US and Saudi Arabia: A souring relationship

S P SETH

If President Obama’s recent visit to Saudi Arabia was an exercise in fence mending, it didn’t look like it achieved much. It is so because for some time now---indeed under Obama--- the US has been looking to broaden its policy in the Middle East. And Obama has been impressing on its crucial Middle Eastern ally, Saudi Arabia, to explore diplomatic avenues that might help stabilize the region. And as part of this process, an opening with Iran might not be a bad idea. Such advice from the US, directly or indirectly, is anathema to the Saudi kingdom. They consider Iran as their eternal enemy trying to destabilize the region.  Riyadh considers itself the centre around which everything should revolve.

The Middle East was, by and large, a predictable region until rocked by the Arab Spring early in the decade. And the US did nothing to save Egypt’s dictator, Hosni Mubarak, despite all his years of loyal service to the US to maintain and perpetuate an oppressive regional status quo to underpin US’ strategic interests. This was a chilling warning to the Saudi monarchy which, meant in effect, that what happened to Hosni Mubarak could as well happen to them if the Arab Spring got out of control as it looked like at one time. Fortunately for the Saudis, the Arab Spring got derailed and a new military coup in Egypt, under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, virtually brought back the old order reminiscent of the ‘good’ old days based largely on maintaining status quo. Under Sisi, relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt are probably even closer, considering that Sisi has made a gift of two Red Sea islands to Saudi Arabia, which created some commotion in Egypt. Not surprising considering that Saudi Arabia is financially underpinning Sisi’s political order, and Sisi’s gesture might be his way of repaying the debt.

But the US, Saudi Arabia’s trusted ally, doesn’t appear as mindful of its strategic centrality in the Middle East as it once was. Indeed, sometimes, it would seem to the Saudis that the US was indeed courting Iran at their expense. Knowing that how much Riyadh was opposed to any nuclear deal with Iran, the US nevertheless went ahead and lifted wide-ranging sanctions on Iran to virtually make it into a normal state from its long-standing pariah status. The Saudis weren’t amused but they had to gulp it in the absence of any viable security alternatives.

And in the case of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad regime, considered an Iranian proxy, Riyadh was quite confident that Washington would get rid of it as they had, at one time, crossed Obama’s ‘red line’ of using chemical weapons on their people. But Obama still didn’t want to commit necessary military force to do this job. Riyadh is not interested in knowing Obama’s reasoning, however rational it might be from the US viewpoint. The point was that the Obama administration was not prepared to do what suited the Saudis. That has created a wedge, and the Saudis are finding it hard to adjust to the new realities of the situation, and tend to blame it on Obama.

Worse still, there is even serious talk of making Saudi Arabia accountable for its real/alleged links with the 9/11 terrorists, with 15 of 19 hijackers reportedly  being Saudi citizens. Though the 9/11 Commission report exonerated the Saudis of any link, a 28-page excerpt of the voluminous 858-page report was suppressed allegedly to save Riyadh from embarrassment. However, Obama has indicated that he would veto any such legislation if passed by the Congress. But the possibility of court action in the US is quite worrying from the Saudi viewpoint.  On a broader level, the US and Saudi Arabia are still close strategic partners. Under the Obama administration, for instance, the US reportedly sold close to  $100 billion worth of arms to Saudi Arabia, which is more than any of his predecessors.

But it is a changing relationship, and increasingly lacking conviction, based only on lack of viable options, especially on the Saudi side. Riyadh is rattled at all the revived talk and prospective legislation to hold it accountable for its acts of omission and commission, at whatever level, leading to the 9/11 terror attacks. So much so that they have expressed their severe displeasure by threatening to pull out hundreds of billions of dollars from the US economy. All this talk is indicative of suppressed rage and a sense of desperation. Otherwise, such action will probably hurt Saudi Arabia more than the US by seriously devaluing Saudi assets. Another recent thought bubble is this talk of diversifying Saudi economy by reducing its addiction to oil revenue.

