US-Iran breakthrough

S P SETH

The US-Iran nuclear deal is the most important breakthrough in their relationship, indeed the only breakthrough since the 1979 Iranian revolution that ruptured their bilateral relationship. It is indeed a multilateral accord including also Britain, France, Russia, China (as permanent members of the UN Security Council) and Germany. During the last over three decades, the US-Iranian relationship only went from bad to worse. Indeed, President Bush branded Iran as part of the ‘axis of evil’ and it is still regarded as a terrorist state, most notably by Israel. And when Iran was found to nurse nuclear ambitions, its ‘evil’ character was so magnified that it became a threat to the world. Indeed, when the US wanted to station missiles in eastern European states, apparently against Russia, it was justified as defence against an Iranian nuclear threat. As the threat was amplified and Iran refused to surrender its sovereign right, as Tehran put it, to pursue nuclear research for peaceful purposes, the US led the charge for international sanctions against it that seriously affected, probably crippled, its economy, making Iran virtually into a pariah state. But that was not the end of the story.

Israel wanted the US to bomb Iran’s nuclear installations or else allow it to do the job with US help and under its protection. There were times it seemed that Israel might persuade the US to do its bidding, though with what follow up results was not quite clear. As is said at times, Israel is not only an occupying power in Palestine; it also seems to occupy the US Congress. But when the pressure for military action against Iran increased towards the end of George Bush’s presidency, he had already seriously messed up things in Iraq and Afghanistan that even he wasn’t prepared to dig an even bigger hole for his country. When Obama became President, he was keen to find a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear question, as he did with the Palestinian issue. Which put him at odds with Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, who did everything possible to undercut Obama on both the issues by working the powerful Israeli lobby in the US.

It must go to Obama’s credit that despite all the pressure from Israel, as well as from Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies, he quietly and persistently pursued the diplomatic path to untangle and resolve the nuclear issue with Iran. And under the nuclear deal now signed, Iran has agreed, for all intents and purposes, to forgo for the next 10 to 15 years any advanced work that might be interpreted as pursuing a nuclear weapons goal. And this will be achieved through a highly intrusive UN inspection and surveillance regime under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Which will lengthen the “breakout time” for Iran to make an atomic bomb to one year. The scope for any cheating will be minimal, if any, because of an extensive inspection regime. In specific terms, Iran’s stockpile of low-enriched uranium would be reduced by 98 per cent for 15 years, probably by transferring it to Russia. Its centrifuges, the spinning machines used to enrich uranium will be cut from 19,000 to 5060. And if Iran follows up on its commitments, its crippling sanctions will be phased out.

Of course, all this is not going to be smooth sailing. Israel’s prime minister Netanyahu is still doing his utmost to wreck the deal. Some months ago, when Netanyahu was invited to address the US Congress on the subject, he duly railed against it. And he is continuing to do that and in this he has the support of Saudi Arabia and its fellow Gulf kingdoms, opposed to the deal for their own reasons. But having worked on the deal for the last 20 months, Obama administration is determined to get it through the Congress. President Obama has said that he would veto any rejection by the US Congress that has to review the accord within 60 days. The Congress though can out veto the president by a two-third majority. But it appears that Obama’s opponents might not be able to marshal that kind of majority. In that case, the nuclear accord with Iran is a done deal, especially after its adoption by the UN Security Council.

Israel, of course, will be terribly disappointed. Netanyahu has called it a “ historic mistake”, which will turn Iran into a “terrorist nuclear superpower.” Netanyahu, of course, sees phantoms when it comes to Iran; notwithstanding the fact that Israel is already a nuclear state with an estimated arsenal of 200 bombs. In his hard sell for the deal, Obama told a press conference: “The bottom line is this: This nuclear deal meets the national security interests of the United States and our allies. It prevents the most serious threat---Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon, which would make the other problems that Iran may cause even worse.” And he went on, “ Without a deal, we risk even more war in the Middle East, and other countries in the region would feel compelled to pursue their own nuclear programs, threatening a nuclear arms race in the most volatile region in the world.”

But Netanyahu is not interested in any explanation or cogent reason for the deal because he wants Iran to be perpetually in the doghouse. As Philip Hammond, British foreign secretary, said, “The question you have to ask yourself is what kind of deal would have been welcome in Tel Aviv. The answer, of course, is that Israel doesn’t want any deal with Iran--- Israel wants a permanent state of standoff and I don’t believe that’s in the interests of the region. I don’t believe it’s in our interests.”

