense, it is a poor counterweight to the west, if that is
what Erdogan is aiming. Even as Ankara is trying to play the Russian card as
evidenced by Erdogan’s recent visit, there are reports that Ankara was insisting
that it didn’t signal a fundamental shift in Turkey’s foreign policy.
Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.
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