Dealing with Islamic State

S P SETH

The self-proclaimed Islamic State (of Iraq and Levant) has become a living nightmare for much of the Muslim and non-Muslim world. For the Muslim world at large, it has declared war on all and sundry that do not subscribe to their version of Islam, whatever that might be. Which is why there is now growing panic among Arab kingdoms, like Saudi Arabia, that otherwise were supporting these and other militants of varying descriptions. The Shias, of course, are ISIS’s mortal enemies. The rest of the world would also, at some point, need to be subdued to the writ of the new caliphate. Of course, this wouldn’t happen soon, even the diehard among the ISIS must recognize this. But it is important to set a long-term goal of re-establishing the envisioned Islamic glory of the past. And for that it was important to declare an Islamic State with its own territory that would become the magnet for many Sunni Muslims from all over the world that feel disempowered and humiliated with western domination. And this is already clear from the fact that a good number of of ISIS’ hardened fighters are Muslims from foreign countries, feeling empowered with this new Mecca of the Islamic world.

In other words, even though IS is not as powerful as its leaders would make out to be and is highly vulnerable, but the act of its proclamation with its own territorial space stretched over large parts of Iraq and Syria, has created the image of a nest for all Muslims with deep-rooted hatred of the west and their ‘lackeys’ in the Arab world. Viewed against this backdrop there is logic of sorts behind the declaration of the Islamic State. And that would explain why it has, in a sense, supplanted the al Qaeda as a driving force for disempowered Muslims. Interestingly, this has led al Qaeda to re-energize itself by retooling jihad in the sub-continent to include India, Bangladesh, Burma, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are already in different stages of that struggle. While the al Qaeda created enough havoc, largely with its ideological inspiration, it lacked its own territorial space to draw many adherents. As a result, the al Qaeda largely became an ideological brand name for local/regional jihadis in different parts of the world. The IS wants to be a global phenomenon in its own right with its own territorial space, and take it from there.

 Whether or not IS will make much headway regionally or globally, is another matter. But it certainly has created alarm, particularly in the US, among some NATO countries, in Australia and among its Arab neighbours.  The US is leading the charge against the Islamic State (of Iraq and Levant). The strategy to deal with it is three-fold. The first is to create an inclusive Iraqi government with fair and effective representation of Sunni and Kurd communities. The removal of Nouri al-Maliki as prime minister and his replacement by Haider al-Abidi, who now heads the new government, is an attempt to create national consensus and mobilization against the Islamic State militants. The US considers it as an important step. But the two most important cabinet positions of internal affairs and defense have been left vacant to be filled at a later stage, suggesting serious differences. Therefore, as long as there is such persistent distrust, the idea of national consensus is a bit pre-mature.

At the regional level, countries like Saudi Arabia and Gulf kingdoms that have been funneling aid of all sorts, and through different channels, to Sunni militants in Iraq and Syria will have to seriously reconsider their options. The US is organizing an Arab coalition for effective action against IS. This coalition of Arab countries will take appropriate action against IS, though the specifics of what that action might be are still not clear. These countries are coming to realize that Islamic State is a serious danger to their political stability because, first, their espousal of the so-called caliphate would suggest a dominant political and religious Centre with Baghdadi as the new caliph; and, two, if Saudi Arabia were, for instance, to go on the offensive against IS in some form of collaboration with the US, it might create serious domestic/regional backlash from the sort of extremist constituency that IS represents and Saudi Arabia has been nurturing. Saudi Arabia has generally encouraged Sunni militant orthodoxy, and suddenly to turn against that when these militants of the IS brand feel empowered, is not likely to go well with its sympathizers and adherents in the birthplace of orthodox Islam.