Saudis are so annoyed with President Barack Obama that their displeasure was visibly on display when King Salman didn’t turn up to receive him at the airport during his recent visit, even though he did receive his fellow monarchs attending the Gulf Cooperation Council meeting. It must be galling for the Saudi and other Gulf monarchies to be described by Obama reportedly, as “free riders” with no “skin in the game.”

The US President is said to complain that Saudi policies fuel anti-US terror and contribute to chaos in the region. The brutal bombing of Yemen by the Saudis is an example of growing chaos in the region, though the Obama administration cannot wash its hands of this as it is American intelligence and weapons that are doing the job for the Saudis. But the Saudi contribution to spreading the extremist ideology is noticeable from the vast sums they have spent (estimated to be at least 70 billion dollars), and continue to spend, on spreading the Wahhabi brand of Islam, which largely forms the ideological foundation of all the terror groups, including IS. And when these terrorist groups start creating chaos and mayhem, the Saudis start playing favourites. And Riyadh expects the US to bet on their favourites and use its massive military power, including ground troops, to produce the desired results even though the same strategy hasn’t worked in the Afghan and Iraq wars. That would explain Obama’s reference to the Saudis as “free riders” with no “skin in the game”, as they have avoided putting troops on the ground.

The Saudis would hope that this hiccup in their relationship with the US is an Obama phenomenon and they will simply wait him out for six months or so of his remaining term. But I suspect it is not as simple as that.

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times. 

Middle East conundrum

S P SETH

The Middle East remains a complex amalgam of civil wars, sectarian strife, and a battlefield for regional and global rivalry overlaid by the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Often all these factors fuel each other. With the fall of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War (WW1), the British and the French divided much of the Middle East into their virtual territory/kingdoms, thus creating artificial borders and divisions. After the Second World War, these became part of the Cold War between the west and the Soviet Union. And into it was added the newly created state of Israel, with the US and its allies, turning it into it its political and security fortress as well as an advanced outpost in what was considered a volatile region. The imposition of Israel was resented and opposed by the Arabs and led to the 1948 War between the newly created state of Israel and a coalition of Arab states. The Arab coalition was defeated but the region was plunged into perpetual conflict, with Israel expanding its territory and control of Palestine, particularly after the 1967 Six–Day War between Israel and a coalition of Arab states with Israel coming out much stronger from this.

It put an end to the then Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser-led project to create a pan-Arab consciousness transcending national boundaries, of which opposition to the creation of Israel was a central element. There was another Arab-Israeli war in 1973. Despite some spectacular initial advances by Egypt, Israel finally prevailed. Not surprisingly, the US supported Israel in all sorts of ways. Eventually under considerable US persuasion/pressure, the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty was signed in 1979 with Cairo recognizing Israel. It was one of the great game changers in the region with Egypt, the largest and leading Arab country, virtually abandoning the Palestinian cause. Which caused great disappointment and anger for which Egypt’s then President, Anwar Sadat, paid with his life. His successor, Hosni Mubarak, was committed to keeping Egypt out of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel continued its policy of occupying and expanding its settlements, thus encircling what was left of Palestine, and following it up with military raids and attacks, as if to periodically demonstrate its military and political prowess. The Oslo Accords of 1993, which laid down a peace process for an eventual two states solution, didn’t work as Israel was never serious about a Palestinian state and did everything to sabotage the process.

This short history of the Palestinian issue is an important backdrop to understand the frustrations of the Arab people, also called the Arab street. The Arab street, in a sense, represented the volatility of the region. And it was sought to be tackled with the repressive regimes of dictators like Hosni Mubarak who, in turn, got all the necessary help from the United States and largely followed US regarding the primacy of Israeli interests by downgrading/ignoring the Palestinian question.

Another element of the Middle East conundrum was the region’s monarchies, with Saudi Arabia as the most important. Saudi Arabia was important because it was (and is) the largest producer of oil in the world, with the US becoming increasingly dependent on imports from that source, until only recently when its dependence is lessening. Being the largest producer of oil, Saudi Arabia also played an important role in setting the price of oil internationally. Saudi Arabia’s strategic importance couldn’t be over-emphasized. Indeed, Saudi Arabia also played a significant role in the Cold War by financing and arming Afghan Mujahedeen and Pakistan’s role in it which, in no small degree, contributed to the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.

