Will Saudi Arabia implode?

S P SETH

Saudi Arabia is a political volcano waiting to implode though, as with most volcanoes, it is difficult to put any time scale on it. Indeed, the Saudi monarchy is aware, at some level, of political combustion and has been, for a long time, preemptively trying to hose down the simmering fire. One such occasion was in 1979 when, seemingly inspired by the overthrow of the Iranian monarchy and the establishment of an Islamic republic in that country, Islamic militants occupied Mecca’s Grand Mosque and declared a new order under a leader who proclaimed himself the Mahdi. But the Saudi forces, reportedly aided by Pakistani Special Services Group, counter-attacked and retook control of the Mosque. The Saudis now pushed ahead with their Wahhabi version of Islam, a pact of sorts with the country’s clerical establishment in return for their support of the monarchy.

Ever since, the Saudi kingdom and the Wahhabi version of Islam have become indistinguishable and used to strictly supervise and control people’s ‘moral’ and social behavior. Even with this internal compact with the clerical establishment, and partly on their behest, the Saudis still felt insecure and have gone on to promote Wahhabi version of Islam in the wider Islamic world. This supposedly would make Saudi Arabia the authentic voice of Islam among Muslims around the world, conferring on the kingdom the aura of legitimacy and respectability. But this search for internal and external security is a never-ending affair for a regime that continues to regard itself as under siege of some sorts. And there is an endless preoccupation to enforce ‘moral order’, even though there are signs of decay and decrepitude around.

Which, in different ways, figures in four books on Saudi Arabia in a recent issue of the New York Review of Books. The reviewer, Nicolas Pelham, the Economist’s Middle East Correspondent, has paraphrased some of their findings. For instance, Pascal Menoret, one of the authors, has described young men in the kingdom whose only escape from Riyadh’s social strictures is the homoerotically charged practice of joyriding the city’s grim highways. It is a case of so much energy bottled up but with no acceptable social and moral outlets. Paul Aaarts and Carolien Roelants describe the suppression of Saudi women, who still need a man to study, work, travel, or open bank accounts. Simon Ross Valentine is appalled at the power of the Wahhabi clerics. The Shias in eastern Saudi Arabia, the oil rich part of the kingdom, live on edge, with restrictions on practicing their version of Islam. And somewhere along the line, if one is prepared to take risks and these can be horrendous, it is possible to live a ‘corrupt’ life. According to Simon Ross Valentine, author of one of the books: “Wherever I lived in [Saudi Arabia], I was not only offered drugs and alcohol, but also ‘woman, for good time.’’’

When the old King Salman, at 79, succeeded his even older half-brother who died aged 90, the future of the kingdom assumed even greater urgency. Though Saudi Arabia is still an important regional power, it has slowly been losing its capacity to virtually dictate the course of events in the Middle East. This happened for a variety of reasons. First, it was the sudden eruption of Arab Spring early in this decade, which not only created turmoil in some of the regional countries but also posed threat to internal stability in the kingdom. A trusted way for the kingdom to maintain status quo in the region was its strategic alliance with the United States that gave Riyadh an almost determining role in the way US exercised power in the region, which in turn was based on strategic convergence of their interests. And that prevailed largely until the eruption of the Arab Spring when the US, in the new circumstances of a popular revolt, was unable to save Hosni Mubarak in Egypt despite strong advocacy by Riyadh and, indeed, by Israel.

In any case, the seizure of power by the new Egyptian military strongman, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, eased Riyadh’s concerns to some degree. But the example set by the Arab Spring was an important, if not a determining factor, in the popular uprising in the predominantly Shia populated kingdom of Bahrain to challenge the autocratic and repressive regime of its Sunni monarchy. Saudi Arabia lost no time in coming to the rescue of its follow monarch by rushing troops to quell the rebellion, fearing the contagion might spread to its restive Shia-dominated eastern province. The US didn’t seem too concerned about the Saudi and Bahraini government’s excesses in Bahrain, and in its largely Shia eastern province, as this was projected as an exercise in containing Iran’s perceived dangerous and nefarious role to expand its regional power by destabilizing neighbouring Arab countries.

Which brings us to the conflict in Yemen, where Houthi rebels, now in control of the capital, Sana’a, are pitted against a Saudi-led regional coalition, which is bombing the hell out of Middle East’s poorest country because the Houthis, broadly categorized as Shias, are perceived to be fighting a proxy war on behalf of Iran. And Saudi Arabia considers Iran to be its inveterate enemy both at home and in the region and must be contained. The US has broadly shared this view and has helped Riyadh with weapons, intelligence and strong naval presence in the regional waters. But the recent Saudi bombing of a funeral gathering, which killed 140, mostly innocent people, even embarrassed the US, especially when it was leading the charge against Russia over its bombing raids in eastern Aleppo. Which led to reports that the US would be reviewing its relationship with Saudi Arabia. But the Saudis are continuing their bombing missions.