While the US is seeking to represent IS as an enemy of Muslims and non-Muslims alike and rally international and regional forces in a common cause, this has the potential at some point of time of appearing as an anti-Muslim crusade. By rallying Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries, the US seeks the legitimacy of the Muslim world against this particular brand of Islamic militancy, learning lessons from former president Bush’s disastrous Iraq war that, at times, appeared like a global crusade against Islam. This time, the US is keen that any expanded military action should have a specific and narrow focus on IS (in Iraq and Syria). And that it has the authorization of Iraq’s new supposedly inclusive government. The whole idea is to make it legitimate at the national, regional and international levels to the extent possible. At home in the US, opinion polls suggest overwhelming support for action, short of, it would seem, combat troops. At national level in Iraq, the Sunnis and Kurds are not satisfied with the composition of the new Shia-dominated government, which looks more like old wine in new bottles. The inclusivity argument is, therefore, is bit of a stretch. As for broad regional support, it is likely to vary with the success or otherwise of the US-led project against IS.

One might ask: what exactly is the objective of the US-led coalition? President Obama has said, “Our objective is clear, and that is to destroy ISIL so it is no longer a threat not just to Iraq but also the region and to the United States.” Apparently, this is the optimum goal, which has no time limit. A more modest goal, as Obama said at another time, is that a coalition force led by the US might “continue to shrink ISIL’s sphere of influence, its effectiveness, its financing, its military capabilities, where it is a manageable problem.”  And that seems to be the guiding principle behind the international and regional coalition that was broadly laid out in his recent speech to the nation. There is, of course, a lot of confusion about dealing with IS. While Obama has ruled out putting combat troops on the ground, Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is of the view that air strikes alone will not do the job.

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

Contact: sushilpseth@aol.com.au

     

Islamic State

Islamic State

S P SETH

In a world plagued with multiple crises, the self-proclaimed Islamic State (of Iraq and Levant) has emerged as another lightening rod for a region that is already facing quite a few fires. Its rapid advance through Mosul and threatening Erbil at one point, the capital of Iraq’s Kurdish region, has sent shock waves bringing the US back into Iraq to contain this new threat. Indeed, the new Islamic army didn’t have to do much by way of fighting to occupy Mosul, because the Iraqi forces simply fled abandoning much of their American weaponry and equipment as a helpful contribution for the ISIL forces. The advancing forces also helped themselves to the vast treasury left behind. And the orgy of killings by the ISIS continued with gruesome pictures of those executed put on social media sites. While the enemy was advancing, the Iraqi political establishment was undecided, at that point of time, about who will govern the country. The elections held on April 30 had returned Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s party as the single largest group but nowhere near a majority to form a government. He will soon be replaced as Prime Minister by Haider al-Abadi.

Why has the Iraqi situation reached this critical point? The starting point, of course, was the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, which simply opened up a Pandora’s box that refuses to be put together. The situation got even more complicated when the Maliki Government played divisive sectarian and ethnic politics, targeting Sunnis and being distrustful of the Kurds. Even though Maliki had suffered greatly under Saddam Hussein and spent many years in exile in Iran and Syria, as Prime Minister he was largely practicing his former tormentor’s politics of fear and terror against his presumed enemies, the Sunnis. The tribal Sunni coalition forged with American support and involvement against al Qaeda in Iraq, that eventually killed its leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and destroyed much of its structure, was allowed to dissipate under Maliki as he didn’t want to share power with the Sunnis. In other words, Maliki was a paranoid leader keen to centralize power under his control and his faction of the Shiite community. However, considering all the fault lines of Iraqi politics of sectarian and regional divisions, it was probably expecting too much of any Iraqi leader to create and lead an inclusive Iraq. Iraq was and remains a fractured state. Maliki simply made an already difficult situation worse.

Will Haider al-Abadi be able to do a better job of uniting Iraq’s fractured politics and society? A hopeful feature in this respect is that his selection was welcomed by both the United States and Iran separately. In the short term, therefore, there is likely to be much talk of a united government with better representation for the Sunnis and Kurds. An ‘inclusive’ government will mean more US military and humanitarian assistance, and greater Iranian support (of all sorts) for the new political order. But, considering the deep-rooted sectarian, regional and ethnic fault-lines, such unity is unlikely to hold for long. The sectarian violence seems to have its own momentum.