And that in turn led to the rise of al Qaeda, with Afghanistan becoming the incubator of radical/extremist Islamic elements from all over the world. The 9/11 terrorist attacks followed, which led to the US-led invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. In all this progression, the repressive regimes of the Middle East, like that of Egypt and the Gulf monarchies, became even more important to the US. The popular frustration and anger with some of the autocratic Arab rulers burst out into the open with the Arab Spring, starting in Tunisia in 2011, which led to the fall of its dictator, Ben Ali. It also brought down Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, led to the overthrow of Libya’s dictator, Muammar Gaddafi, with military help from the west, and started a full-scale insurrection against Bashar-al-Assad regime in Syria. In Saudi Arabia, it led to serious protests in the Shia-majority oil-bearing eastern province, which were crushed brutally. For the rest of its Sunni citizens, the Saudi ruling dynasty bribed them into submission with even more financial goodies. And in Bahrain, where its majority Shia population rose in revolt against the ruling Sunni monarchy, the Saudis and some of its Gulf allies sent armed forces to crush the movement.

Apart from Tunisia where post-Arab Spring political order is still a fragile work in progress, everywhere else it is either chaos, as in Libya, or seemingly endless civil war as in Syria. In Egypt, another military dictator, almost a successor to Hosni Mubarak, has taken over, and the Abdel Fattah el-Sisi regime and Saudi monarchy are becoming blood brothers of sorts, which means a perpetuation of the decades’ old order responsible for the mess in the Middle East, in the first place, and the rise of Islamic terrorism. It is necessary to point out that Saudi Arabia’s patronage and championing of the Wahhabi brand of Islam has been the ideological foundation of both al Qaeda and Islamic State (IS).

With the collapse of the Arab Spring, the last hope of a possible political transition to secular liberal democracy has died down for the foreseeable future. Which, in turn, has further shifted the pendulum to Islamic extremism reflected in its even more severe form of Islamic State. And the resultant refugee crisis from the exodus of displaced and terrorized people from Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East toward Europe, where they are unwelcome and being pushed back, is only compounding the problem. Brutalized and terrorized at home and pushed back from refuge in Europe, some of them at least might fall for the IS’ message.   

 Note: This article first appeared in the Daily Times  

Terror in Belgium

S P SETH

Terror struck Belgium recently with more than 30 dead and many more injured. It had happened before in Paris, last November, with 130 fatalities. Both appear to have germinated in Brussels, with its ring leaders/suicide bombers able to plan and move around Belgian/French borders with ease. What has come out is that Molenbeek district in Brussels is a hotbed of Islamic radicalism. And it has been left to fester and grow because of fragmented governance in the country. For instance, Brussels alone is said to have six police departments and 19 mayors. Different intelligence agencies lack focus and intelligence sharing. Molenbeek district is a sort of no go area where police seemed to follow a laissez faire policy of not wanting to know or act whatever was going on. As a report said, “ [It has] Areas where there are close-knit groups of susceptible youth, often lacking a sense of purpose or belonging outside their own circle, have proved to generate a momentum of recruitment that spreads through personal contacts.”

While Molenbeek might be a more extreme case of such concentration of alienated Muslim youth, it seems a fairly representative picture in many European countries. The first generation of migrants simply worked to survive and build up some kind of a future. And they concentrated in ghettos and were largely left to themselves by the mainstream governing institutions. The second, and now into third generations, wanted something more by way of jobs, a vision for future, and above all acceptance. And on all these counts, they felt as outsiders and marginalized, with no real hope for the future. A good number of such youth took to crime by way of drug peddling, burglary and all sorts of criminal involvement. The rate of unemployment has been proportionately very high among Muslim youth in the west, and crime seemed one way of finding some occupation. With a name like Mohammad or Ahmed, breaking into the job market was hard going.