And, of course, if the deal is implemented, it has the potential of changing the Middle Eastern region in some fundamental ways. With sanctions lifted, Iran’s economic potential will open up all sorts of opportunities not only for Iran but also for the region and beyond. Iran will get access to its frozen funds estimated at $100 billion. It will be able to openly sell oil and gas in the international market. There will be potential for international investment in varied projects in Iran, with its people free at last from a perpetual sense of siege since the revolution in 1979. Iran will take its place in the community of nations, and might even play a constructive role in a region torn apart for all sorts of reasons.

However, all this will take time, if it works its way. On surface, both the US and Iran have sought to confine this breakthrough to the nuclear deal between them. They are in fact underplaying, even ignoring, its significance in their overall bilateral relationship, largely for domestic reasons. But there is already a shared sense of danger from the so-called Islamic state. The US is already understanding, if not approving, of the frontline role that Iran-sponsored militias are playing against the self-styled caliphate. And as the nuclear deal proceeds, this is likely to be the most productive area of cooperation between Iran and the US. And once that trust is established, there will be scope for multifaceted cooperation.

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

Contact: sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au 

Saudi Arabia and delusions of power

S P SETH

When one looks at the conflict-ridden Middle East, what strikes one is that there are two broad currents that underlie regional instability, aided and abetted by powerful external forces. The first is the proponents of the status quo led by the oil rich Saudi monarchy and its fellow monarchs in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). And the second is the inexorable pressure for change. And the two have been in a process of collision. The Saudi-led GCC have been doing their best to push back change. They have sought do this by using Islam, its Wahhabi version in the case of Saudi Arabia, as one of their principal tools. In the absence of any kind of demonstrable popular support for the Saudi monarchy, the sanctity of religion, with a pact of sorts with the country’s clerical establishment, has been a useful tool of longevity at home. And since Saudi Arabia houses and cares for the Islamic world’s most revered sites, it sees itself invested with a special kind of religious dispensation for the rest of the Islamic world.  

Which makes Saudi Arabia regard itself not only as an important regional player but also as an authentic voice internationally of the Muslims. And with its vast financial patronage dispensed to promote all sorts of Islamic causes, it has acquired tremendous political clout for a country with such a small population. Besides, it has used its vast oil resource as a strategic tool to weigh into regional affairs. In other words, Saudi Arabia and the GCC have tended to use their assets to insure the stability of their dynasties at home and promote their causes abroad. And in this, they had the support of the United States and its western allies as their strategic interests converged. Which is to say that they too largely supported status quo of dictators and monarchs ruling their subjects.  To placate their subjects, the Saudi rulers have generously provided economic benefits to their subjects. But this generosity doesn’t extend to foreign workers. So far, such virtual bribery to keep most of their subjects on the royal side seems to have worked, at least on surface, combined with the repressive enforcement of the state sanctioned/sponsored Islamic code.

However, this will, most likely, not work if the region around the Saudi kingdom were racked by political turbulence, as happened during the Arab Spring. Saudi Arabia’s oil producing and Shia-majority eastern province was greatly affected, as well as its near neighbour, Bahrain. But in both cases the kingdom’s army crushed this. Which would explain why Saudi Arabia has worked hard to maintain and perpetuate the status quo in the Middle East, apart from Syria under Bashar al-Assad and in Lebanon where Hezbollah must be contained and eliminated. And lately, this also applies to Yemen where Houthis, a Shiite group, have managed to substantially capture power. In Yemen, Saudi Arabia has been bombing the country since March demanding the restoration of the exiled (in Saudi Arabia) former President Abed-Rabbu Mansour Hadi.

In all these cases (Syria under Bashar al-Assad regime, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Yemen increasingly under Houthi control) the common denominator is that they are believed to be Iranian proxies as part of Tehran’s game plan to expand its power into the predominantly Sunni and Arab Middle Eastern region. Saudi Arabia considers it necessary to contain and push back this threat. And as part of this policy, Riyadh has been providing arms and money to Syrian rebels of all descriptions trying to bring down the Assad regime. But this hasn’t worked so far. Instead, a good portion of Saudi-supplied weaponry has ended with the IS now controlling a big chunk of Iraq and Syria, with its ambition to extend the reach of its self-proclaimed caliphate to all Muslim countries. In other words, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf kingdoms are also IS targets as and when they can get around to it. But, for the present, Saudi Arabia is obsessed with Iran and its supposed threat to the Sunni Arab world. And hence, it will continue to bomb Yemen to crush the Houthis, continue supporting and arming rebels of all descriptions in Syria and work to erode Hezbollah influence in Lebanon.