Even though US-Saudi strategic ties still remain close, Riyadh is unhappy with the state of affairs. Despite their strategic convergence to contain Iranian influence in the region, a serious breach occurred with the US-Iran agreement to freeze Tehran’s nuclear programme for the next 10-15 years. Which has resulted in lifting of some important sanctions against Iran. It seriously displeased Saudi Arabia, as it was keen, like Israel, to keep Iran in international purgatory.

The second important breach has been over Syria, as Riyadh wanted the US to get rid of the Bashar al-Assad regime. Which Obama was reluctant to do directly to avoid any more direct regional military involvement after the experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. In other words, the US is now more cautious and selective about regional military involvement and not simply does Riyadh’s bidding. And since its dependence on Saudi oil has lessened, it is seeking to exercise some flexibility in pursuing its regional policies while, at the same time, maintaining a close strategic relationship with Riyadh.

With its regional clout dented as its strategic control of oil is lessened from reduced demand internationally and excess supply and consequent fall in oil price, Saudi Arabia’s position both internally and externally is becoming increasingly precarious. And this is sought be dealt with by Mohammed bin Salman, the country’s now effective ruler as deputy crown prince under his aging father’s rule, following the new king’s coronation in January 2015. The prince has floated plans to diversify the kingdom’s economy to reduce dependence on oil income, which is easier said than done. Externally, Iran remains the primary preoccupation, while still promoting Wahhabi version as Saudi Arabia’s Islamic brand. With such limited vision, Saudi Arabia is caught in a time warp that might, sooner or later, envelop the monarchy on a course to self-destruction. 

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

Contact: sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au 

        

Syria: from bad to worse

S P SETH

What went wrong in Syria after a brief ceasefire, negotiated between the US and Russia, that didn’t hold? The ceasefire was intended to enable UN relief supplies to reach some of besieged people in Aleppo and elsewhere for, what looked like, eternity. There was even some hope at the time that the ceasefire might be extended and after that, who knows, there might even be the beginning of some sort of a breakthrough. The brief lull in fighting had became possible because both Russia and the US excluded al-Qaeda inspired/affiliated Al-Nusra Front and the IS from its scope, where the US-led coalition and Russia were allowed to continue their operations. In other words, they seemed to have agreed on a shared definition of terrorists, which seemed hopeful.

But this was too good to be true. First, the US-led coalition mistakenly, as they put it, bombed a Syrian position killing, at least, 60 of their soldiers, which might have enabled the regime’s enemies to consolidate and advance their position. And when the Russian side pointed out to the Americans what they had done, the damage was already done with the Assad regime calling it a deliberate act to help its enemies. Which led Damascus to call off the ceasefire. It is just unbelievable that after the agreed ceasefire there was apparently no understanding about the exchange of coordinates between the US and Russia regarding the area of exclusion. If this had been the case, the US side wouldn’t have mistakenly bombed the Damascus regime’s forces.

And here is the problem. An assortment of Syrian rebels, with their linkages and cooperation with Al-Nusra front and even IS elements, have a shared objective of getting rid of the Assad regime. The US broadly shares this goal and is supportive of some rebel groups among them. But the complex interplay of who is who among the Syrian rebels and who eventually ends up with US arms, remains an open question. Because the US supports some rebel groups, it is circumscribed in sharing intelligence with Russia about the coordinates of its operations. On the other hand, the Assad regime wants all rebels to be treated as terrorists and dealt with accordingly as a cooperative project, to include the US and Russia. Not surprisingly then that when the US “mistakenly” attacked and killed its soldiers, the Assad regime withdrew from the ceasefire.

And in the midst of it all, the Syrian situation took an even worse turn with attacks on the UN relief convoys with a number of its personnel killed. Which led the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to strongly condemn the act with his remarks: “Just when we think it cannot get any worse, the bar of depravity sinks lower.” And he called the attack on the convoy “sickening, savage and apparently deliberate.” But, as is the case with the savagery of the Syrian conflict, the opposing sides and their external patrons make it even more sickening by starting the blame game. The US seems convinced that it is the Russians and its surrogate, the Bashar regime, while the Russians are pointing the finger at the US and the rebel groups. The tragedy of it all is that in this age of electronic surveillance and imagery, it shouldn’t be difficult to determine what went wrong and, with political will and determination on all sides, to put an end to the ongoing slaughter in Syria.