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the situation even got worse with racial and religious profiling. At the same time, al Qaeda imbued dissatisfied and alienated western Muslim youth with an ideological and political tool that made them feel empowered. And it also made intelligible in a simple and simplified sort of way-- with most of the onus on the west-- of the desperate situation of the Muslim youth and the Muslims in general. Which, by re-establishing and reviving the so-called caliphate and glorifying the Muslim past in the process, would be rectified. But the problem with al-Qaeda (and as we shall see with IS as well) is that the message of ‘empowerment’ and ‘hope’ is predicated on destroying the western system, culture, traditions and religion (Christianity). The message of 9/11 and the subsequent attacks on the west continue to be one of destruction and savagery.

Take the case of IS which prides itself on being an even ‘better’ killing machine than al Qaeda. Its spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, reportedly told its followers in an audio message in 2014: “If you can kill a disbelieving American or European, especially the spiteful and filthy French, or an Australian or a Canadian, or any other disbeliever, kill him in any manner or way however it may be.” And such killing doesn’t exclude Muslims, if they happen to be in the way and, worse still, if they are Shias and do not practice the IS version of Islam.

The IS arose out of the disastrous military intervention in Iraq, supposedly for Saddam Hussein’s alleged links with al Qaeda and his supposed weapons of mass destruction. Saddam was no angel. In fact he was a maniac and a monster but he was not inclined to be subverted by an ideology or cause that was not centred on him and his power machine. In that sense, he was an obstacle for any grand Islamic vision sponsored by the likes of al Qaeda. The prolonged tragedy in Iraq is now being played out, with even greater destruction, by a revived and expanded version of al Qaeda but with a new brand that has taken on the name of Islamic State (IS), and has managed to capture a fair chunk of territory in Iraq and Syria and declared itself a caliphate. In other words, they are pretending continuity with Islam’s glorious historical past and calling upon Muslims all over the world to rally around the ‘caliphate’ and do and die for it. And this ‘do and die’ call has meant expanding their domain and spreading terror.

And it worked as IS captured Mosul and made some significant gains in Syria, some of them now reversed. They were able to create a financial base for their new state through the illicit sale of oil, by taxing the population under its control and looting the treasury. In the process, IS managed to create an image of a ‘successful’ and ongoing enterprise, which further increased its appeal as committed to the cause of Islamic resurgence and revival it professed. This was happening at a time when al Qaeda increasingly looked marginalized with no territorial base. Not surprisingly, IS was able to attract marginalized Muslim youth in the west, especially with the skillful use of the Internet. And these alienated young people sought to channel their energy into an ‘ideal’ and a cause that seemed noble in a weird sort of way, especially as some of them were simply involved in crime like peddling drugs, burglary and the like and being in and out of jail. It didn’t seem all too hard to create terror and mayhem in Brussels, Paris and elsewhere when they were willing to die.

And if the Australian Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull, is right, the situation in Europe was (is) soft for such incidents of terror. According to Turnbull, “European governments are confronted by a perfect storm of failed or neglected integration, foreign fighters returning from Iraq and Syria, porous borders, and intelligence and security apparatus struggling to keep pace with the scope of the threat.” And he quotes Bernard Squarcini, a former head of France’s internal intelligence, who “described these factors in Belgium as creating a favourable ecosystem for an Islamist milieu.” 

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times.  

Russia and the Syrian situation

S P SETH

Russia’s surgical military intervention in the Syrian conflict by way of bombing rebel and terrorist targets, starting September 30, has bolstered up the Assad regime’s position, giving it an advantage in any kind of parleying for a political solution. Before the Russians intervened in a big way, the Assad regime was looking increasingly shaky losing territory to disparate rebel and jihadi groups, including IS. That situation has been reversed and Damascus has recovered fair bit of its lost territory, thanks to the Russian aerial bombing and support on the ground. Having retrieved and, possibly, reversed the military situation to the Assad regime’s advantage, Moscow suddenly announced, as suddenly as they had earlier started their military intervention in September, that it was curtailing and withdrawing bulk of its military activity having largely achieved its objectives against Islamic extremists and terrorists. But that this could easily be reinstated if the situation so warranted. Indeed, Russia continued to help the Assad regime to capture from the IS the historically and strategically important area of Palmyra, which has further bolstered its position.