At the same time, Saudi Arabia wants its Sunni Arab neighbours to maintain and perpetuate their status quo. Indeed, when the people’s power exemplified by Arab Spring was in ascendance, the Saudi ruling dynasty was mortified sensing an existential danger from them. And they did their utmost, prevailing on their most trusted and powerful ally, the US, to save the Egyptian dictator, Hosni Mubarak. Coincidentally, Israel was doing the same—both favouring regional status quo. However, Mubarak couldn’t be saved at the time, even if the US had wanted it because the revolutionary fervour in Egypt seemed unstoppable. Indeed, this was the beginning of a growing strain in Saudi-US relations, which has since widened as Washington didn’t follow up its threat to bring down Syria’s Assad regime after it used chemical weapons on rebels; reinforced further with a prospective nuclear deal with Iran, and US inability to effectively intervene against Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen. In other words, Saudi Arabia’s superpower ally, the US, is not proving as reliable as it once was.

But at one level, Saudi Arabia was relieved when Egypt’s strong army man, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, overthrew the first ever popularly elected President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood, now sentenced to death along with other Brotherhood leaders, on a slew of charges. If this is one way of turning the clock back to recreate status quo, it will only explode at some point with even greater intensity. Perhaps it is already starting to happen, if the violent eruptions in Sinai and elsewhere in Egypt are anything to go by. Riyadh might think that their multi-billion dollar investment in the Sisi regime has put the lid back on the revolutionary upsurge of the Arab Spring, but signs do not seem propitious. The most astute thing for Riyadh would be to start/encourage a process of graduated change in the kingdom as well as in the region, with its large financial resources. But that seems unlikely.

On the other hand, it has tended to overreach by seeking to turn back the tide of change. It is a small country but with delusions of power. It did work up to a point. But now, with the US connection/power weakening and oil ceasing to be an over-riding strategic asset, Riyadh is encountering serious difficulties. In the circumstances, Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies might find that they can’t turn the tide of history in favour of change. Instead they might need to change to survive. 

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

Contact: sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au               

The nightmare that is Islamic State

S P SETH

The fall of Ramadi to the Islamic State (IS) has shown it to be more durable than is comfortable to believe. It led the US defence secretary to blame the Iraqi army for lacking the will to fight, even when they far outnumber their enemy. The Iraqis, on the other hand, blame the US for not providing enough weaponry and being selective about their aerial targets. Both might be right to a point. Unlike the loss of Mosul to the IS last June when the army simply fled, this time the Iraqi army did put up some resistance but only just. They seem to be more comfortable with disorderly retreat than putting up a good fight. And the reason for this is that, unlike their enemy, they lack the ideological and religious fervour that imbues and inspires the IS, however abominable that ideology might be.

At the same time, despite all the training and weaponry Iraqi forces have received from the Americans, their US mentors were hardly inspirational. They were basically foreign invaders even when they got rid of the Saddam regime, hated by Iraq’s Shia majority. However, the Nouri al-Maliki government, a Shia version of Saddam’s killing machine---though this time the victims were the Sunni minority- was hardly inspiring with widespread corruption where some of the listed army battalions existed more on paper with top commanders pocketing their salaries. And these so-called commanders were Maliki’s cronies heading different fiefdoms. It is important to remember that Maliki was the US choice, a continuation of the mishandling of Iraq by Washington. In other words, there was nothing inspiring in the Iraqi situation--- whether it was the US role or the Maliki experiment--- for the Iraqi army and society to cherish and uphold. His successor, Haider al-Abadi, might be an improvement on Maliki but in the absence of any worthwhile ideal and vision for the future, the Iraqi army simply is a ragtag force led by self-seekers out to enrich themselves.

