Turkey’s
dilemma under Erdogan
S P
SETH
An interesting recent development about the multifaceted Middle
Eastern crisis was the “Moscow Declaration” in which Russia, Turkey and Iran
suggested that they could become the guarantors of a Syrian peace deal. That
begs the question: what kind of deal it might be? So far, a political solution
mooted at different times by the rebel groups/jihadis and supported by the US
and its allies have involved the removal of Bashar al-Assad and his coterie as
a precondition, though there hasn’t been any clear alternative to what might
follow. Russia has indicated in the past that they are not committed to Assad
and his regime per se but, in the absence of any clear alternative, the Syrian
regime remains the only effective force on the ground to fight extremists and
terrorists of all hues. Iran is clearly committed to Assad regime, while Saudi
Arabia and its Gulf allies are aiding and abetting forces fighting to bring
down the Syrian regime. Interestingly, the “Moscow Declaration” has been
followed by a ceasefire between Damascus and some rebel groups brokered by
Russia and Turkey, but Iran, though a signatory to the tripartite declaration,
is not in the picture. Which is telling but that is another story. In any case,
the ceasefire is already faltering.
Turkey’s activist role as a broker and guarantor needs some
explaining. Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was, from the beginning of
the Syrian crisis in 2011, all for bringing down the Assad regime. Now that it
has become a party to the “Moscow Declaration”, it would appear that it might
not now be as committed to Assad’s removal as before, because both Moscow and
Tehran do not seem to be considering a political deal contingent on that.
Turkey finds itself in a bind because Erdogan’s attempt to revive
his country’s role as a successor of sorts to the Ottomans has run into all
sorts of problems because the events in the Middle East have developed a
momentum and trajectory of their own. And in the meantime, Ankara is now beset
with problems of its own which it imagines might require some deft politicking.
The Erdogan administration is imagining an existential threat for the
government and the country from two sources. First is the Kurds, both inside
Turkey and outside, in northern Syria, where they have virtually carved out an
autonomous region with Kurdish YPG fighters proving to be the most effective
force on the ground against IS. They have operated as US’ virtual ally,
supported and backed by it with aerial operations against IS.
Ankara is unhappy with the virtual alliance between the US and
Kurdish YPG fighters, as it regards them as terrorists because of their presumed
links with Turkey’s Kurdish PKK movement that has been fighting for autonomy
for the majority Kurdish populated southeastern region of the country. Ankara
fears that an autonomous/independent Kurdish region in northern Syria will be a
magnet for its own Kurdish minority. It is trying to deal with it at two
levels. First, it has put its Kurdish-majority region under a total security
clamp down with almost all Kurds seen as harbouring separatist designs, leading
to large scale arrests and shut down of normal civilian life. And this seems to
have contributed to some terrorist incidents blamed on the PKK and/or IS.
While Turkey is dealing with its internal Kurdish problem, it is
also seeking to confront Kurdish YPG fighters who have carved out an autonomous
Kurdish region across the border in Syria. To this end, it has been seeking to
convince the US to drop its support of YPG in favour of Turkey undertaking to
take up the fight against IS, which it has done in places. At the same time,
Turkey’s President Erdogan has told the US emphatically that, “We will not
allow the formation of a new [Kurdish] state in northern Syria.” In other
words, the US might, at some point, have to choose between Turkey and the
Kurdish YPG group in its fight against IS.
Erdogan’s Turkey has been feeling let down/ignored by the Obama
administration for all sorts of reasons and is hoping that the incoming Trump
administration might be more responsive to its concerns. And he has already
made a pitch by highlighting the success of Turkish military action against IS,
which Trump regards as the main danger. Erdogan reportedly said that Turkish
troops were about to advance to IS’ de facto capital in Raqqa and has suggested
joint action with the US against its stronghold but, with the proviso, that the
incoming administration would prevent Kurdish forces from participating in such
an operation. In other words, Turkey is willing to become the main fighting
force against IS, if the US would ditch YPG and the Kurds. At the same time,
Erdogan’s dalliance with Moscow is banking on presumed Putin-Trump special
relationship with focus on IS as a common enemy.
Another of Erdogan’s problem and paranoia arises from the presumed
existential threat from the self-exiled Turkish cleric, Fetthullah Gulen, a
former Erdogan ally. His Hizmet movement is believed to be running a parallel
administration infiltrating all branches of the state encompassing bureaucracy,
police, judiciary and even military. The recent failed military coup to overthrow
the Erdogan government was allegedly inspired and engineered by the Gullenists,
with their leader Fathullah Gulen somehow doing it all through remote control
from his exile in Pennsylvania in the US. Erdogan demanded that Gulen should be
handed over to Turkey and since the US authorities weren’t convinced with the
evidence from Turkey about his involvement, Ankara came to believe the worst
about the US in the matter.
Following the failed coup, the Erdogan administration has gone on a
wild hunt to arrest thousands of suspected conspirators in military and across
the board in other branches of the administration. Which has evoked
considerable criticism in the west of heavy handedness with declaration of
emergency to smother all kinds of opposition and criticism of the Erdogan
government. And it is designed to institute a virtual Erdogan dictatorship.
This is making Erdogan increasingly estranged from the US and its western
allies. And he is looking for some leverage from forging a new path. Therefore,
when the Russian ambassador was recently shot by an off-duty police man unhappy
with Moscow’s Syrian intervention, Erdogan had no qualms about putting the
blame fairly and squarely on Gulen’s Hizmet movement, apparently seeking to
have Russia as an ally when the US is proving so ‘difficult’. But Moscow has so
far not taken Erdogan’s bait by turning the Gulen affair into a new cold war
issue. Which shows how desperate Erdogan is becoming, whether he is dealing
with the Gullenists and/or the Kurds.
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