Egypt’s state of despair

S P SETH

One would expect that the referendum on the draft constitution would usher in a new democratic era in Egypt. But that is not going to happen. Ever since the Egyptians brought down Hosni Muabark, their dictator, who presided over Egypt’s destiny for three decades, the country is struggling to find a new path to democracy. The referendum on the constitution is making that transition even more difficult and painful.

In fact, President Mohammed Morsi’s gamble to assume sweeping powers to rush through a newly drafted constitution for popular referendum, brought the country to near chaos, with Tahrir Square once again the centre of popular demonstrations. Though Morsy later rescinded his decree under popular pressure, he refused to rescind the referendum on the constitution. Most of the opposition members of the constituent assembly had boycotted the drafting process, fearing that it was being rushed to produce a draft that negated the inclusive spirit of the Egyptian revolution to empower women, youth, minorities and the population at large around its new secular polity.  With the ruling Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party rallying its supporters for counter demonstrations, it looked like the country was in free fall.

The Morsi camp had calculated that the constitution, drafted by a predominantly Islamist assembly, would pass easily and that would give his party the stamp of popular approval for their policies. And that might not happen because there is significant opposition to it. The draft constitution is opposed as much as for its creeping Islamization as for its ambiguity on minority rights and human rights in general. The opposition, therefore, objects both to its substance as well the process by which Morsi has sought to push it through.

The process by which Morsi assumed sweeping powers, supposedly to promote democracy by putting the draft constitution to popular referendum is preposterous. Once the executive authority, in this case President Morsi, decides by decree to suspend or supersede established institutions, such short cuts can easily be replicated in future to circumvent normal constitutional channels. In other words, this was not an auspicious start for Egypt’s new democracy. No wonder, there was determined opposition to Morsi doing away with democratic processes to promote democracy.

Not only that the draft constitution had virtually no input from parties and groups other than the Islamists, the unseemly haste with which the referendum was pushed through, with very little time for any public debate, was against the norms of democratic functioning. Morsi needs to guard against becoming identified, like the fallen dictator Hosni Mubarak, as the symbol and personification of all that continues to be wrong with Egypt.

It is true that Morsi was voted President in the first ever-popular election in Egypt’s history. But he won by a very narrow margin, taking only 51.7 per cent of the vote against the Mubarak-era prime minister and a former air force commander, Ahmed Shafiq. In other words, the country is highly polarized. Another fact worth noting is that the voter turnout at the presidential election was quite low at 43.4 per cent. More than 50 per cent of the eligible voters didn’t care to vote either way, suggesting disillusionment or indifference with the political process being unfurled.

There are two reasons for this. First, the attempts by the army to manipulate the system by entrenching its over-riding power and interests seemed to suggest that the old system was likely to prevail minus Mubarak. Second, even as the army was trying to subvert the emerging democratic process, the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists were resurrecting religion (both as a matter of faith and political tool) to create an over-arching political presence. Which threatened the minorities, many women, liberals and secular elements that were in the forefront of Egypt’s revolutionary upsurge that brought down Hosni Mubarak. It appeared that the Islamists for their obscurantist ends were hijacking the revolution. Many people simply lost interest and seemed to be opting out by not voting at all. And many others decided to vote for the remnant of the Mubarak era, Ahmed Shafiq, than Morsi of the Brotherhood. They certainly didn’t like the Brotherhood usurping power in the name of democracy.

It was sad that the revolution had reached this point. And for this the Brotherhood must bear responsibility. They have never made a secret of taking the country into a faith-based (Islamic) direction, notwithstanding the fact that the revolution was actually pioneered by liberal elements, with women and the country’s Christians playing a prominent role. According to Human Rights Watch, Article 36 of the constitution promises to ensure equality between men and women as long as it does not conflict with “the rulings of Islamic Sharia”. There is this underlying message that the society will be reconfigured on Islamic principles. Considering that the Brotherhood and Salafists had dithered and only reluctantly, towards the end, decided to jump in on the revolutionary bandwagon, the usurpation by them of a broad-based revolutionary movement is not a good start.

It wouldn’t be easy, though. First, even if the constitution is adopted, it will face myriad challenges of vote rigging, the absence of international monitors, the stacking of the drafting panel and so on. Therefore, it will always suffer from a certain sense of legitimacy that comes from a country reconciled after a tumultuous popular upsurge.  And that is not going to happen with a large and diverse part of the population feeling that the Islamists had hijacked the revolution.  Such irreconcilability, in the midst of the country’s economy tottering, is likely to crystallize into Morsy replacing Hosni Mubarak as the hated symbol of all Egypt’s problems, past and present. If that were to happen, the regime will become increasingly dependent on the army like Mubarak was, taking things back to where it started. It would appear that Egypt is set to remain in a perpetual state of strife for the foreseeable future.  The Arab Spring in Egypt looks like turning into a long winter of discontent.

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.