Another important drawback is that Iraq lacks the unifying features of a nation state. It is a hodgepodge of ethnic and sectarian elements culled out of a dying Ottoman empire after WW1, like other Middle Eastern entities, and foisted on the world by the British and the French colonialists and manipulated by them for their economic, political and strategic gains. No wonder, the country never developed into a real nation state when its components lacked cohesive features. On the other hand, its disparate and fractious components, like the Sunnis, Shias and the Kurds, were ruled with an iron hand under Saddam Hussein’s brutal dictatorship, with the Shias and the Kurds as his special targets. And when the US attacked Iraq in 2003 and removed and hanged the dictator that was the easy part. The easy success of military operations, symbolized with President George Bush appearing on the deck of a US warship to declare victory, encouraged Washington to uproot the existing system by virtually abolishing the Saddam-era army, bureaucracy and everything else associated with it.

In the absence of any alternative structure to govern the country, Iraq soon descended into anarchy. Which led to the rise of the al Qaeda in Iraq, making things even worse. During 2006 and 2007, the US occupation succeeded in enlisting the support of the Sunni tribal leaders against the al Qaeda that had become unpopular with the local tribes because of its foreign leadership, high handedness and disregard for the tribal leaders. The US made a deal to fund tribal fighters against the al Qaeda in Iraq and to eventually have them incorporated into the regular Iraqi force. However, Iraq’s Maliki government wasn’t willing to incorporate Sunnis into the regular army, as they weren’t trusted. On the other hand, the US-approved Maliki government turned on the Sunni minority and any hope of a cohesive Iraq faded pretty soon.

Under Haider al-Abidi as Iraq’s Prime Minister, the US has been encouraging a coalition of Sunni tribal leaders and fighters into a united front of the Sunnis, the Shia militia and army and Kurdish fighters to fight the IS. At the same time, the US is tactically supportive of Iran’s role in backing the Shia militias with arms and, where necessary, taking a commanding position. While the Abidi government is keen to have the Sunnis on their side, they are reluctant to provide them with the necessary weaponry. The US is continuing the pressure on the Abidi government to enlist Sunni tribal leaders and is keen to provide them with US weapons. But the Abidi government’s distrust of the Sunnis would remain an obstacle. Therefore, any coalition between the Shia regime and Iraq’s Sunni minority is unlikely to eventuate or be effective. And the Kurds, on their part, are concerned more about saving their own autonomous region from IS than diverting their resources and fighters to save Shia Iraq. In other words, all this talk of a US-inspired grand coalition of Iraq’s feuding sectarian and ethnic groups seems rather unlikely.

The US is now committing more elite forces as trainers and advisers, taking their numbers to 3500. Indeed, there is talk of setting up a string of bases to do an effective job of training the Iraqis. This would suggest that the US is being drawn once again into the Iraqi war theatre. Whether this would be more productive than the disastrous experience, starting with the 2003 military invasion, would remain to seen. But the long record of direct involvement in the Iraqi war by the US and its allies is not very encouraging. Already, the US aerial intervention, while useful in stopping the IS advance in some areas, is not proving as effective as was originally thought.

There is also constant talk in the US that Iraqis or, for that matter, people in other troubled Middle Eastern countries, should do more of their own fighting, with the US and its allies willing to help with arms, intelligence, money and aerial support where necessary. The problem, though, is that these people blame their troubles on the US intervention in the region, in the first place. And they do not have the resources, leadership and cohesion to effectively fight against their real or imagined enemies, even as they are simultaneously feuding internally over a host of issues, with sectarian divisions at the top. Iran could be an effective ally against the IS but that raises a host of other questions further aggravating regional fault lines. Hence, there are no easy answers. However, even if the IS were to gain further ground, it will always remain under siege and will have difficulty functioning as a normal state. 

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

Contact: sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au       

     

Obama explains: Will Israel listen?

S P SETH

It is not often that a US president feels the need to explain his policies to an aggrieved country, unless that country happens to be Israel. And that is precisely what President Obama recently did in an extensive interview with the New York Times’ influential columnist Thomas L. Friedman. It concentrated mostly on explaining the rationale of the recent nuclear framework deal with Iran, the final agreement to be fleshed out by end June. Interestingly, it was Obama who invited Friedman in order to expound his views and policy on the subject. Generally, it is journalists who seek interviews with a country’s leader. By taking the initiative to explain, Obama obviously felt the need to explain to Israel and the Zionist lobby in the US that in seeking a diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue, he was not acting against Israel’s interests. Indeed, he was putting Iran’s nuclear programme under the most stringent inspection regime for ten or more years, and that will serve Israel’ s security interests. And besides, if it doesn’t work the US will continue to have other options.  