But it won’t happen, not any time soon. Already, the talks to resume ceasefire between Russia and the US do not seem to be going anywhere. And they are now vetoing each other’s resolution to resolve the situation. The reasons are the same as before. Which is that both the patrons, the US and Russia, are themselves a hostage to their local proxies caught up with their respective agendas, like the Assad regime in the case of Russians, and a mix of rebels and jihadis out to overthrow the Assad regime for the US. At the same time, the regional power brokers, like Iran in the case of Assad regime and Saudi Arabia and the likes for the rebels, exercise their own pressure/leverage. For instance, the US on its own and under pressure from the rebels and their regional supporters want Russia to commit to the removal of Assad at some point during political transition, and sooner the better.

Russian President Putin had one time suggested that he wasn’t irrevocably committed to Assad but increasingly it would appear that there is no viable alternative. Any search for a viable alternative to Assad or to impose one might lead to its collapse. Which itself is a nightmarish situation because the rebels/jihadis/terrorists are united only, if one might call it that, to bring down the Assad regime. And if that were to be achieved, there will be another free for all creating a situation, worse than what is happening now, if one can imagine that. And the beneficiary of that chaos will be IS determined to bring about its own Islamist utopia. In the circumstances, in the view of the Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, the US needs to come around to the idea that President Assad is the only viable partner in the fight against terrorism, calling his army “the single most efficient force fighting terror in Syria.”

Even as the Syrian tragedy is being played out with dire consequences for its people, Turkey is seeking to further exploit the situation on its border by creating a security corridor through military intervention against the Syrian Kurds and their militia, that has played an important role in expelling IS from their enclave. Indeed, Kurds have been the US’ most dependent ally on the ground against the IS in Syria. One doesn’t hear much about their role in the current situation, having been, more or less, sidelined/abandoned by the US for the larger imperative of submitting to Ankara’s ambitions in the Syrian sector, as well as its ruthless repression in the Kurdish-majority southeastern Turkey. As has happened in the past, Kurdish autonomy might become expendable, even as nothing gets resolved in Syria.

In the midst of it all, the US seems quite hopeful that IS will be defeated in Syria and also driven out of their political enclaves in Iraq. This message was recently conveyed to the world by Australia’s Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull, after a briefing at the Pentagon where he met US defence secretary, Ash Carter. He cautioned, though, that in the process the western countries might face increasing threat from ‘lone wolf’ attacks in their midst. 

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

Contact: sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au   

     

Syrian tragedy rolls on

S P SETH

The image of a five-year old child sitting on a giant-sized chair after being pulled out from a bombed site in the Syrian city of Aleppo is a defining moment of the madness that has gripped Syria during the last five years of rebellion/civil war in that country. With his dazed face and stunned emotions, he seems to be the living embodiment of a world that has lost its soul. In some ways, it is like the 9-year old girl in the Vietnam War, came to be known the ‘Napalm Girl’, trying to escape American bombing, which so vividly captured the senselessness and cruelty of carpet-bombing of Vietnam by the US war machine. This 5-year old kid, like so many others, is the collateral damage, to use an American terminology, of the on-going rebellion/civil war, in Syria.

As in any war or insurgency, there are competing narratives the opposing sides are trying to sell to their own people and the world at large. And this is true of Syria too. For the Bashar al-Assad regime, its opponents of different hues are all undifferentiated terrorists. Indeed, it casts itself in a superior/moral struggle against terrorism, deserving of global support. Therefore, in their propaganda war, which they are waging alongside the real war that is killing people all around, they appear bewildered that the US and its allies are not making a common cause with the Syrian regime. The Russians are obviously buying this narrative and promoting it, and are heavily involved militarily on the regime’s side ever since the Bashar regime appeared like it might lose to the rebels.

The US and its Arab allies want Assad regime out and accordingly have been helping its enemies with their respective versions of an Islamist replacement. However, the US was never sure of who was who among the rebels that might be worthy of their consistent support to get rid of the Assad family rule. Therefore, their weapons supplies and financial aid to the rebels was cautious subject to wetting of their credentials, which never really worked. But the ‘trusted’ rebels still got enough weapons and related assistance from the US, but some, if not much of it, fell to the jihadi/terrorist version of them. Indeed, according to reports, IS got a good chunk of it through their allied sources.  In other words, US’ Syria policy has lacked conviction because there is no clear alternative to the Assad regime. The removal of Assad regime, though, remains a goal.