A hopeful by-product of ‘inclusive’ politics, if it works, is that it might help to detach Sunni tribes and other Sunni groups from the brutal Islamic State, as happened when they helped the US military to suppress the al Qaeda in Iraq in 2006 and 2007. Whether or not it will happen is a matter of conjecture and hope. But increased American involvement, being canvassed increasingly by powerful figures in the US after the beheading of an American journalist, is likely to contain the threat from the Islamic state. It seems to be already happening in northern Iraq with intense US aerial bombardment. A combination of Kurdish pesh merga (military) forces on the ground, supported by stepped up US aerial strikes, is producing results for the time being at least. They have, for instance, retaken the Mosul dam from the IS forces.

In any case, the potential for the self-proclaimed caliphate is rather limited. There is much talk of great economic resources at its disposal and looted weaponry helping its onward march. But, over an extended period, any state entity would need to create a governing structure with recurring revenues and ability to engage in trade with other countries like, for instance, to sell oil from its captured oil fields and refineries. And that would be quite daunting for the Islamic State under constant attack and international isolation. Which doesn’t mean it will cease to be dangerous. It will certainly continue to be a magnet for jihadists of all sorts within Iraq and Syria as well as radical Muslims from abroad.

An important question is how best to create regional consensus on the issue? For Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies, including Turkey, the over-arching regional issue has been and is the sectarian divide between the Sunnis and Shias, the latter identified with Iran’s ambitions to carve out a powerful role. And this has been the driving force behind them helping jihadist groups of all sorts. But with the Islamic State and the caliphate becoming a potent threat, these Gulf kingdoms might have to rethink their entire strategy. A militant expansionist Islamist movement, committed to spreading its own version of Sunni Islam under the overarching umbrella of caliphate, is as much a danger to Shia Iran as it is to Sunni monarchies in the Gulf. The US would very much want the broadest regional consensus and a united front to stem the rising tide of the IS. But will it be possible to bring together Shia Iran and the Sunni Arab states of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf kingdoms to fight this menace? It doesn’t seem likely, considering their history. And it is these contradictions that might give enough political space to the new Islamic State to maneuver.

In the US-led international response to the ISIS militancy, the Kurdish region of Iraq is understandably getting much more attention by way of humanitarian and military assistance. The humanitarian situation of the Yazidi people of the Sinjar region, under siege by the IS forces, seems improved. But other minorities are now being targeted. And the threat to Erbil, the capital of the Kurdish region, appears to have been contained after the US aerial bombing. But such US commitment to Kurdish security is likely to create resentment among the Shias. In the larger regional context, any strengthening of Kurdish autonomy in Iraq will have spill on effects, over time, creating pressure for a regional Kurdish homeland. In other words, there are multilayered fault lines in Iraq and the region.  And this could work to the Islamic State’s advantage.

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

Contact: sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au

Israeli terrorism

S P SETH

Whether or not there is a ceasefire, Israel wants to continue the massacre in Gaza. Of course, there is the excuse/justification that Israel is simply exercising its right of self defence against incoming rockets fired from Gaza by Hamas and other associated groups. But there are only two Israeli civilians killed from rocket firing, while the Israeli bombing, at the time of writing, has killed over 1800 Gazans (and rising). And 80 per cent of those killed are civilians, many of them women and children. In other words, Israel is using the civilian population as ransom to crush the resistance movement spearheaded by Hamas. Undoubtedly, most Gazans and other Palestinians share the aspiration to become masters in their own homeland.  Who wouldn’t when your territory is besieged from all sides and the people are confined to a vast prison-like existence with all movements of humans and goods dependent on Israel’s mercy? And there is no hope in hell of any redemption, unless the world wakes up to the Palestinian misery.  By and large, the Arab world and the larger international community have abandoned the Palestinians. This is what Israel wants.  Every time it pounds the Palestinians in Gaza and/or West Bank, its narrative presents itself as the victim and much of the world seems to buy it.