It is interesting to note that the drawdown of Russian military activity coincided with the starting of the political process in Geneva for a possible political solution. Russia’s action seemed aimed at multiple constituencies in the Syrian conflict from the Assad regime to rebel/jihadi groups, their regional supporters like Saudi Arabia, as well as the US. Above all, it was meant to convey that Russia was a determining force in the Syrian situation intending to help the political process rather than hinder it. For instance, it seemed to convey that Russia was not simply there in Syria to support the Assad regime at any cost. It would be willing to support any viable alternative to stabilize the situation. But at the same time, it would not ditch the Assad regime to make things worse to the advantage of extremists and jihadists of varied persuasions.

Moscow’s determined intervention in Syria is not the result of any kind of idealism. It is part of its policy of bringing Russia back into a global role after the cavalier fashion in which its interests have been treated since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990s. The expansion of North Atlantic Treaty Organization right on to its borders created the crisis in Ukraine, where it supported and fostered the rebellion in eastern Ukraine, which is still unresolved. And that has brought on Moscow a sanctions regime from the US and its European allies. In the Middle East, Russia found itself sidelined largely until it dealt itself into a determining role by intervening in Syria and virtually changing the internal balance of power in favour of the Assad regime.

Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union Moscow still maintained military interests and ties following from the Soviet time by way of a naval base and other strategic interests. Moscow has also been trying to cultivate Egypt’s president/dictator Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, seeking to revive, in some ways, Soviet Union’s special ties with Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser, in power during the fifties and sixties. Putin’s Russia would like to have a broad-based Middle Eastern policy but has found its options rather limited as Saudi Arabia and its Gulf partners are US’ strategic allies and they would rather prefer Moscow to ditch Syria and Iran, where Russia has created strategic stakes.

As pointed out earlier, even though Moscow has scaled down its military involvement to facilitate a political solution, it is retaining the option to up scale it if necessary. And as things stand, the Geneva peace process is not making much headway. Syria’s opposition high negotiating committee’s emphasis remains on creating a transitional political regime minus Assad. Which would basically mean a political order opposed to the existing ruling system. In other words, it would mean installing some sort of a hybrid regime that is difficult to even figure out because of the disparate elements involved with varying ideological, sectarian and regional interests. And this is without even thinking how an alternative (to the Assad regime) political system will deal with the IS and other terrorist outfits that are excluded from any political solution, if a solution were possible at all.

Even as the so far non-existent political permutations and combinations are imagined, the Assad regime is not willing to sign off its death warrant, and what for in any case. There is no visible alternative, even more so now that the Assad regime has further consolidated its territorial control with considerable help from Russian intervention. In this situation, even though Moscow might be willing to entertain a political transition minus Bashar al-Assad, a viable and effective alternative is not around. The US and its regional allies would very much like Moscow to facilitate a Bashar al-Assad alternative but they don’t seem to have any clear alternative. And without that, it would simply be adding further to Syrian chaos and misery. In other words, with all the will in the world, there doesn’t seem, in the foreseeable future, any resolution of the Syrian situation.

The Assad regime is likely to hang around, but with continued help from Russia. As of now, having propped up the Assad regime, Moscow is in a strong position among international players. And that is so because its surgical military intervention has produced results on the ground to make the Assad regime a credible ---some might even say legitimate—stake holder. However, if Russia were to stay around long to prop up the regime, that might be counter-productive because, however strong and decisive it might appear, its economic situation is quite fragile.

It continues to face a comprehensive sanctions regime from the west over the situation in Ukraine, and its major source of revenue from oil and gas exports has been hit hard with falling international prices. And to carry with it the economic burden of military intervention in Syria for an extended period of time will simply make things worse. So far Putin’s popularity at home from action in Ukraine and intervention is Syria has been quite spectacular. But if the Syrian situation drags on, as it looks more likely, Russia could find itself into a quagmire. But so far it is playing its cards well and would hope that it all ends well. 

Note: this article was first published in the Daily Times.