The first thing he emphasized was that Iran was not some giant that is unstoppable. It can be contained and deterred. Indeed it is worth engaging with Iran diplomatically. And if “we can resolve these issues [constraining Iran’s nuclear capability] diplomatically we are more likely to be safe, more likely to be secure, in a better position to protect our allies, and who knows? Iran may change. If it doesn’t, our deterrence capabilities, our military superiority stays in place … We’re not relinquishing our capacity to defend ourselves or our allies.  In that situation, why wouldn’t we test it [the diplomatic path].” It seems pretty simple and straightforward. In simple language, Iran might be clobbered if it didn’t follow the straight and narrow path laid down for them in a nuclear accord.

The point, though, is that Israel is not interested in any nuclear deal with Iran short of abandonment or destruction of its nuclear capability. With this basic parameter, what leads Obama to think that his message would get through? Apparently, he believes that making a direct pitch to the Israeli people over Netanyahu’s shrill rhetoric might work and give him the necessary political space at home to sort out the nuclear issue. Taking on board Israel’s security concerns from an Iran with any nuclear capability, Obama said in his interview that, “… But what I would say to them (Israeli people] is that not only am I absolutely committed to making sure that they maintain their qualitative military edge, and they can deter any potential future attacks, but what I’m willing to do is to make the kinds of commitments that would give everybody in the neighbourhood, including Iran, a clarity that if Israel were to be attacked by any state, that we would stand by them.” He added, “And that, I think, should be sufficient to take advantage of this once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to see whether or not we can at least take the nuclear issue off the table.”

But will that convince Israel? As of now, it seems highly unlikely for two reasons. First, they don’t trust Obama. Second, and more importantly, they don’t trust Iran. On the first, most Israelis found him a bit evangelical on the broad question of seeking reconciliation with the Islamic world not long after he became President. His Cairo speech in 2009 riled Israel because it was not consulted.  It was delivered without clearing it with the Israeli government, which is used to vetting or vetoing US policy on the Middle East. At the same time, the Obama administration started unsuccessfully, as it turned out, its peace initiative on the two state formula on Israel-Palestine relations, gently goading Israel to temporarily, at least, halt its settlement policy. Which enraged Israel, and it showed its anger by continuing to build new settlements.

Obama and, later, his secretary of state, John Kerry, seemed on a mission to promote the two-state formula, even telling Tel Aviv that this was in Israel’s interest. Which seemed preposterous to the Netanyahu government as if Obama knew better than them what was or wasn’t in Israel’s interest? Obama’s Palestine policy might seem well meaning but was not regarded as serving Israel’s interests. And above all, pushing a deal with Iran on its nuclear programme was regarded certainly as not well-meaning, to put it mildly. Indeed, Obama was left in no doubt that Israel was not happy with Obama’s Middle Eastern politics.

Which pained Obama. He told Friedman, “It has been personally difficult for me to hear… expressions that somehow… this administration has not done everything it could to look out for Israel’s interest ---and the suggestion that when we have very serious policy differences, that that’s not in the context of a deep and abiding friendship and concern and understanding of the threats that the Jewish people have faced historically and continue to face.”

The personal chemistry between Obama and Netanyahu didn’t work as the latter behaved more like that the new President needed some coaching about how to conduct his Middle Eastern policy. And as Obama seemed a bit ‘obdurate’, Netanyahu started to play internal politics with the US system. It was reflected in his preference for Mitt Romney as a presidential candidate in the last election, his keenness to address the US Congress and make a pitch against a prospective nuclear deal with Iran, followed up by some US congressmen cautioning Iran that any deal with the Obama administration could be reversed by the US legislature. In other words, the Netanyahu government was seeking to undermine Obama by working against him through the US’s internal political processes.

Obama though seems keen to push ahead with the nuclear deal. As he told Friedman, “We know that a military strike or a series of military strikes can set back Iran’s nuclear programme for a period of time--- but almost certainly prompt Iran to rush towards a bomb…” But the framework deal, when hopefully fleshed out by end-June, will seriously constrain their nuclear path for the next 10 or more years with a stringent inspection regime “able to inspect and verify what’s happening along the entire nuclear chain from the uranium mines all the way through to the final facilities like Natanz… Iran will be subject to the kinds of inspections and verification mechanisms that have never been put in place before.”

While Obama’s pitch with the Israeli people is well meaning and cogently argued, it is not likely to make any real impact.   

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.

Contact: sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au