What is this narrative? Essentially, it preys on the holocaust visited on the Jews and other pogroms they were subjected to when they lived in Europe. And the stereotypes created about them, reproduced also in the United States, have been a part of the mainstream European literature and culture. Its culmination by way of a ‘final solution’ under the Nazis, and European and American indifference to their plight, finally persuaded these countries to salvage their conscience by creating a ‘homeland’ for these people. And since the Zionist movement wanted to ‘reclaim’ their ‘homeland’ in Palestine, it didn’t seem a difficult proposition as the Palestinians were among the most powerless people in the world. Which would explain why the creation of the state of Israel got the stamp of approval from the UN Security Council. Against this backdrop of victimhood in which, incidentally, the Palestinians had no role to play, the state of Israel emerged as a ‘heroic’ tale of a people managing to return to their ‘lost’ land. And when this story had supporters among almost all members of the Security Council, it was not difficult to see how it became an ‘acceptable’ narrative.   

The problem, though, was that the people of Palestine didn’t want to be displaced and replaced from where their forefathers had lived forever. They, therefore, put up strong resistance and their consequent struggle, backed by some of the Arab countries, only resulted in greater misery. Israel, created and nurtured with US support, money and weaponry, proved too powerful for the Arab coalition. And in the six days war of 1967, Israel exponentially expanded its occupied territory, leading its defence minister Moshe Dayan to declare that Israel is now an empire. Since then this basic fact that Israel is an occupying power acting at will and constantly altering ground realities, is a constant. Notwithstanding the Oslo agreement of 1993 creating a framework for a peaceful resolution to the Palestinian issue, and subsequent efforts in that direction-- the recent one by John Kerry whom the Israeli government found so annoying--, Israel simply doesn’t want a political solution that will accommodate Palestinian aspirations. The entire façade, over the years, of a political solution is a gimmick to drag on the process to a point where it becomes pointless and fruitless. Israel wants total capitulation, with an acceptance of an even deeper state of apartheid than exists today. Better still, they would like to make the Palestinians’ existence so miserable that they would just exit their homeland like many did before.

Just look at what they are doing to Gaza.  Gaza is a vast open-air prison with its 1.8 million people as prison inmates, surrounded on all sides by Israel. Some Israelis have, at times, urged that it be reduced to ‘stone age’ or simply flattened. And at best, its residents should be kept at a bare subsistence level to keep them  occupied with their sheer survival. But the problem is that despite periodical flattening of parts of their territory and mass murder of their people from Israeli bombing and missile attacks, they still haven’t submitted to Israeli terror. Egypt sought to bring about a ceasefire on Israeli terms, which amounts to total surrender on Gaza’s part. In essence it would mean the demilitarization of the Gaza strip under Israeli control.

But Hamas hasn’t been willing to go so easily, and has kept up its barrage of rockets falling in Israel but without causing any real damage, while Israeli bombing is killing people on an industrial scale. Watching women and children in cries of despair is heart rending. But Netanyahu reportedly described them as the “telegenic corpses” of the Palestinian children. How sick! But the Israeli narrative, however grotesque and cruel, still is that they are bombing and killing Gazans as a defensive measure. And that is not the end of it. Its ground invasion is intended to destroy, according to Israel, the network of tunnels that are, in some ways, Gaza’s alternative lifeline. Israel wants to destroy the entire infrastructure that makes Hamas continue its resistance.

And Egypt under Sisi, like his predecessor Hosni Mubarak, is facilitating this task with even greater enthusiasm. Some of its journalists, working for the state-controlled media, reportedly are even appreciative of Israeli efforts to eliminate Hamas. Indeed, the defeating silence of the Arab world on the Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip is a sad reflection on its state of affairs in the wake of the so-called Arab Spring. Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other Arab monarchies have no love lost for Hamas, regarded as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. Which, in turn, has been banned as a terrorist organization in Egypt, with its entire leadership in prison and many of them sentenced to death or long prison sentences. Saudi Arabia is right behind the Sisi regime in its crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood. Against this backdrop of politicking within the Arab world targeting Muslim Brotherhood, it is not entirely surprising that the Hamas finds itself so much isolated. And Israel is getting away with murder and mayhem. Still, Israeli forces might find the going hard to pacify Gaza Strip as even the inveterate Israeli warhorse Ariel Sharon found when he finally withdraw Israeli occupation and settlements from there.   