Libya is an instructive example where the US and its western allies went all out to get rid of Gaddafi and the country is now a mess as a hotbed of feuding fiefdoms, with IS now having an important foothold. Syria, without a properly and assuredly worked out alternative to Assad regime, is likely to be worse. The US is now much more involved against IS in Syria, which is now its main objective. But the main objective of some of its Arab allies, like Saudi Arabia, remains the removal of the Assad dynasty. Turkey, another US ally, is now engaged militarily against both IS and Syrian Kurds, who also happen to be US’ ally on the ground against IS. In other words, there is lack of political and strategic convergence among those whose broad goal is the removal of the Assad regime. The US is now much more committed to destroying IS.

This is where, superficially at least, there is broad agreement between the US and Russia. Moscow’s interpretation of it, though, includes all ‘terrorist’ networks that would include, more or less, all Assad regime enemies. In this sense, Russian bombardment of rebel-held areas in Aleppo and elsewhere, as part of its strategy to destroy terrorism, is intended to save the regime that had seemed, only a year ago, likely to lose to an array of rebel forces.  More recently when the rebels were making gains to wrest an important supply route, Russians intensified their bombing, using Iranian air bases. Which was a new development because so far, Russian and Iranian intervention on behalf of Damascus, had not involved the use of Iranian territory for Russian sorties. Iran has now backed away from allowing the use of their bases for Russian operations, as they reportedly felt betrayed that Moscow advertised this too loudly for their comfort.

Another new development is the emergence of China to support Assad regime. Politically, in the UN Security Council, China and Russia have been effectively vetoing US-led efforts to create a global action plan against the Damascus regime.  But it now seems to be developing into limited cooperation at the military level between Beijing and Damascus. The Chinese news agency, Xinhua, recently reported a meeting between Rear-Admiral Guan Youfei, who heads China’s office for international military cooperation, and Lieutenant-General Fahad Jassem al-Frejj, the Syrian defence minister, in Damascus. It said, “They reached consensus on improved personnel training, and the Chinese military offering humanitarian aid to Syria.” The Global Times newspaper of the ruling Communist Party has reported that Chinese advisers are already on the ground in Syria to train regime forces in the use of Chinese-bought weapons, including sniper rifles, rocket launchers and machine guns.

China’s involvement is unlikely to be on the Russian scale, but reportage in the Chinese media attests to the increasing complexity of the Syrian situation with a wide array of regional and global interests involved. And a reported meeting between the Chinese Admiral Guan and Russian Lieutenant-General Sergei Chvarkov in the context of developments in Syria might also indicate a level of consultation between China and Russia. Russia has been getting deeper into it with its naval ships in the Mediterranean lobbing missiles into the rebel held areas of Aleppo.

In the midst of it all, it is the Syrian people that are suffering the most, even though all the parties involved in the conflict claim that they are actually in it for the people, whoever they might be. But it is not difficult to see that the so-called people are a pawn in a game involving sectarian, political and strategic interests of the concerned parties. And because these interests tend to clash, with no foreseeable prospect of reconciliation, the Syrian tragedy keeps rolling on.

Note: This article first appeared in the Daily Times.

Contact: sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au

Turkey-Russia turnabout

S P SETH

Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s recent visit to Russia is an important development. First of all, it breaks the logjam in their relationship, which nosedived after a Russian plane was shot down last November for breaching Turkish air space for bombing raids on Syrian rebels. Moscow denied any violation of Turkish air space and demanded an apology. As the apology was not forthcoming, the relations between the two countries were virtually suspended thus adversely affecting Turkish economy. Russia stopped imports of fruit and other agricultural products, and tourism from Russia was halted. Similarly grandiose projects like a gas pipeline and a nuclear power plant to be built in Turkey were suspended. Erdogan’s visit will now lead to a resumption of their suspended relationship, with prospects of closer ties between the two countries.

It would seem that Erdogan was already having second thoughts and was keen to repair the damage from the shooting of the Russian warplane. He had already expressed regret for the incident, as earlier demanded by Putin. In the wake of the failed military coup in Turkey, President Putin’s rapid phone call expressing solidarity with President Erdogan was regarded as a “psychological boost” by the Turkish President, when it was needed most. Which in a way puts in context Erdogan’s initiative to revive his country’s strained relationship with Russia. While Russian President was immediately forthcoming and supportive of Erdogan’s situation and apparently his crackdown on his internal enemies, the US and Europe have lately become critical of the sweeping nature of Erdogan’s suppression of all freedoms, using the coup as a blunt instrument to go after all his real and imagined enemies. And he feels let down because, in his view, his crackdown is indeed meant to protect democracy.