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

Contact: sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au 

Iraq: what next?

S P SETH

Where will Iraq go from here? During his recent parleys with Iraqi and regional leaders, as well as western allies, the US secretary of state, John Kerry, sought to convey US thinking on it. The first and the foremost message was that the US wouldn’t let Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) run havoc with Iraq and become the hub of terrorism in the region posing a threat not only in the Middle East but also to the United States. As President Obama told the West Point military academy graduates in a recent address, “…for the foreseeable future, the most direct threat to America at home and abroad remains terrorism….” But to confront this, the US would like to “more effectively partner with countries where terrorist networks seek a foothold.” At the time of his address, the ISIL’s advance into northern and western Iraq hadn’t been envisaged. And now that it has happened, and considering that terrorism is a major threat, the US would need to tailor its counterterrorism strategy to deal with, perhaps, the greatest terrorist threat that might emerge over time. We are talking here of the potential of a vast swathe of Iraq and Syria becoming the operational headquarters of a movement that even the al Qaeda regards as vicious.

The new caliphate and the Islamic caliphate, as proclaimed by its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, if it manages to consolidate and expand its hold, and with its own economic and military assets, might become the magnate of militants from all over the world. Baghdadi has indeed asked Muslims all over the world to rally around the new caliphate as the dawn of a new Islamic era in which they can hold their heads high. He personally gave a sermon to this effect at a Mosul mosque to this effect.

Not surprisingly, with the ISIL challenge and a good part of Iraq and Syria under their control, the Iraqi government approached the United States for military help. But in the light of its past bitter experience, Washington apparently is not keen to rush in, though they have sent a small contingent of special troops reportedly to evaluate the Iraqi military and protect the US embassy in Baghdad. Whatever the role of this new contingent, said to be between 300-500 strong, the US would seek to rally regional countries in its efforts to contain and isolate the ISIL. But there are some problems here. First, some of the regional countries, like Saudi Arabia and Gulf kingdoms, have been funneling money and arms to different militant outfits in Iraq and Syria, including the ISIL operating on both sides of the Iraqi and Syrian border. After the proclamation of the Islamic state and the caliphate and Baghdadi’s direct appeal to the Muslim masses, the ISIL is now emerging as a possible threat to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies. No wonder that Saudi Arabia has reportedly moved 30,000 troops to its border with Iraq. The threat from the new Islamic state should become the basis for a regional coalition.

But it is easier said than done. Because, ever since the clerical revolution in Iran in 1979, these countries have regarded Shia Iran as their major threat and enemy, sharing this perception and strategy with the US.  And suddenly to change that course and focus on ISIL as their primary concern and threat will not be easy. Saudi Arabia and its regional allies have been nurturing these militant outfits from, at least, the time of the Syrian insurrection, if one discounts the original al Qaeda. A good number of original al Qaeda operatives had their baptism in or from Saudi Arabia. Much of the money to propagate and fund madrassas, where some of the hard line militants have emerged from, has come from Saudi Arabia and its fellow Gulf neighbors. And now all this might come to haunt the Saudi kingdom.

While regional cooperation/collaboration to confront ISIL is yet to emerge, pressure has been mounting for Maliki’s replacement as Prime Minister and the formation of an inclusive unity government. That would mean sharing power with the Sunnis, who have been at the receiving end of sectarian killings by the Maliki government. Indeed, the Sunni tribal militias, mobilized and financed by the US in 2007 and 2008, played an important role in crushing the then-powerful al Qaeda insurrection in Iraq. And there was an expectation that they would be integrated into the new Iraqi national army. Maliki saw to it that this wouldn’t happen. His removal as Prime Minister will be a step in the right direction. It is not just the Sunnis but the Kurds also have found him an obstacle in the way of their political aspirations.

The Kurds already have virtual autonomy but are now heading for separation. The Kurdish army has occupied much of the oil rich Kirkuk region and plans to keep it. Maliki is also facing a call for his replacement from some within the Shia ranks, as from Muqtada al-Sadr who has emerged from political hibernation, as if, calling for for the inclusion of Sunnis in a new unity government. Even as all this was going on, the ISIL upped the ante by declaring an Islamic caliphate. This declaration of the new caliphate is designed, among other things, to create a global centre for Islamic militants to supersede al Qaeda’s role as the legitimate authority for such groups around the world. The point to make is that the situation in Iraq is highly complex and not given to any easy solution, if there is a solution at all.

To further complicate the picture, there are all sorts of external factors. The US is already there in a limited role, so far. The Iraqi government is seeking further US involvement by way of air strikes on ISIL positions. They want American military hardware and equipment. The Maliki government has also bought some Russian military aircraft for aerial strikes on the ISIS territory, and Russian technicians are reportedly training the Iraqis to operate them. Maliki welcomed the bombing of ISIL positions across the Syrian border by the Bashar regime. Iran undoubtedly will play an important role against the ISIL.  How will all this play out in the end is anybody’s guess? But to think that the removal of Maliki, and the formation of a unity government, will be a game changer is an oversimplification. The fault lines in Iraq between the Shias, Sunnis and Kurds are too deep to be bridged with political games.

Saudi Arabia, other Gulf monarchs and Turkey must be deeply worried about the turn of events in Iraq, and likely will make their own moves at some point of time. Whatever the internal and external permutations and combinations against the ISIL, it has established strong roots in both Iraq and Syria. Any aerial bombardment will certainly do some serious damage to the ISIL, but the resultant civilian casualties, mostly of the Sunni population, is likely to make them even more popular. The mess in Iraq is not easy to fix and likely will make the region even more combustible. 

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

Contact: sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au  

Iraq: a rolling tragedy

S P SETH

Iraq is one rolling tragedy after another. A hodgepodge of a country created by the British, after the First World War, out of the ruins of the Ottoman Empire to serve their own economic and strategic interests, Iraq has struggled to find its new national identity. And this is not surprising because it was and has been an artificial creation clubbing together disparate regions, tribes, ethnicities, superimposed with the oldest sectarian schism in Islam between the Sunnis and Shias. Out of a welter of bloody power struggles, Saddam Hussein finally prevailed and went on to build a state of fear with all power virtually invested in him. After consolidating his power by eliminating all his real and imagined enemies, he sought to terrorize the country’s Shia majority and Kurdish minority, fearing them as his natural enemies. He was a feared leader at home and was not much of a hit with most of his Arab neighbours.

But following the 1979 revolution in Iran, he was increasingly seen as a useful counterweight to Iran’s new clerical regime that was on a political warpath with the United States. The US embassy and its personnel were under siege, regarded as ‘a nest of spies’ working for the now toppled Shah of Iran who was the US’ trusted ally in the region. The new political order in Iran led by its supreme leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, was also causing nervousness in the Sunni Arab world. At the same time, Saddam’s Iraq had its own scores to settle involving maritime and territorial disputes with Iran. The US seemed more than happy to help Iraq with weapons and intelligence to start and prosecute its war against Iran. The long war that ensued between the two countries, with Iran suffering tremendous loss of life, was fought to a stalemate and ended after eight years of carnage (1980-88).