He believes that the US and Europe are hypocritical in not appreciating and recognizing that his enemies are indeed “terrorists” and that his campaign against them is on par with the west’s war on terrorism. And, in the case of the US, Erdogan feels even more aggrieved and betrayed that they are sheltering the cleric, Fathullah Gulen, who is said to be the mastermind behind the failed coup.  His Hizmet movement is said to be working for the overthrow of Erdogan’s democratically elected government. And by refusing to extradite Gulen for his “terrorist” crimes, the US is complicit in the failed coup and all that Gulen and his supporters are hatching against the Erdogan government and Turkey’s democracy.

Erdogan believes that he is not without leverage in seeking to forestall western criticism of his policies for failure to follow due legal processes.  Both Putin and Erdogan find western criticism and values self-serving and hypocritical. They find themselves under western pressure to tailor their internal politics and system to dovetail with western concept and practice of democracy as a universal system. Even though Turkey is a NATO ally, Ankara feels let down when subjected to criticism for its tough internal crackdown after its democratically elected government came close to be overthrown. And indeed, as the Erdogan government sees it, all this time the architect of all the conspiracies, Fathullah Gulen, is safely ensconced in the United States and acting with impunity.

The Turkish government is seeking Gulen’s extradition, but the US is refusing to hand him over even after President Erdogan made a direct request to President Obama. Therefore, as Ankara sees it, this is not how friends and allies are supposed to act. In the same way, but in a different context, Putin sees Russia subjected to comprehensive sanctions for safeguarding its sovereign interests from an advancing NATO alliance by seeking to coopt Ukraine into EU and, likely, into NATO. On the face of it, there is no agreement between them on specific issues that rile Turkey and Russia against the west. But there appears to be a shared sense of outrage over western hypocrisy and double standards. Russia is treated as a pariah and Turkey fears that it might be heading in that direction for refusing to ‘behave’ according to western norms.

Turkey would very much like its western allies, particularly the United States, to become part of its crusade against the Kurds which it regards as a bigger enemy than IS. But they happen to be the US’ principal ally on the ground against IS.  It is only recently that Turkey has hardened its policy against IS. Otherwise, it has been allowing jihadis and weapons to pass through its borders into Syria. Erdogan has sought all this time to bring down the Bashar al-Assad regime, and was unhappy when the United States didn’t take the opportunity to bomb Assad regime out of existence when it crossed Obama’s ‘red line’ with the use of chemical weapons on its citizens. And when Russians intervened to save Assad with their bombing sorties, it was then than Erdogan ordered the shooting of the Russian plane putting Russian-Turkish relations in serious jeopardy.

 Even though the process of repair and revival has seemingly begun, there is no indication that Turkey and Russia might sort out their serious differences on Syria policy. In other words, the apparent improvement in Moscow-Ankara relations appears tentative rather than substantive. While the imagery created by Erdogan’s Moscow visit is useful internally in both countries as having alternative options, their real value, as of now, lacks depth. The resumption of economic relations will marginally help Turkey but it cannot afford to risk its overall relationship with the US and Europe.

Erdogan seems to believe he has more cards to play, as he did with slowing down the exodus of refugees from Syria and elsewhere into Europe. However, Ankara is unhappy at the ‘ingratitude’ of the EU, even though they have reportedly paid Turkey over $4billion for its services. The promised visa-free travel for Turks doesn’t appear to have materialized. And considering that Europe is critical of Erdogan’s no-holds-barred repression of his ‘enemies’ in the country, it doesn’t look Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership is likely to make any advance. On the face of it, Turkey is not making much headway in enlisting the US and European support on a whole range of issues that it considers important.

Which has led President Erdogan to believe that he might be able use his Russian card to create the necessary space to deal with the US and Europe. But there is one problem. While Putin has been able to create a larger than life image for Russia by intervening in Ukraine and in Syria, Russia is no Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War. Although it is the second largest nuclear power in the world, its economy is in rather bad shape from falling oil prices compounded by comprehensive western sanctions. In that sense, it is a poor counterweight to the west, if that is what Erdogan is aiming. Even as Ankara is trying to play the Russian card as evidenced by Erdogan’s recent visit, there are reports that Ankara was insisting that it didn’t signal a fundamental shift in Turkey’s foreign policy.

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.