Even though Iran suffered heavy losses, it was Saddam who emerged from it considerably weakened. He had got much encouragement and help from the US and funding from the Gulf monarchs as they all wanted the new Iran contained, if not destroyed. But they didn’t have much sympathy for him when he failed so badly in his and their shared objective. His Arab creditors, the Gulf rulers, wanted their money back as they had liberally advanced him loans, but Saddam’s treasury was virtually empty after the long and disastrous war with Iran. He, therefore, sought to retrieve and even benefit from his planned invasion of the oil rich Kuwait. A successful military invasion and occupation of Kuwait would give Saddam’s Iraq all the oil revenue from that oil rich country, strengthening his position in the Arab world and in the regional oil cartel. He apparently raised the issue with the then US ambassador and heard no specific objections to his ambitious plan to invade Kuwait. And it was only when his forces were in Kuwait with its annexation, more or less, accomplished that the US realized the enormity of the Saddam adventure that could change the regional geostrategic situation to its detriment and that of its regional allies like Saudi Arabia and other Arab monarchs.

The resultant Gulf War (1990-91), under the US leadership, was disastrous for Saddam and he would have been easily toppled but for the then President George Bush senior’s decision to instead strangulate Iraq politically and economically. In the decade or so that followed the first Gulf war, Iraq bled under UN sanctions with its children and sick suffering the most. A number of powerful Republicans thought that Bill Clinton’s presidency, that followed Bush senior’s electoral defeat, had wasted America’s unparalleled opportunity as the world’s only superpower to expand its horizon and power. In 1997, a small group of them, that included Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, promulgated the “The Project for the New American Century” for doing just that keeping in view the 2000 presidential elections. Its wide-ranging agenda included encouraging an invasion of Iraq to restructure the Middle Eastern geostrategic map to strengthen the US and Israeli power. And as it happened George Bush junior, their own man, won the 2000 presidential election presenting opportunities to roll out their plans.

Even as the Republicans were relishing their election victory, the country was unexpectedly hit by the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001. While the US went after Afghanistan to hunt out the al Qaeda leadership, the blueprint for the new American century as it related to Saddam’s Iraq appeared tantalizingly promising. Iraq seemed to fit neatly into the larger al Qaeda picture and was also accused of producing weapons of mass destruction. The US cobbled together a ‘coalition of the willing’ to get rid of Saddam. Whether or not Saddam’s Iraq was guilty as charged was immaterial. The act of toppling Saddam was considered good enough to ‘liberate’ Iraq and usher in ‘democracy’ in that country that would serve as an example for the entire region.

The tragedy now being enacted in Iraq, with the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) militants rushing in to turn much of Iraq and the neighbouring region of Syria into a terrorist haven, might prove more lethal than Afghanistan. All this follows from the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Having announced the ‘mission accomplished’ following Saddam’s fall and the US occupation, the next blunder was the dismantling of the Baath party and all the existing state structures, including the Iraqi army. This turned the country into a veritable state of anarchy. And when the US occupation sought to create some semblance of order, there was no effective leadership material at hand. They chose Nouri al-Maliki to run the country. This selection process is a story by itself as recounted by Dexter Filkins in a recent issue of the New Yorker. And Maliki became Iraq’s Prime Minister (American support helped him elected by the new parliament) and still continues in that position, though his position seems increasingly shaky.

Maliki is an unreconstructed die-hard politician with scores to settle with the country’s old Sunni establishment—what is left of it.  Maliki was one of the targets of Saddam’s megalomania and power craze but he managed to escape to Iran to live another day to even become Iraq’s Prime Minister. Unlike Saddam who was no sectarian zealot but a tyrant with an eye on power, Maliki has been determined to exclude Sunnis from any power sharing. When the US was the occupying power they had, at one point, largely succeeded in defeating the al Qaeda insurgency with the help of Sunni tribal militias they had created, mobilized and financed. And these militias were supposed to be integrated into the new Iraqi national army. But Maliki would have none of it. He not only excluded Sunnis from power sharing, but his new regime went on a killing spree targeting Sunnis. No wonder that many Sunnis are sympathetic, if not collaborating, with ISIL. And we now have the spectacle of regional and international intervention to further fuel an already burning fire.

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

Contact: sushipseth@yahoo.com.au